**INFO ARTIKEL**

**Abstrak**

This study aims to analyze Indonesia and U.S. national interest and shared interest in the Strategic Partnership and to explain how Indonesia and the U.S. Strategic Partnership had operationally impacted the Bilateral Military Exercises with the case study of Joint Military Exercises Garuda Shield from 2016 – 2022. The authors scrutinize the understanding of the Operational Impact that conceptualizes the context of the analysis and uses the qualitative research approach through literature study and some interviews with government and military officials. The result shows that the national interest of both countries was influenced by domestic and international factors, resulting in a shared interest that was projected in the Indo – Pacific region. The Strategic Partnership acts as the medium for both states to reach these interests, one of which is by conducting bilateral military exercises. The U.S. – China rivalry has also driven Indonesia and the U.S. to interact in defense cooperation closer. This is important to see how foreign and defense policies are being implemented at an operational level.

**Keywords:**
National interest; strategic partnership; Indonesia-US; joint military exercises Garuda Shield.
INTRODUCTION

Indonesia and the U.S. have a shared interest in maintaining a rules-based international order. Besides cooperating on regional and transnational issues, China's increasingly aggressive behaviors also become concern for both countries. For Indonesia the reason for this concern is that Indonesia is very protective of its sovereignty and territory, and it sees China as the most likely threat to those things. The Natuna Islands, which are just outside China's "Nine-Dash Line" but have waters that reach into the area where China claims it has economic and political control. It seems to be the most likely place for a conflict to start shortly. At this point, Indonesia defends its sovereignty as strong as possible (Lin et al., 2020). The advancement of the Chinese military has brought a challenge to the regional stability of Southeast Asia; some incident with the Philippines and Vietnam has shown China's assertive behavior (Montolalu & Perwita, 2019).

In dealing with regional stability, both countries are needed to play a more decisive role by enhancing defense cooperation and military interaction. Indonesia and the U.S. defense cooperation was reshaped due to human rights issues in East Timor (Santa Cruz Tragedy 1991). The sequence of circumstances after that tragedy hampered both country's relations leading to the banned of several military training programs, including International Military and Education Training. In 2006, Washington took up the final restriction on security assistance. Thus, Indonesia and the U.S. have since reassumed their agenda on security cooperation, including military training and joint exercises. Of several joint exercises that carried out, the Joint Military Exercises Garuda Shield (GS) was firstly held in West Java in April 2007. GS is the first brigade-level army-to-army joint exercise between both country since 1997 (Weatherbee, 2007 on (Tellis & Wills, 2007)).

Exercise Garuda Shield 2007 is a sequence of command post-exercises held in Indonesia that focused on improving peace support and civil-military operations capabilities. This initiative is led by the common goal of Indonesia and the U.S. to maintain peace, security, and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. During that year, Garuda Shield was the latest and most prominent example of increasing U.S. – Indonesian military cooperation. At its inauguration, Garuda Shield was initially intended to be an annual bilateral exercise between Indonesia and the United States. However, Garuda Shield changed to a multilateral exercise in
peacekeeping operations in 2009, and 2010 as can be seen in Table 1, which was organized in conjunction with the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). Garuda Shield returned to being a bilateral exercise in 2011 after three years conducted as a multinational exercise (Wenas Inkiriwang, 2021). The fifth GS exercise covered three main activities: Field Training Exercise (FTX), Command Post Exercise (CPX), and Humanitarian Civic Action Project (Douglas C., 2011). In 2012, the Garuda Shield exercise focused on peacekeeping and stability operations and began covering disaster relief capabilities. Both armies also participate in engineering projects for the local community (Wenas Inkiriwang, 2021).

Garuda Shield was then continuously held every year without missing a single year. During this year, many developments in defense cooperation with the result of military training grew more significant. This is supported by a thriving trust between the two countries, especially in military-to-military cooperation. The fact that for decades, Indonesian and U.S. service members have worked together in many aspects of operations, in training and education, in military weapons, in joint exercises, in intensive and extensive exchanges of experts, and in high-level meetings between both country's defense officials (Garamone, 2022).

