

INDONESIA-NORWAY COOPERATION: EFFICACY IN REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND DEGRADATION (2010-2022)

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
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Abstrak

Penelitian ini bertujuan mengukur efektivitas program REDD+. Metodologi yang digunakan adalah deskriptif dengan pendekatan kualitatif, menggunakan teori efektivitas rezim oleh Arild Underdal yang menilai fungsi dan penyelesaian masalah rezim. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa REDD+ adalah program internasional pertama yang membantu negara berkembang mengurangi emisi dari sektor hutan, menjadikan perlindungan hutan tropis fokus baru dalam mitigasi perubahan iklim. Hutan menyumbang 25 persen dari emisi global yang memperburuk kerusakan iklim. Di Indonesia, REDD+ sudah berjalan lebih dari satu dekade bekerja sama dengan Norwegia, namun program ini berlangsung lambat dan kurang transparan. Sentimen negatif, pemahaman berbeda, dan konflik politik lingkungan membuat pelaksanaan REDD+ semakin rumit. Pendanaan dari Norwegia yang seharusnya meningkatkan kesadaran pentingnya hutan malah menciptakan logika konservasi baru berbasis insentif.

Abstract

This research aims to measure the effectiveness of the REDD+ program implementation. The methodology is descriptive with a qualitative approach, using Arild Underdal's regime effectiveness theory, which assesses the functions and problem-solving capabilities of a regime. The research shows that REDD+ is the first international program to help developing countries reduce forest emissions, making tropical forest protection a new focus in climate disaster mitigation. Forests contribute 25 percent of global emissions, worsening the current climate state. In Indonesia, REDD+ has been running for over a decade in collaboration with Norway but is not running smoothly. The program is sluggish and opaque. Different sentiments, understandings, and internal political conflicts in Indonesia add to the complexity of REDD+ implementation. Norwegian funding, meant to raise awareness of forest protection, went awry and created a new incentive-based logic for forest conservation.



INTRODUCTION

The global warming issue has been growing since the research publication by a Swedish scientist, Svante Arrhenius, in April 1896. Svante examined the relationship between the earth's temperature and Carbon Dioxide (CO²) gas that has increased and caused the earth's temperature to rise (Maslin, 2004). This phenomenon occurs due to human activity through coal burning on a large scale which may increase the earth's temperature by 5-6 degrees Celsius which is currently known to be very likely to increase by 2-3 °C. Svante's research provoked a heated debate before it received much public response and became a scientific consensus in the 1950s (The Guardian, 2016).

In addition to Svante, British and American researchers, such as Gay Callendar in 1938 and Gilbert Plass in 1956 reinforced Svante's theory, stating that emission problems would trigger future disasters. They argued that industrialization might raise the temperature by more than 1 °C per century (Sample, 2005). In the 1960s, this issue was taken up by the public movement (Fukuyama, 2018) to the table of international political conferences and in Stockholm, the *United Nations* at the 1972 *Conference on the Human and Environment*

brought attention to climate issues and new responsibilities for the UN (Eckersley, 2004).

After Stockholm, the United Nations established an international climate regime called the *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* (UNFCCC) (Elliot, 2004) and established the *Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (IPCC), a research association that monitors and updates the state of global warming. According to the IPCC, the concentration of carbon gas will accumulate continuously and have environmental impacts such as rising sea levels by 10 cm–20 cm (Change, 1992) and global warming will lead to catastrophic diseases in the early 21st century that threaten human lives, and bring natural disasters such as storms, heat waves, and droughts (Change, 1992).

Entering the 21st century, a series of events predicted by the IPCC have come true. The *Copernicus Climate Change Service* (C3S) recorded rapid increases in temperature in several regions of the earth. Europe was hit by severe heatwaves that rose by 0.1 °C in 2016, 2017, and 2019 since the last time it was recorded in 1984 (Climate Copernicus, 2019). In 2022, heatwaves rose by a sharp 2 °C in the Middle East, Western Europe, China, Central Asia, East Africa (Horn of Africa), Central Asia, and

Northwest Africa (Climate Copernicus, 2023). This phenomenon is the earth's reaction to climate change related to the increase in the intensity of heat waves from 1.5 degrees to 3.5 °C (Vautard & Maarten Van Aalst, 2020). In Southeast Asia, flash floods occurred simultaneously in 2011 in Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines due to several factors at once such as storms, tropical storms, and heavy rains (Torti, 2012).

Previously, the IPCC has emphasized that the ongoing global warming caused by the explosion of human population, the industrial revolution, high consumption of fossil fuels, and the development of agriculture and deforestation in 1992 recorded an increase in carbon concentration in the atmosphere by 26 percent since the UNFCCC climate regime was established (Change, 1992), which means that there is a 50 percent chance of a 5 °C escalate in the earth's temperature by the end of the 21st century (Peet & Paul Robbins, 2011).

After the existence of the climate regime, the handling of climate issues tried to be achieved through the *Conference of Parties* (COP), an annual conference that discussed handling climate issues. One of the important moments of the COP was marked

by the birth of emission mitigation mechanisms called *Joint Implementation* (JI), *Clean Development Mechanism* (CDM), and *Emission Trading* (ET) (UNFCCC, 2010) in Kyoto, Japan, in 1997 to limit the emission expenditure of industrialized countries following the mechanisms offered and agreed upon by these developed countries (UNFCCC, 1998). These mechanisms are flexible instruments such as regulation, carbon pricing, and financial aid (Peet & Paul Robbins, 2011) which are mandated for developed countries. However, there was friction between the United States and 105 countries because the US, being the highest emitter, refused to approve the Kyoto Protocol in March 2003 (Dessai & Nuno S. Lacasta, 2004) citing the adverse impact on the US economy and the exclusion of developing countries in this mitigation effort (Borger, 2001). At the time, the Kyoto Protocol required industrialized countries to cut their emissions spending by 5 percent starting from 2008-2012.

A few years after the Kyoto COP, Forest Conservation is now an international storyline (Kartodiharjo, 2017) to fight global warming with reforestation and nature conservation measures. The release of carbon gases due to deforestation cannot be

underestimated. Most of the forests spread across developing countries (74 countries) in 2005 and 2010 contributed as much as 25 percent of emissions from deforestation activities such as forest burning and logging (Pearson, Brown, & Sidman, 2017). The inclusion of forest conservation as a climate management agenda voiced by developing countries, namely Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica, etc., created the REDD program or Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (UNFCCC, 2011) at COP 11 in Montreal in 2005.

In Indonesia, the REDD+ program was adopted by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Dwisatrio & Zuraidah Said, The Context of REDD+ in Indonesia Drivers, Agents & Institutions, 2021). At COP 15 in Copenhagen in 2009, SBY pledged to contribute to reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and following this promise, at the G20 conference in Pittsburgh in the same year, SBY committed to cut 26 percent of the GHG emissions as *business-as-usual* levels by 2020 unilaterally, and by 41 percent with international support (Dwisatrio & Zuraidah Said, 2021). The following year, on May 26, 2010, Indonesia and Norway as a REDD+ partnering country will fund the implementation of this in-country program. The implementation of this program takes

effect after the signing of the REDD+ Letter of Intent by both countries. In the REDD+ LOI, Norway pledged 1 billion USD if Indonesia succeeds in decreasing their deforestation carbon.

REDD+ is challenging to be implemented because Indonesia has many forest, tenure, and land conflicts. Just like other developing countries where the biggest emission-contributing sectors come from deforestation, mining, fossil-fueled electricity production, and other activities (Ojeaga & Posu, 2017). Indonesia alone, deforestation accounts as much as 80 percent of national emissions (Ansor, Nurul Qomar, & Taufik, 2010).

REDD+ is conceptualized as a mechanism to address the problem of emission releases from *Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry* (LULUCF) (Seymour & Angelsen, 2012). On the one hand, the program is designed to create economic incentives to protect forests and carbon reduction due to deforestation activities (Keohane, 2016). The Directorate General of Climate Change Control (Ditjen PPI) stated that the program to cut emissions from deforestation and reduce the number of forests was followed up with conservative efforts to manage sustainable forests and increase forest carbon stocks with

implementation at the National and Sub-National or Regional stages (Direktorat Jenderal Pengendalian Perubahan Iklim, 2017).