Table 1: The Summary of Garuda Shield Exercise in Indonesia with U.S. Army 2007 – 2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>ID Army</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Locus</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>ID Army/ Others</th>
<th>U.S. Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GS-1/2007</td>
<td>Infanteri Kostrad</td>
<td>Infanteri Kostrad</td>
<td>Markas Divisi I Cilodong Bogor</td>
<td>Aims to improve joint brigade-level staff officers' cooperation and coordination capabilities in support of the United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Operations</td>
<td>No Info</td>
<td>No Info, Estimation &lt;50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-2/2008</td>
<td>Kodam Jaya</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kodam Jaya, Jakarta</td>
<td>Enhancing the cooperation and coordination capabilities of joint Brigade level staff in supporting UN peace operations</td>
<td>No Info</td>
<td>No Info, Estimation &lt;50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-3/2009</td>
<td>Pussenif Students</td>
<td>Infanteri, Cipatat, West Java</td>
<td></td>
<td>Solidarity among participating countries in the framework of multinational unity effort and effectiveness in carrying out peace operations</td>
<td>1000 soldiers (Pussenif students) from 9 countries</td>
<td>No Info, Estimation &lt;50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-4/2010</td>
<td>Pussenif Students</td>
<td>Infanteri, Cipatat, West Java</td>
<td></td>
<td>Improve the ability and professionalism of the trainees following UN standards, increase interoperability and improve the relations between training participants countries</td>
<td>Nepal, Philippines, Thailand, Brunei Darussalam, Bangladesh, and Indonesia</td>
<td>No Info, Estimation &lt;50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-5/2011</td>
<td>Zipur TNI AD</td>
<td>Komando Pendidikan Kodiklat TNI AD in Pusdikzi, Bogor, West Java</td>
<td>The fifth Garuda Shield was returned to an annual bilateral exercise that focuses on (CPX), (FTX), and a humanitarian civic action project</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>No Info, Estimation &lt;50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-6/2012</td>
<td>Infanteri 2 Kostrad</td>
<td>Markus Divisi Infanteri 2 Kostrad in Singosari, Malang, East Java</td>
<td>Strengthening both armies' capacity for disaster relief and peacekeeping missions</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>104</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-7/2013</td>
<td>Infanteri 1 Kostrad</td>
<td>Divisi Infanteri 1 Kostrad Cilodong</td>
<td>This exercise contributed to achieving U.S. and Indonesia Security objectives by improving the overall stability of the Pacific region while focusing on international peace support operations</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>312</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-8/2014</td>
<td>Infanteri Kostrad</td>
<td>Dodiklatpur Rindam V/BRW Asem Bagus, Situbondo and Pusat Latihan Tempur Marinir</td>
<td>To increase soldiering professionalism and interoperability among the participant, including the Confidence Building Measure</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>103</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-9/2015</td>
<td>Infanteri Kostrad</td>
<td>Daerah Latihan Kostrad, Gunung Sentul, Cibenda, Sukabumi</td>
<td>Focused on peacekeeping operations training materials using CPX, FTX with patrol materials in the framework of peacekeeping operations</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>450</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-10/2016</td>
<td>Infanteri Kostrad</td>
<td>Asembagus, Situbondo, East Java</td>
<td>The Commander of the U.S. Army for the Hawaii Region said that Indonesia is an important partner country that continues to develop its role as a regional leader</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>345</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-11/2017</td>
<td>Divisi Infanteri 1 Kostrad</td>
<td>Daerah Latihan Kostrad, Gunung Sentul, Cibenda, Sukabumi</td>
<td>Develop both countries' bilateral partnership and strengthens the Indonesian capacity as a regional leader and increasingly important global actor</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>342</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-12/2018</td>
<td>Brigif Raider 9 Kostrad</td>
<td>Asembagus, Situbondo, East Java</td>
<td>The overall training includes the material Command Post Exercise (CPX - Post Rehearsal)</td>
<td>100 - 176</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-12/2019</td>
<td>Divisi Infanteri 2 Kostrad</td>
<td>Didiklatpur Kodam V/Brw, Asem Bagus, Situbondo, East Java</td>
<td>Training for brigade staff, field exercises, aviation and medical exercises, and joint firing exercises</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>700</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-15/2021</td>
<td>Divisi Infanteri 1 Kostrad</td>
<td>Puslatpur Kodiklatad in Baturaja, Daerah Latihan Amborawang in Balikpapan and Makalisung in Manado</td>
<td>Evolved by being more focus to the threat perception in the region. It advanced cooperation in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific region and deters adversaries</td>
<td>2161</td>
<td>1547</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adopted by author from (Bakrie, 2021)

This process has heightened the level of military training, including Garuda Shield, especially at the operational level. For example, besides the increment of personnel
involved during the annual training, significant operational changes happened in 2021, when the training was held outside Java Island for the first time. This allows the Indonesian military to absorb as many possible approaches and strategies from the U.S. military in support of the capacity-building and confidence-building measures. Even though not to mention that the U.S. also needs this experience to train their soldier in an environment that may vary from their usual training grounds. The most recent “Super” Garuda Shield, or the 16th annual Garuda Shield exercise, was held in August 2022. This event expands from a bilateral training exercise between Indonesia, and the U.S. Army is now one of the most extensive joints, multinational exercises in the Indo–Pacific region.

As a strategic partner, the defense cooperation commitment between Indonesia and the U.S. is stated in the Framework Arrangement on Cooperative Activities in the field of Defence between the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia and the Department of Defense of the United States of America. This framework is from Indonesia–U.S. Comprehensive Partnership, established in 2010. As mentioned in Indonesia Defense White Paper 2014, the areas of cooperation developed include: dialogue and bilateral consultation on security issues that become mutual attention; developing the human resources in the defense institution and armed forces of both countries through education and training, capacity building project on maritime security; as well as the logistic and military supply cooperation (Kementerian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, 2014). As a successful result of the Comprehensive Partnership, during President Joko Widodo's visit to the United States to meet President Obama in 2015. Both leaders upgraded their countries' partnership to a Strategic Partnership to expand cooperation on shared strategic interests. This partnership allows them to work together on issues of both regional and global significance (The White House, 2015).

In the same year, the Framework Arrangement on Cooperative Activities in the field of Defense was signed in 2010, enhanced by a Joint Statement on Comprehensive Defense Cooperation in October 2015.

In general, the improvements in the total of participants in the Garuda Shield from 2016 to 2022, as shown in the Table 1, indirectly shows that the Strategic Partnership and the Joint Statements on
Comprehensive Defense Cooperation have leveraged the space for defense cooperation between Indonesia and the U.S. The Strategic Partnership can play a more decisive role in Confidence Building Measures between the two countries and increase the confidence of Indonesia and the U.S. armed forces. It also prevails for their defense department to allow such events through a defense diplomacy approach to pursue national interest and foreign policy objectives. This is in line with the statement of K. A. Muthanna; defense diplomacy can help distant country-specific foreign policy objectives by managing defense foreign relations and supporting the other diplomatic initiative of the government (Muthanna, 2011). The transformation of bilateral military exercises Garuda Shield from an army-to-army exercise to a multilateral military exercise that is now involving not only the army but also the air force and navy, of course, cannot be separated from the defense diplomacy effort. It is developed based on the national and mutual interests of both countries in the years that have passed and the forthcoming years. The author argues that the Strategic Partnership is used as a tool for both countries in contemplating defense diplomacy, which can be seen in the joint military exercises Garuda Shield. This effort can be articulated as a Capacity Building Measure and Confidence Building Measure for both countries based on their national interest.

**ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK**

*Concepting the Operational Impact*

**Figure 1: Levels of Warfare**

Source: (Harvey, 2021)

Pertinent to visualize the operational impacts, (Morissan, 2008) emphasizes two types of plans: strategic plan and operational plan. A strategic plan is a plan or design to meet the organization's broader goals for implementing the mission that provides the organization's unique grounds for existence. There is the ability to think strategically in the plan, including the act of estimating or building the desired future goals. The operational plan is a more detailed description of achieving the strategic plan. This more detailed description establishes a fixed plan with standardized approaches for handling recurring situations (Morissan, 2008).
Figure 1 shows the three levels of warfare—strategic, operational, and tactical—link tactical actions to achieve national objectives. There are no finite limits or boundaries between these levels; it creates to help commanders and leaders to design and synchronize operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to the appropriate command. The purpose of the three levels of warfare depends on the nature of the objective, mission, or task. This figure shows the levels of war as a distinct hierarchy with marginally overlapping areas between the strategic and the operational and between the tactical and the operational. Under hierarchical order, there is no overlap between the tactical and the strategic (Harvey, 2021).

The author clarifies that the operational meaning assessed in this research relates to its position in the level of warfare. Though, in its establishment, the Joint Military Exercises Garuda Shield focuses on Peace Support Operations and Civil-Military Operations and currently varies into jungle warfare capabilities of both militaries and the military operations other than war that is composed in the form of military training.

In military theory, the operational level of war represents the level of command that connects the details of the tactics with the strategy's goals. The operational level of war sits between tactics, which consists of organizing and employing fighting forces on or near the battlefield, and strategy, which involves aspects of long-term and high-level theatre operations, and the government's leadership (Simpkin, 1987).

“Through the ground, sea, and air, the tactical training activities focus on the operational and strategic challenges facing our country and region,”

“This exercise goes beyond tactical interoperability. It is about partnership, our hosts--our friends recognized the opportunity to conduct training and took every precaution to ensure the health of both forces.” - Gen. Charles A. Flynn, commanding general of U.S. Army Pacific (ODonnell, 2021).

Therefore, the Oxford English dictionary gives two definitions of the word impact: ‘the action of one object coming forcibly into contact with another’ and ‘a marked effect or influence’ (YouMatter, 2021). This term is used in showing that there is a change happened in the object of the research, which is the case study. On the conclusion of these two terms, the author
then limits the discussion to how the strategic level (agreed upon in the Strategic Partnership between Indonesia and the U.S.) influences the operational level in the case of Joint Military Exercises Garuda Shield.

РЕСЕАРЧ МЕТОД

The research method used in this thesis is the qualitative research method. It is expected to give a wider meaning to the phenomena observed by interpretation. The author uses a case study design, by considering the approach's focus is on developing an in-depth description and analysis of a case or multiple cases (Creswell & Poth, 2018). By considering the research method and design, the author decided to use the data collection method through interview and literature study techniques that is expected to have a high-quality of research (Ahmad, 2021).

РЕЗУЛЬТАТЫ И СОБЫТИЯ

RESULT
Indonesia - U.S. Bilateral Relations: The National Interest of Both States

President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo signed Presidential Regulation Number 8 of 2021 on the 2020-2024 General Policy of National Defense. The Presidential Regulation was issued based on a consideration that Presidential Decree Number 97 of 2015 on the 2015-2019 General Policy of National Defense is no longer suitable for the general policy of national defense for the 2020-2024 term (Presidential Regulation, 2021). As the fundamental conception of the General Policy of National Defense, this Presidential Regulation further defines the national interest as:

“An effort to secure the integrity of the National territory, secure economic resources, and protect the safety of citizens carried out with national defense efforts that are managed systematically through the national defense system as one of the government's functions in the defense sector” (Presidential Regulation, 2021).

On the U.S. side, President Barrack Obama reportedly signed Presidential Policy Directive 20, which specified the principles and processes of cyber operations. The national interest of this era is written as follows:

“Matters of vital interest to the United States to include national security, public safety, national economic security, the safe and reliable
functioning of “critical infrastructure”, and the availability of “key resources” (Newsome & Jarmon, 2016).

The National Interest of Indonesia and the U.S. mostly tends to lay its focus on its domestic resources as it stated to “secure” or “security”. In order to promotes the National Interest abroad, foreign policy comes as a strategy or approach chosen by the national government to pursue its goals in its relations with external entities. To see the most realistic view in the shared interest of both countries, it will be reasonable to drive the focus on the Indo – Pacific region. When talking about this region, in the perception of the U.S., the discourse of China rising will be the number one issue to be carried about. To manage China's rise as a strategic rival to the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, the DoD's 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizes the significance of cooperating with regional allies and partners (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018).

The U.S. sees Indonesia as one of the important partners in dealing with this effort. China's desires for regional dominance and willingness to trample on international standards in pursuit of these desires are a source of significant concern for both the United States and Indonesia. However, both nations would favour a strategy that coaxes China into abiding by international standards over one based on military confrontation. Nevertheless, the U.S. should remember when Indonesia may prefer more nuanced terminology; it should refrain from taking any steps that Indonesia may view as an attempt to compel it into a de facto alliance. For example, pressing for high-profile promotion of security cooperation. This is related to Indonesia's deep-seated desire for a nonalignment country.