REDD+ became a National Strategy (STRANAS) project, organized into three phases. The *first* phase (2011-2012) was a preparatory phase to develop REDD+ into a National REDD+ Strategy, simultaneously with an action plan, policy, and capacity building. The *second* phase (2012-2014, Transformation, focuses on capacity building, policy development, and implementation. The *third* phase (2014-after) will be complete operation. In this third phase, REDD+ is implemented with the *Result Based Payment* (RBP) mechanism (Indonesia, 2012). This phase focuses on capacity building and policy development.

However, more than 10 years after the signing, progress on REDD+ is still silent. Reports on the program's activities are not widely available at the national or sub-national level. The official *Safeguard Information System* REDD+ website, which is supposed to provide implementation information from each region, does not contain anything. In addition, there was an "automatic" LOI update in 2016 issued by DG PPI that scheduled the Full

Implementation phase to take place in 2018 (Knowledge Center Perubahan Iklim, 2017). This missed the mark, as Full Implementation was only adequately implemented in 2019.

September 10, 2021, Indonesia took steps to terminate its REDD+ forest protection and conservation with Norway. The termination was taken over the assessment of the absence of *Result Based Payment* (RBP) for the realization of Indonesia's emission reduction of 11.2 million tons of CO₂ in 2016/2017, which is said to have been verified by international institutions. The Indonesian government stated that it had reported a significant achievement over 20 years in 2020 in which Indonesia claimed to have successfully controlled the area of forest fires (Kementerian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia, 2021). However, this claim is less convincing given the lack of data on REDD+ implementation. And, when referring to live data on 20 years of Indonesian deforestation released by *Global Forest Watch* (GFW) without using the definition of Indonesian forests, the rate of loss of tree cover or Indonesian forests during 2000-2020 tended to continue to rise and even rose sharply in 2009, 2011, and 2016. 2016, during the REDD+ period, was the worst deforestation

year, reaching 2.42 million Mha (Global Forest Watch, 2022).

ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK

Regime Effectiveness

In general, according to Aggarwal (1985), the presence of an effective regime can be said to be successful if the regime can function in certain roles and has a problem-solving ability as the background of the regime. In the environmental regime, Underdal emphasizes the same thing that the effectiveness of a regime lies in the ability to carry out various functions and problem-solving that lead to the condition of improving the country's environment itself (Miles & Arild Underdal, 2002). According to Underdal, the objective of the presence of an environmental regime is to change the behaviour that causes environmental damage. In measuring the effectiveness of the regime, three variables must be addressed, including understanding the malign problems and benign problems that are being faced by the regime to solve problems that are always related to the *Political Context* (Miles & Arild Underdal, 2002) is understood as an independent variable. Then, the relationship between regulations and rules (output), changes people behaviour as *Outcome*, and biophysical changes as *Impact* (Miles & Arild

Underdal, 2002) as dependent variables. Third, there is the Intervening Variable which is expressed as the result of the relationship with the content of the independent variable.

Beyond these variables, there is Underdal's general reference in comparing regimes. One of them is by looking at the situation of the absence of the regime and the presence of the regime, it can be measured whether the regime makes a difference and whether the regime can solve problems when it is present (Underdal, 2002).

Dependent Variable

Output, the results that emerge from the process of establishing the beginning to the end of the establishment of a regime, usually written but also unwritten such as conventions, rules of law, treaties, and declarations, can also be norms, or principles. At this stage, the assessment of the *Output* can be judged by the strength of the rules and regulations as well as the system of targeted activities under its domain (inclusiveness), and the level or stage of collaboration established.

Outcome is a relationship related to changes in human behavior and the natural environment. The purpose of this stage is to understand human habits (Miles & Arild Underdal, 2002). This factor can determine the

success of the regime as it will be directly compared to *Impact*.

Impact is an important part of the assessment of the dependent variable. Impact by Underdal is understood as the response of the environment to changes in human habits following or not following the international regime (Miles & Arild Underdal, 2002). The assessment of Impact must also be done carefully to distinguish between impacts that are produced by the regime and those that simply occur or even those outside the influence of the regime.