The Establishment of the Strategic Partnership: From Comprehensive to Strategic

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono first initiated this Comprehensive Partnership in his speech at the United States Indonesia Society (USINDO) event in 2008 in Washington, DC. He sees that cooperation with the administration of President George W. Bush has provided a huge impetus in the development of bilateral relations between Indonesia and the United States. Obama's election as president could also have a powerful impact on the relationship between the people of the two countries. Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono said that Indonesia had collaborated in the form of strategic partnerships with several countries, which reflected a change in Indonesia's strategic environment from million friends and zero enemies to an all-direction foreign policy (USINDO, 2010). The Comprehensive Partnership between Indonesia and the United States in 2010 produced an action plan explaining the main areas of cooperation between the two countries. The action plan is a desire of the two countries to carry out long-term cooperative relations. The action plan consists of 54 items categorized into three classifications. Twelve points of political and security cooperation, twenty-seven items of economic and development cooperation and as many as fifteen items of socio-cultural cooperation, education, science and technology, and other fields of work (Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 2010).

In the same year, as a product of this Comprehensive Partnership, Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia and Department of Defense of the United States of America sign a Framework Arrangement on Cooperative Activities in the Field of Defense (Point 5 of the Political and Security cooperation Action Plan). The objective is to integrate already existing cooperative activities in the field of defense. The principle of this cooperation is mutual respect, trust, and mutual benefit, in areas of security dialogue, education and training, the defense industry, procurement of military equipment, maritime security, and other mutually agreed areas of cooperation.

Five years later, when President Widodo visited the United States in October 2015 at the request of President Barack Obama at the White House. In order to meet evolving challenges and capitalize on emerging opportunities, the two Presidents recognized the need to enhance the U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership and continue deepening the relationship based on mutual benefit and respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In this spirit, the two Presidents committed to forge a Strategic Partnership between two countries, to expand cooperation on shared strategic interests (The White House, 2015). There are six areas of cooperation in this partnership, such as: Maritime Cooperation; Defense Cooperation; Economic Growth and Development; Energy Cooperation; Increasing Cooperation on Global and Regional Issues; and People to People Contacts. Following to this heightened level of partnership, as a result in the field of Defense Cooperation. Indonesia and the U.S. signed a Joint Statement for Comprehensive
Defense Cooperation between the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia and the Department of Defense of the United States of America in the same year where the Strategic Partnership established. The purpose of the document is to provide facilities to promote and enhance Comprehensive Defense Cooperation between Participants with the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and full respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity to fulfill the national interests of both Participants.

In accordance with the national laws and regulations of each country, the Participants agree to promote Cooperation in the following activities: (a) Maritime Cooperation (b). Defense Procurement and Joint Research and Development, (c) Professionalism, (d.) Operational Cooperation and Peacekeeping Training, (e) Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Management, (f) Handling of Transnational Threats (Kementerian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, 2015). Point d highlights the Operational Cooperation and Peacekeeping Training, where one of the implementations can be found in the annual Joint Military Exercise Garuda Shield that has been done since 2007. By agreeing to promote cooperation in the training, the result is expected to bring operational improvement in conducting it. The purpose of the joint statement is to provide the facilities necessary to develop the training to be more strategic to fulfill the national interest of both participants.

The Joint Military Exercises (JME) Garuda Shield

At the beginning of the establishment, Garuda Shield Exercises were conducted for carried out a world peace mission that aimed to improve the participant to have capabilities for UN Peacekeeping Operations (Puspen TNI, 2007). One of the activities is a simulation for carrying out peace aid tasks in conflict areas within the framework of military operations other than war (MOOTW) (Puspen TNI, 2008). Due to the primary mission being peacekeeping, in 2009, the exercise was conducted along with the GPOI (Global Peace Operations Initiative) as the U.S. program projected in Asia – Pacific was conducted multilaterally with other participating countries. It was last two times and returned to a bilateral exercise in 2011 that focused on a humanitarian civic action project. Both Indonesia and the U.S. army are involved in helping local communities to build houses and public
facilities. However, the other team of troops also conducts command post exercise (CPX), a field training exercise (FTX) for promoting regional peace and security. In the next annual exercise, another area that was trained included capacity building for disaster relief and peacekeeping missions. During this period, from the government level, both countries established a plan of action under the signatory of Comprehensive Partnership that focused on defense and security cooperation, one of which stated that both countries become partners in maintaining regional and international peace and security in Southeast Asia and beyond. Though this is the only plan of action, the activities that are carried out are still on the United Nations (U.N.) scenario and a field-training exercise based on a rescue operation scenario. Nevertheless, the U.S. counterparts also claimed that this exercise contributed to achieving U.S. and Indonesia Security objectives by improving the overall stability of the Pacific region while focusing on international peace support operations (Lombardo, 2013).

Establishing Strategic Partnership has given room for improvement in every cooperation Indonesia and the U.S. have. Difference from the Comprehensive Partnership, whose objective is limited to deepening and elevating bilateral relations between the U.S. and Indonesia. The era of no partnership established with the Comprehensive Partnership signatory can be described as a situation where the two countries are ready to repair the bilateral relations. The Partnership was limited to “Framework Arrangement” during that period, especially in defense and security cooperation. Creating the Strategic Partnership in 2015 shows the seriousness of the two countries' repair, which should be evaluated as momentum to Strengthening a Long-Term Partnership. Strengthening means enhancement and enhancement will lead to improvements.

The author analyzes that the Joint Military Exercises Garuda Shield from 2016 – 2022 shows that both countries are walking into more strategic cooperation and not only conduct it as a mandate by the U.N. It is in line with the objectives of the Strategic Partnership to become an avenue to address more strategic issues at the highest level. It will create opportunities to deepen Indonesia and the U.S. joint contribution and collaboration on bilateral, regional, and global issues. The author intentionally separates the overview into two; Joint Military Exercises Garuda Shield 2007 – 2015 as the era where no partnership has been
The Operational Impacts of the U.S.-Indonesia Strategic Partnership
On the Joint Military Exercises Garuda Shield

Reynaldo Rudy Kristian Montolalu, Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, Sudibyo

created to establish a Comprehensive Partnership, and Joint Military Exercises Garuda Shield 2016 – 2022 by considering the Strategic Partnership found at the end of 2015. Thus, ideally, the best year to start is 2016. Even though the process from the government that works with the foreign policy (which creates the partnership) constitutes quite a long journey to tell at the operational level (which directly deals with the joint military exercises), it might not influence the first year that fast. Any operational thing will be discussed in forums like The Indonesia – United States Security Dialogue (IUSSD) and United States – Indonesia Bilateral Defense Discussion (USIBDD). Though the partnership mandates this forum to produce programs that can improve the strategic cooperation between two countries, including in bilateral military exercises.

To start with, during Garuda Shield 2016, the U.S. stated that Indonesia was an important partner in developing its role as a regional leader. In 2017 it also noted the exercise too helped further develop both countries' bilateral partnerships and strengthened the Indonesian capacity as a regional leader and increasingly important global actor. The situation will be different if Indonesia is not considered as important at this point. Not without any reason, but the same as U.S. allies, partners are also chosen. The U.S. army wants to have capable, interoperable forces throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific region foster peace and stability that benefits U.S. interests and its partners (U.S. Army Pacific, 2017).

In the increment level of partnership, the U.S. trusted Indonesia can help them for interoperability in the region. Thus, increment level of participants can be tracked significantly from 2017, where the training includes early entry aviation subject matter expert exchange (SMEE) and unmanned aerial surveillance SMEE. There were also aviation live fire exercises (Surface and Littoral), a command post exercise, an infantry company field training exercise (FTX), and a live fire exercise (LFX). The kind of training becomes more varied, especially in 2019. Garuda Shield is included in the U.S. Pacific Pathways program, the same program the U.S. encountered with its influence allies and partners in the region. Even though the Covid-19 spread in 2020 does not limit both armies to online training, GS 2020 conducts Commander and Staff Relations procedure or the PPKT (Tactical

GS 2021 was the most varied among the annual Joint Military Exercises. It marks the first time the bilateral military training between Indonesia and the U.S. was conducted outside Java Island. Garuda Shield 2021 is taking place in 3 locations in Indonesia, such as Baturaja, South Sumatera; Amborawang – Balikpapan, East Kalimantan; and Makalisung – Manado, North Sulawesi (Puspen TNI, 2021).

This occasion was also the first time for the U.S. Army Pacific to deploy The Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center in the region. This occasion also sends a message that there is an increment level of trust rooted in the enhancement level of partnership. Letting other countries’ military trains in several different locations is something special and should not be available to any country. The training also evolved by being more focus to the threat perception in the region.

The U.S. perceived the training as the continued face-to-face interactions with Allies and partners not only solidified the U.S.-Indonesia Major Defense Partnership, but it also advanced cooperation in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific region and deters our adversaries (O’Donnell, 2021).

Many experts argue that it is a signal to China, in its correlation with the South China issue, that Indonesia has support from the U.S. even though Indonesia never claimed such a statement as the host country. Not to mention, another breakthrough happened in 2022, which in fact, involved more than 4000 combined forces as it is also inviting navy and air forces to contribute.

As the general overview, the author needs to dig for more information to have a clear perception of this level of increment, especially on the operational side, thus data are collected and presented in the next section.

The National Interest and Shared Interests of Indonesia and the U.S. in the Strategic Partnership

The increment in cooperation status was based on the desire of the two countries to strengthen bilateral cooperation and increase strategic cooperation at the regional level and other global issues. The Strategic Partnership is built on the shared values of democracy, pluralism (Harkomoyo, 2023), tolerance, the rule of law, equality, mutual respect, and benefit. This Strategic Partnership is aimed at creating a true partnership. The “true partnership” indicates that before, both countries did not
strategically meet their mutual interest. The term true partnership also points out that all the bilateral problem that happened in the past should be replaced with a stable and sustained relationship based on the reciprocity principle.

In the security and defense sector, problems in the past mark the unharmonious defense cooperation through the military embargo from the U.S. to Indonesia. The author interpreted the national interest of Indonesia and the U.S. in the Table 2 and Table 3, as follow:

**Table 2: Indonesia National Interest in the Strategic Partnership**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic Environment</th>
<th>International Environment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building - The need to strengthen the capacity of its resources, in this case, the Indonesia Armed Forces (TNI).</td>
<td>Sense of belonging to support the regional stability for the sake of its territorial integrity and sovereignty.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Processed by the author, 2023

**Table 3: U.S National Interest in the Strategic Partnership**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic Environment</th>
<th>International Environment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building – To train U.S. forces in an environment where they are most likely expected to operate with their partner (primarily when it binds under Strategic Partnership). Combat credible force multi-domain capabilities into the Indo–Pacific region to build tactical operational and strategic readiness forager enables them to experiment with new capabilities.</td>
<td>A vision to achieve a better future of a free, open, secure, and prosperous world: (through) military presence. To show U.S. adversaries that they together could defeat any military challenge.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Processed by the author, 2023

The shared interest is the mutual desire to be achieved by Indonesia and the U.S. by conducting the Joint Military Exercises Garuda Shield. Not to mention when the Strategic Partnership enhanced the space of cooperation between the two countries in conducting such activities.