Independent Variable

In the international world, it is generally very difficult to build cooperation and maintain it. Even if the consensus is built on mutual agreement and good knowledge of a problem being faced by a regime, it does not guarantee the success of the regime (Breitmeier & Arild Underdal, 2011). This variable sees two rules for assessing the effectiveness of a regime, namely the characters of the problem, Malign or Benign and Problem-solving capacity (Miles & Arild Underdal, 2002). Underdal adds one more variable that departs from the assumption of whether the existence of cooperation can lead to better results? Several levels of

cooperation become the benchmark to be able to measure regime collaboration in carrying out activities such as Output, Outcome, and Impact. However, these variables are also created and shaped by the situation of Problem Complexity and Problem-Solving capacity built by the regime. (Underdal, 2002).

Malignancy Problem

Underdal defines Complex Problems as reflected by the complexity of the problem itself and the actors involved in it. Therefore, the complexity of the problem should be given two special attentions. At the intellectual level, a problem shows that intellectual capital and energy are needed to describe and trace the problem to develop a good solution (Miles & Arild Underdal, 2002).

Complex Problems are characterized by three categories: *Incongruity* is characterized by the incomprehension of the actor and the criteria formed by the actor in carrying out the task of subjective values. Incongruity is assumed to be an action motivated and dominated by individual will. Actors can see and act with *Cost and Benefit* calculations that will result in decisions and actions that only pursue their respective interests and lead to poor outcome levels and

this complexity can also be a combination of character problems of *Asymmetry and Cumulative Cleavages* (Miles & Arild Underdal, 2002).

Secondly, Asymmetries are also characterized by actors who are brought together to perform the same task but whose values and interests are negatively correlated (Miles & Arild Underdal, 2002).

Third, Cumulative Cleavage is understood as a situation where parties feel that they exist on the same dimension so that they can produce the same output. For example: if the other party succeeds or fails or loses/wins, the other party on the other side will also win/lose (Miles & Arild Underdal, 2002). This leads parties to judge that it is better not to get involved at all.

In addition, this factor is also related to the distribution of power. The assumption is that if power is concentrated in the hands of strong parties, it will most likely produce an effective effect on the regime but will also create fear or anxiety for *laggards*. However, if power is concentrated in the hands of *laggards*, it will produce the opposite effect of the effectiveness of the regime itself (Miles & Arild Underdal, 2002).

Problem-Solving Capacity

There are three conceptions of problem-solving capacity to measure the outcome of the regime and the implementation process, and how it is explained by the knowledge base of the problem structure and system, as well as the extent to which skills and efforts make a significant difference.

First is the structure of the decision-making situation, limiting some leeway and the distance from the visibility of political solutions. More precisely, it is knowing the shape of the actor's understandings, the institutional setting, especially "the rules of the game", and the distribution of power. The first assumption for a reasonably good description of what is politically possible, though less accurate and less convincing, indicates the probability of how narrow the outcome will be.

Second, the structural logic of most situations is to some extent indeterminate and can only be understood by the actors involved. Underdal cites this as an implicit reason for sparing time and energy in negotiation efforts. Some situations, such as those characterized by high complexity or instability, tend to be perceived as more volatile than others. In this case, the conception of the negotiation process may be indeterminate for at least three reasons. First,

the problem or situation itself may be ambiguous and conceived differently by the actors involved. The causality effect and relationships that need to be understood to tackle environmental and other problems are often superficially understood (Miles & Arild Underdal, 2002).

Third, skill and energy. Skill stands for elucidating the competence, knowledge, and expertise of the actors involved in the negotiation and implementation of international agreements. Skilled negotiators and policymakers can create effective agreements, foresee potential challenges, and find innovative solutions to complex problems. Skill also involves understanding the technical, legal, and diplomatic issues of the issue at hand (Underdall, 1993). Energy refers to the effort that actors put into a negotiation and implementation process sort of their motivation and commitment. High energy levels mean that actors are ready and willing to invest the necessary resources, time, and effort to ensure that the agreements are very effectively implemented (Miles & Arild Underdal, 2002).

Table 1. Intervening Variable Level of Collaboration

Collabo- ration Scale	Collaboration Type
0	Regime members gather in deliberation but no cooperating actions.
1	Regime members act by their own understanding or privately.
2	Regime members act according to explicitly formulated rules but with implementation entirely in the hands of the national government. There is no centralized assessment of the effectiveness of their actions.
3	Same as point 2 but with centralized assessment.
4	Regime members in coordinated planning are combined with national implementation.
5	Regime members in integrated planning and implementation with centralized assessment of effectiveness (Underdal, 2002, p. 483).

Source: (Peter Haas's Criteria, 2002)

Underdal adds the variable 'collaboration' as an Intervening Variable to test the assumption "is collaboration able to bring real results?" Table 1 illustrates the scale of collaboration. In addition, this variable assumes that the level of collaboration is always related to the complexity of the problem and the problem-solving capacity built by the regime but also because collaboration can make positive things even if it is simple or mediocre in regime effectiveness (Underdal, 2002).

RESEARCH METHOD

The chosen research methodology in this paper involves a descriptive approach with a qualitative orientation. Descriptive research describes empirical facts accompanied by appropriate arguments. Qualitative research method is a search to explore and understand a central symptom (Creswell, 2013). The results of the description are followed by a study to produce analytical conclusions.

The descriptive method of analysis in this research will explain the performance of the collaboration between Indonesia and Norway in implementing REDD+ partnership. The data collection technique used is a literary study by collecting primary and secondary data in the form of books, scientific journals including electronic journals both domestic and international journals, and international news articles from trusted media and interviews with people who can be trusted and related to the problems in this realm of study (Neuman, 2014).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

REDD+

According to Hein (2019), REDD+ has been a mitigation mechanism to control deforestation emissions since 2005 at the Montreal COP. The establishment of

REDD+ was driven by a coalition of tropical forest countries, large environmental NGOs, and several transnational corporations interested in cost-effectively offsetting greenhouse gas emissions based on market schemes successfully lobbied to include REDD in the climate mitigation agenda. Epistemically, the motivation for REDD+ is built on the need to control emissions because deforestation is the world's second-largest emitter after the energy sector, and the program is claimed to be able to provide two benefits such as biodiversity protection and financial incentives (United Nations ESCAP, 2010).

In the work of Bumpus and Liverman (2011), REDD+ can be said to be like the CDM or Clean Development Mechanism but with a governing body that is not centralized in a particular agency such as the UNFCCC. Previously, the CDM was agreed upon in the Kyoto Protocol which was officially recognized in 2007 at the Bali COP (Bumpus & Liverman, 2011). The international regime governing REDD+ is highly fragmented or decentralized as it is populated by many different actors as the UNFCCC provides a very broad and non-binding political framework mechanism for REDD+ (Horstmann & Hein, 2017).

REDD+ is argued to support forest conservation as a “*win-win solution*” with forest countries contributing to biodiversity conservation, rural development, and climate change mitigation (Hein, 2019). The big idea of REDD+ draws from the dominance of *market-oriented* views on conservation concepts such as payments for ecosystem services and carbon trading. In other words, REDD+ intends to carry out mitigation efforts called *Market Environmentalism*, which Liverman (2004) stated is an effort to protect the environment by putting a price on environmental services by assigning rights to the environment or property and services into the global market.

The market-based view is expected to motivate REDD+ countries to take environmental remedial action while bridging them to business activities and multilateral cooperation. REDD+ brings a neoliberal approach to environmental and climate change regime outreach (Bumpus & Liverman, 2011). The implementation is executed by the forest-owning country with funding from partners, which can be in the form of incentives in return for ecosystem services provided by the forest-owning country.

At the beginning of the proposal, REDD tasks did not include conservation measures, which are now marked with the + symbol in the abbreviation “REDD+”. Two years after the Montreal COP, REDD became an important point on the international climate agenda brought by the UNFCCC at COP-13, Bali. The addition of + (Conservation) to REDD occurred a year later at Poznan, COP 14 (REDD+ Suriname, 2017).

Constructing REDD+ in Indonesia (Output)

Indonesia’s REDD+ was signed as a mechanism to cut deforestation emissions, promised as an action plan to reduce GHG emissions by 26 percent from business-as-usual levels by 2020 unilaterally and by 41 percent with international assistance (Dwisatrio & Zuraidah Said, 2021). In 2008-2009 before REDD+ was introduced, the Ministry of Forestry issued an early REDD+ Ministerial Regulation (Pemenhut) to support REDD+. For example, Ministry of Forestry Regulation No. 68 of 2008 on regional procedures for REDD+ demonstration activities (DA) outlined procedures for implementing demonstration activities and the second part outlined