In the domestic environment, both countries have similar interests in capacity building. Nevertheless, it is initiated to strengthen the capability of their resources and not to a single case that, hand in hand,
wants to achieve both countries. Thus, as break downed in Table 4, the shared interest can be drawn as to optimize opportunities and safeguard regional challenges. The opportunities may refer to the capacity-building, where at the same time also enhanced the confidence-building measures of the two countries, whereas safeguarding regional challenges is the effort to keep regional stability. The stability in the region is on the interest of both countries on the scope of international environment. The external factor or international environment is determinant in the national interest and foreign policy as it includes regional dynamics, patterns of relations with friendly countries, involvement in various international organizations and regimes, and opinions from the international community. It means the international environment influences the national interest considering the need of every country to evaluate their strategic environment and realize the need to cooperate with other countries to maintain it. The Bilateral Military Exercise, or in this case Joint Military Exercise Garuda Shield, is indicated to have a political-strategic component or an operational goal that Heuser and Palmer's substitute consists of reassurance of friends and allies, exercises in support of defense reform and standardization, exercises as a tool of diplomacy, deterrence of potential adversaries, preparation of wartime operations whether it is defense or offensive (Heuser & Palmer, 2018).

**The Operational Impacts of the Strategic Partnership on the Joint Military Exercises Garuda Shield from 2016 – 2022**

The author summarizes several actual parameters to see the pattern that can be quantified and qualify the execution of the Joint Military Exercise from 2007 to 2022 to see the operational impact has been given by the partnership in the joint exercises. Those aspects include the number of personnel involved, training location, and the duration of the exercises.

**Figure 2: Garuda Shield Exercises 2007 - 2022 Total Participant**

![Garuda Shield Exercises 2007 - 2022 Total Participant](image)

Source: Processed by the author, 2023

The number of personnel involved in Garuda Shield Exercises yearly is increasing,
whether from Indonesia or the U.S. side. In the Figure 2 above, the pattern shows an increment from the beginning of its establishment, excluding 2009 and 2010, where no exact data was founds since it was conducted multilaterally along with the Global Peace Operation Initiative (GPOI). The number of personnel increased in 2015, and the following year also marked the implementation of the Indonesia-U.S. Strategic Partnership that also focuses on enhancing bilateral defence cooperation.

However, the exercise had a drastic reduction in 2018 since it was considered the third exercise in USARPAC’s second iteration of Pacific Pathways, a series of multinational engagements with ally and partner militaries in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, Garuda Shield 2018 also marks the first time an Army National Guard unit is participating in the series as the lead training element that will conduct a joint staff exercise with the Indonesian army (Howell, 2018).

The number of personnel deployed for the exercises increased in 2019. Looking back to the agreement, each country established a Joint Statement between the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia and the Department of Defense of the United States of America. It is projected to reaffirm the sound mechanism and agreements outlined in the 2010 Framework Arrangement on Cooperative Activities in the Field of Defense and the 2015 Joint Statement on Comprehensive Defense Cooperation. Both countries strongly desire to continue strengthening the defense partnership to address regional and global challenges. On that year, the U.S. planned to bolster its presence in the Pacific theatre. Thousands more soldiers planned to be deployed to the Pacific to increase the Army footprint for ongoing rotations. The new deployments could include 5,000 to 10,000 troops, the equivalent of a division headquarters and several brigades. This is the latest phase of the U.S. Pacific Pathway Program (South, 2019). With partnerships and Army unit rotations in the region, the USARPAC has sustained about three-unit cycles a year since the start of the Pacific Pathways program in 2014. It sent soldiers hopping across many countries for various exercises and training events (South, 2018).

How it has impacted Indonesia and the Garuda Shield exercises are that the new Pacific Pathways effort allows units to build stronger partnerships and readiness. It is where the program will place units in partner
nations for up to six months at a time, much longer than the previous weeks-long exercises. The U.S. army maps the extended presence of units in the theatre to provide the Indo-Pacific Command commander options for contingencies, such as humanitarian assistance or conflict (Kimmons, 2019). Indonesia's status as its Strategic Partnership is automatically given space for the U.S. to conduct a more strategic engagement through military training in Indonesia's strategic area. In the upcoming years, there were changes to the Pacific Pathways program to utilize the Pathways to compete with rivals in the Indo-Pacific area by spending extended periods in priority nations to build deeper relationships. The Pathways forces will also be able to provide options to the INDOPACOM commander to assist partner nations in times of need or, if needed, the transition from competition to conflict (South, 2018) Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, Garuda Shield 2020 was conducted online, focusing only on MDMP (Military Decision-Making Process).

There are no specific data on how many personnel are involved in these exercises. In 2021 when the pandemic case decreased, the exercise was back to normal. The number of personnel involved in Garuda Shield 2021 increased significantly by 135% from Garuda Shield 2019. This also marks the deployment of training personnel in three strategic locations in Indonesia: Baturaja, South Sumatera; Amborawang – Balikpapan, East Kalimantan; and Makalisung – Manado, North Sulawesi as shown in the Figure 3.

During that year, the Army Pacific supported Exercise Garuda Shield by deploying the training centre’s exportable capability to Indonesia, one of many Indo-Pacific nations partnering with the U.S. to build their training centres. Across its three training platforms, the training centre enables units to learn to train and fight, generating tactical readiness in conditions that mirror the broader Indo-Pacific region (Flynn, 2022).