procedures for licensing forest carbon projects in the production and conservation of forests, including rules for benefit distribution between the government, communities, and executing companies. Other regulations were also born to strengthen REDD+ regulations such as Regulation No. 30/2009 outlining REDD+ implementation procedures because Regulation 68/2008 was still vague and did not even include communities as implementers. Regulation No. 36/2009 states that implementing companies must demonstrate community benefits to receive permission to implement REDD+ projects (article 6) and must support community empowerment (article 14). This regulation was completed in 2017 when REDD+ finally had MoEF Regulation No. 70 on Implementation Methods and Terms of Reference. In addition, institutional preparation was carried out by establishing a REDD+ supporting institution called the National Council on Climate Change (DNPI, which aims to coordinate climate change control and plan strategic matters related to climate change (The Indonesian Institute, 2012).

After the preparation of regulatory and institutional means, Indonesia signed a REDD+ Letter of Intent aiming to cooperate

to significantly reduce GHG emissions from deforestation, forest degradation, and peatland conversion through international climate change policy dialogue, especially international policies on REDD+ and cooperation in the development and implementation of REDD+ strategies. The REDD+ LOI with the Norwegian government was officially signed with a Result Based Payment incentive scheme with a promise that the Norwegian government would provide 1 billion USD if Indonesia succeeded in reducing emissions using REDD+. According to Hein (2019) and the *Green Climate Fund* (GCF), to obtain incentives through RBP, implementing countries and partnering countries must develop several components such as: National Strategy REDD+ implementation or Action Plan for Forest Reference Emission Level (FREL), National Forest Monitoring, Safeguard Information System (SIS), and Measurement, Reporting, and Verification System (MRV) (Global Climate Fund, 2020). REDD+ institutional components such as MRV, FREL, SIS, etc., are agreements that have been reached with forest-owning countries through the COP related to REDD+ which were then adopted in the LOI agreement between Indonesia and Norway with principles such as certainty of

partnership based on UNFCCC, stakeholders held by relevant parties including indigenous people, transparency regarding financing, actions, and results, etc.

REDD+ takes effect from the signing of the LOI. Implementation includes several phases and an independent review before proceeding to the final stage. These phases are the development of instruments that form the framework for the implementation of the REDD+ program. In Phase I (*Preparation*), Indonesia must establish an *Exclusive Agency* in charge of reporting the REDD+ implementation process directly to the president, establish a national REDD+ strategy, establish funding instruments as early as possible, and select REDD+ implementation piloting sites. Phase II (*Transformation*) starting in January 2011, both countries will target execution from Indonesia and support from Norway on aspects of policy development and implementation of legal reform and law enforcement etc. Phase III (*Verification of Emission Reductions*), starting from 2014, in this stage, the national contribution mechanism for verification of emission reductions will be implemented.

Outcomes & REDD+ Malign Problems

REDD+ is progressing very slowly in Indonesia. Most of the actioning areas (30 areas) of the REDD+ pilot sites already had Provincial Action Plan Strategies (SRAPs) issued by local governments as early as 2012, and 2013 was one year behind the National Strategy timeline (REDD+, 2012). On the other hand, the national institutional development, and the enactment of REDD+ at the provincial and district levels also did not go according to the timeline and plan set out in the LOI. The complexity of Indonesia's REDD+ implementation at various levels is due to three factors: inconsistency between actors and the criteria established by actors in carrying out tasks (Incongruity), actors carrying out the same tasks but with values and interests that are negatively correlated (Asymmetry), and power in the hands of slow actors (Cumulative Cleavages).

REDD+ is not only seen as a mechanism to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the forest actor in Indonesia. Furthermore, the MoEF executive agency and other parties such as NGOs, and other state institutions that are policymakers have sentiments about REDD+. They consider that REDD+ is a tool for developed countries

with asymmetric tasks aimed at restraining Indonesia's economic growth and making forest-owning countries *carbon offset* locations for developed countries so that they (developed countries) can continue to produce with large emissions without making energy or technology transfers (Mulyani & Jepson, 2013). This negative sentiment is also increasingly evident from the statement of the Minister of Environment and Forestry Siti Nurbaya Bakar who openly said, "The massive development of the Jokowi presidential era must not stop in the name of carbon emissions and deforestation". The minister of Environment and Forestry uttered via his X or Twitter account on November 3rd, 2021. This sentiment directly reflects Indonesia's significance to environmental issues which then manifests in the form of how REDD+ is formed and implemented, such as the policy differences between Indonesia and Norway, and the disagreement between central and local government REDD+ actors which illustrates Incongruity.