Figure 3: Garuda Shield Exercises 2007 - 2022
Training Location

Source: Processed by the author, 2023

The increment continued. The recent exercises, as super as it named Super Garuda
Shield 2022, made a new record with more than 4000 Indonesia – U.S. involved personnel, which involved not only the army but also the navy and air force. In addition, the participation of several countries as participants and observers resulted in a broader scope of cooperation. Years before the execution of Garuda Shield 2022, the U.S. initially considered the Indo-Pacific region as a ground zero for developing the U.S. Army’s Multi-Domain Operations, or MDO, concept, which is meant to serve as its capstone war-fighting doctrine in the years to come (Judson, 2018). Army’s Multi-Domain Operations Task Force is a concept quickly becoming doctrine that aims to hit domains beyond the traditional sea, air and land, adding cyber, space and electronic warfare spectrums. Each new Pathways mission will have an MDO focus, looking at how the Army units work alongside their partners in various domains.

Figure 4 shows the current average of the training duration, although that does not rule out the possibility for the program to place units in partner nations, like Indonesia, longer.

Figure 4: Garuda Shield Exercises 2007 - 2022 Duration of Training

Working with a partner like Indonesia is one of the implementations of the U.S. interest in the Indo – Pacific. Indonesia’s strategic area, which covers mainly the ocean (bordered by the Pacific and Indian Oceans), attracted the U.S. attention to add more varied training by also involving the navy and the air force. However, the increment in the joint military exercise's operational level also influences the need for a larger budget. Even though the U.S. Indo – Pacific Command and several government publications stated that the regularly-scheduled bilateral exercise sponsored by U.S. Army Pacific (Erickson, 2014), Indonesia is also obligated to fund other operational costs arising from the implementation of these activities. Due to limitations, the author does not have the opportunity to see the breakdown of how the funds are utilized, which in some cases must be classified. Nevertheless, as confirmed
with one of the Indonesia Ministry of Defense Officials affirms that Indonesia also has such a funding scheme for conducting the activities (i.e., additional allowance for the personnel during their involvement in the joint training) (Achmadi, 2023). Seeing that the amount of personnel is increasing year by year means the cost is supposedly expanded. On the other hand, the term “sponsored by the U.S.” limits the latitude for the Indonesian army to be fully independent in deciding the operational level of the exercise. For example, when this exercise became multinational in 2022, the list of participating countries was also needed to get through the U.S. approvals. The basic skeleton of the training as bilateral exercises also gives limitations that regardless the exercise transformed into a multilateral exercise, the U.S. is maintaining their literal objective along with its national interest. Compared to other similar training like the Komodo exercise, which organizes by Indonesia, which Indonesia may freely control. That will be no problem if there are countries raise a protest because Indonesia is considered the host and the organizer.

**DISCUSSION**

In the document, the U.S. published titled Indo – Pacific Strategy of the United – States. It states Indo – Pacific nations are helping to define the very nature of the international order, and U.S. allies and partners worldwide have a stake in its outcomes. Beyond individual countries’ borders, the United States will also work closely with like-minded partners to ensure that the region remains open and accessible, and that the region’s seas and skies are governed and used according to international law. U.S. will build support for rules-based approaches to the maritime domain, including in the South China Sea and the East China Sea (The White House, 2022). The U.S. clearly stated that binding special relations with specific countries could help them cooperate and be accessible. On the other hand, it shows that the U.S. is safeguarding their hegemony. Only some countries that get particular attention, but primarily allies and partners, are woven based on their regional significance. In this case, Indonesia presents an excellent opportunity based on its geopolitical condition and prestige as the most influential nation in ASEAN. The U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) 2018 National Defense Strategy highlights the critical role that U.S. allies and partners play in U.S. - China strategic competition. America’s strong and enduring relationships with its allies and
partners offer the United States distinct advantages in long-term competition with China (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018). The United States is not competing with China but can draw from allied and partner resources, capabilities, and strengths far exceeding what China can bring to bear. As the U.S. Department of Defense focuses on long-term strategic competition with China, understanding how U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region are responding and adjusting their approaches to China will be crucial to ensuring the success of U.S. strategy.

To keep the support of its allies and partners, the U.S. is preparing to maintain its influence in an area where its position is very far (if comparing the U.S. mainland to the South China Sea, for example). One of that is by approaching its non-allies’ countries like Indonesia with a softer way of special bilateral relations, where they called it a partner country. The U.S. understands how sensitive Indonesia is to be stepping up its stance in a particular country, especially in joining an alliance. Considering this pattern of interaction, the author determines that the U.S. – China rivalry in the Indo – Pacific have influenced the tension of cooperation with the U.S. allies and partner in the region. This rivalry is not only limited to defense but also other aspects, including politics, economy, and culture. Thus, for Indonesia, the Partnership in 2010 and 2015 (and several agreements after that) was built to maintain the status quo with trusted countries to give a sense of getting more open cooperation in aspects they perceived could accommodate the countries' mutual interest. In the security and defense sector, one of the best options for the U.S. to win the heart and minds of its allies and partner is to have a military presence. If countries want to avoid tightening themselves under an alliance, then to convince them whether they side with us is to carry on military-to-military engagements. Regarding it, the U.S., through USARPAC, was prepared the strategic approach under the Pacific Pathways program. It is a program run by the United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) and carried out by I Corps to expand the Army's engagement in the Pacific region and reduce costs. It involves linking multiple military exercises together to create a "Pathway." General Vincent K. Brooks first started the program concept in 2014. Previous Pathways have included exercises in Australia, Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Palau, the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, and the United States.
Indonesia is included in this program, considering the deepened security cooperation between both countries. The two militaries conduct more than 240 military engagements annually, including efforts to intensify maritime security cooperation and combat terrorism (Marshall, 2014).

For Indonesia, the peaceful use of the military as a tool of national diplomacy led to the use of the term 'military diplomacy'. Through decades, Indonesia has been exposed to U.S. military doctrines. Many defense and military programs have been carried out between the two nations, including education and defense procurement. Indonesia uses this opportunity as capacity building to enhance the professionalism of its armed forces. Thus, as a tool of national foreign policy and defense policy effort, Indonesia uses defense diplomacy with the U.S. under the integrated shared interest, especially in the region. Related to China's assertiveness in the South China Sea, General Andika Perkasa emphasized that operations to defend Indonesia's sovereignty and maintain security in the North Natuna Sea, located near the disputed South China Sea, will continue – with or without the help of other countries. However, the Strategic Partnership will be utilized to share information and evaluate the operations in the region (Yoga, 2022).

Over the years, Indonesia has conducted joint exercises with the United States, including the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) between the Indonesian Navy and the US Navy, the Bomber Exercise between the Indonesian Air Forces and the US Navy, and the Garuda Shield involving the Armies of both countries. Seeing the development of the Garuda Shield, the author focuses on the Garuda Shield as the case study examining the operational impacts of the Strategic Partnership on that military exercise. As explained in the previous part, the Strategic Partnership becomes the avenue to address more strategic issues at the highest level. It creates opportunities to deepen Indonesia and the U.S. joint contribution and collaboration on bilateral, regional, and global issues. Under the Strategic Partnership, the joint exercises are not only limited to the peacekeeping operation and humanitarian and disaster relief but also to the issues that may harm the international law and stability of the region. The increment in the size, location, and duration (mostly stagnant) gives a signal that year to year, the exercises are adequate to safeguard the national interest of each nation, whether it is to maintain the
professionalism of its armed forces and for regional stability.

Figure 5: Policy Level

![Policy Level Diagram]

Source: Processed by the author, 2023

Figure 5 shows, policymakers bind the bilateral relations between countries under an agreement and joint statements. Though, the policymakers do not directly decide the operational implementation execute in the Garuda Shield. The Ministry of Defense, which performs the government function in the defense sector, only manages at the policy level. Thus, the implementation is performed by the TNI headquarters and operationally by every force Indonesia has (Sambaouw, 2023).

Although, the next question should ask, do the joint exercise have advantage for both side? Academics have highlighted the question of whether the operational impacts of the partnership run by the reciprocal principle. Connie Rahakundini Bakrie (Bakrie, 2021) least highlights three points, at least from the Indonesian side as the host event, covers the non-alignment foreign policy principle, reciprocal principle and state territory confidentiality principle. Even though at the operational level, year by year continuously carries out an increment,
Indonesia needs to set the limit of any development in the joint military exercises Garuda Shield. Indonesia needs to consider the effect that might happen in line with the execution of the joint activities at the strategic level, implemented level, and operational level.

CONCLUSION

Indonesia and the U.S.'s national interests formed a shared interest that is poured into the Strategic Partnership. Domestic and international factors influence the national interest of each state. To examine the case study, the author scrutinizes the discussion of the national interest in the strategic partnership, specifically in the security and defense sector. By carrying out analysis and research, the author concludes whether, from the domestic environment, both states focus on maximizing the capability of the armed forces. Indonesia is focused on enhancing the professionalism of its armed forces. In contrast, the U.S. used this opportunity to have a credible combat force multi-domain capability in the Indo – Pacific region to build tactical operational and strategic readiness forager, enabling them to experiment with new capabilities. On the other hand, from the international environment, Indonesia, as an influential nation in the region, is obligated to maintain regional stability for its territorial integrity and sovereignty. The U.S., at this point, is moved by its vision of achieving a better future of a free, open, secure, and prosperous world. One of the ways is to conduct a military presence that aims to show the U.S. adversaries that they together could defeat any military challenge.

The Strategic Partnership has greatly impacted the bilateral relations between Indonesia and the United States on defense cooperation, especially in military-to-military ties; the Strategic Partnership has built a foundation for both states at the strategic level. The military then utilizes this opportunity as the one who implements and operationally carries out military exercises. For years Indonesia and the U.S. have executed several military exercises that mainly operate force to force. The Garuda Shield was first created to train the army on peacekeeping operations and humanitarian exercises like the other exercises which mostly followed by the U.N Standard. As influenced by the increment level of partnership (Comprehensive Partnership then to Strategic Partnership), Indonesia and the U.S. is started to execute exercises for more strategic performance that has given more weight to Indonesia and the U.S. military to
conduct the Joint Military Exercises like Garuda Shield. Starting by adding the amount of personnel involved, varieties of exercises, choosing several hotspot areas in Indonesia for conducting the exercises, and finally to merge the army, navy, and air force into Super Garuda Shield. The U.S. – China rivalry factor has also driven Indonesia and the U.S. to interact in defense cooperation closer. The U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) 2018 National Defense Strategy highlights that the role of its allies and partner in its competition with China is critical; the U.S. even admit that these countries could help them cooperate and be accessible. In the case study of Joint Military Exercises, this also added to the leveraging Super Garuda Shield on the operational level; this allowed the U.S. to cooperate and access more part of Indonesia, implements varieties of military operations, and invite allies and partner to participate, where the fact without the involvement of China.

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