The problem of incompatible views occurs in interpreting the costs of RBP conservation and development of one of the REDD+ executive bodies. In understanding the cost of REDD+, Indonesia only refers to one factor, emission reductions in 2016/2017

without looking at the completeness of other components. In addition, Indonesia's interpretation of REDD+ funding seems to try to avoid the principles of the REDD+ LOI. The foundation of Indonesia's understanding of REDD+ funding refers to Article 5 of the Paris Agreement on performance-based payments (Salminah & Wibowo, 2017), which does not talk specifically about REDD+ funding schemes. In fact, the principles of the REDD+ LOI are so strict that this program is well-coordinated and implemented with transparency. Still related to principles, in 2015 Indonesia through President Jokowi also dissolved the REDD+ Management Agency that was established in 2013 without clear reasons through Presidential Decree No. 16/2015 (Jong, 2015). This decision to merge BP REDD+ with the Ministry of Environment and Forestry is known not to have been seriously reviewed (Jakarta Globe, 2015) and was the result of political friction between MoEF and other ministries that disagreed with the existence of an executive body for REDD+ (Mulyani & Jepson, 2013). As a result, the dissolution of BP-REDD+ has added to overlapping REDD+ constitutions and delays in REDD+ development at various levels (Dwisatrio & Zuraidah Said, 2021).

After several years of REDD+ implementation, Indonesia stated that what was offered by partnering countries did not benefit Indonesia (Laporan Delegasi Republik Indonesia, 2017). The MoEF and the private sector implementing REDD+ consider that implementation costs have a very high price and can damage the economic potential of the REDD+ program (Mulyani & Jepson, 2013). Even so, Indonesia has claimed REDD+ success from emissions reductions of 11.2 million tons of CO₂eq in 2016/2017, which was verified by international institutions (Kementerian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia, 2021). It is known that in that year Ari Wibowo and Mimi Salmiah (2016) noted that REDD+ MRV had not been fulfilled. Also, an independent institution that is supposed to present to verify the FREL does not yet exist, which allows Indonesia to increase the Forest Reference Level or FREL by selecting an appropriate historical reference period, scope of activities, forest definitions, and whether to include the degradation category in claiming the success of emission reductions due to REDD+ (Wong & Arild Angelsen, 2016). In the same year, Indonesia has also not finished establishing all the key components of REDD+ that are vital requirements for full

implementation and for receiving the RBP. For example, the Public Service Agency for REDD+ called *Badan Pengelola Dana Lingkungan Hidup* (BPDLH) was only launched in 2019 (Kementerian Lingkungan Hidup dan Kehutanan, 2019). In the same period, Forest Watch Indonesia noted that the deforestation rate of natural forests increased by around 126 percent in the 2014-2015 period. Then, it increased again by around 4 percent in the 2015-2016 period and sloped in the 2016-2017 period, which is known to have decreased by around 18 percent compared to the previous year's period (Forest Watch Indonesia, 2020). This spike in deforestation was the worst since 2000. The axis of deforestation in 2015 was caused by farmers and companies clearing land by burning forests and peatlands for wood, pulp, palm oil, rubber, or small-scale livestock farming (Porter, 2016). There were 100,000 fires from June to October 2015, whose flames consumed millions of hectares of forest in Indonesia and released 1.62 billion metric tons of CO₂ (Weisse & Elizabeth Dow Goldman, 2017).

This deviant understanding of the REDD+ incentive payment mechanism is also followed by a view at the local level that sees REDD+ as a CDM *Carbon offset*

mechanism or carbon trading. As explained in the previous paragraph, many Policy Makers faction view REDD+ as carbon offsets used by developed countries as a “toilet” for their excessive emissions. This assessment has led to the absence of REDD+ regulations in Indonesia that can harmonize REDD+ and Carbon Offset programs (Nofyanza, et al., 2020). Although the government has emphasized that REDD+ is not carbon offset, the government still opens opportunities for carbon offset funding from the REDD+ scheme. This strategy can be seen in Permen KLHK No. 70 Article 20 (3). This regulation is used by actors holding production forest concessions in Lombok who use REDD+ as a Carbon Offset. They are actors running REDD+ at the base level who are competing to lobby carbon buyers in the international market using the MoEF Decree that allows them to trade carbon (Salminah & Wibowo, 2017).

Lastly, the Cumulative Cleavages factor, both countries are stuck in the same situation due to the implementation power being held by the slow country which results in ineffective cooperation. The preparation phase funds disbursed by Norway in 2008-2009 REDD+ amounted to 56.2 million USD through the *United Nations Development Program* (UNDP) (Satwika, 2020) did not

provide an impetus for REDD+ development to be completed according to the timeline. Michelsen Institute and LTS International (2018) reported that the full implementation phase scheduled to enter in 2014 was delayed and could only be implemented in 2019 following the complete MRV and BLU components that would be available. This slow progress of REDD+ has created a passive lacklustre collaboration between the two countries, as the REDD+ LOI was automatically renewed in 2016 for the next 4 years (LTS International & Michelsen Institute, 2018). The complexity of REDD+ development is compounded by Indonesia’s complicated internal environmental politics. Namely, tenure issues are still closely related to business interests and therefore the head of the REDD+ Management Agency stated the need for regulations and preparations to address Land Tenure first before implementing REDD+ (Larson, et al., 2013). This land tenure issue has had a very negative impact on REDD+ implementation. Around 30 REDD+ action areas have been awarded mining concessions and other natural resource businesses that have created the issue of land tenure in Indonesia as a “taboo” and seem to let this issue dissolve into REDD+ (Mulyani & Jepson, 2013).

Impact

REDD+ changes the logic of conservation (Corbera, 2012) in Indonesia. The view of forest conservation and forest protection that should be based on and in favor of ecology is now leaning towards becoming a business facility by concessionaires to gain profits. In Central Kalimantan, where REDD+ was first introduced in Indonesia, the government, and NGOs have been preoccupied with establishing programs designed to exploit REDD+ funds (Lestari, 2019). In Jambi, REDD+ has had a negative impact. REDD+ has exacerbated conflicts between communities and PT REKI, which holds a conservation license. The Jambi government said “We want funding for our four national parks. We want compensation for protecting our national parks from international donors. Our national parks are storing CO₂; industrialized countries are emitting CO₂” (Hein, 2019).

REDD+ creates a mechanism that facilitates forest ownership to carry out beneficial interests without having to fully commodify carbon emissions. Demands and programs that demand funding and incentives without transparent REDD performance are now seen to be running

along the lines of Fisher’s (2012) “no pay no care” or, if elaborated, “no funding no conservation”.

CONCLUSION

In the end, REDD+ has not brought significant changes to deforestation in Indonesia. The function of REDD+ which is supposed to address tenure issues is far from successful. Tenure and overlapping powers are still a serious problem because they collide with the implementation of REDD+ in the field. The government and various other stakeholders such as NGOs have different perceptions and sentiments regarding REDD+. A series of complicated problems in REDD+ development that occur at the national and local levels make REDD+ difficult to develop. The view that REDD+ is a mechanism to hamper the economy of developing countries, REDD+ as a carbon offset, and the use of the term performance-based payment make Indonesia seem to avoid the obligation to build the core components of REDD+ that can make forest conservation operation transparent. This also illustrates Indonesia’s departure from the principles of the REDD+ LOI in contributing to carbon reduction through the REDD+ emission reduction program.

As far as the eye can see, the REDD+ information system website, which is supposed to summarize the activities of this program from beginning to end and to protect the adverse effects of REDD+, is devoid of information on activities. REDD+, which is built on the principle of candor, has no place in the open. Indigenous people whose interests are recognized in REDD+ are also unable to participate in REDD+ actively and positively. In Jambi, for instance, indigenous people who work as farmers clashed with a private party that obtained a license to conduct conservation. News like this does not appear in the REDD+ information system notification. The absence of transparency in running the REDD+ program is a sign of chaos that causes this program to not run effectively.

Instead of being a bridge to overcome the problem of deforestation, REDD+ funding, which is used as a motivational engine to tackle deforestation, has led to a change in the logic of forest conservation in Indonesia. Conservation implementation, which should be based on ecological intentions, is now replaced by incentive intentions based on the cost and benefits generated from REDD+ incentive services. Ultimately, all these events lead to a poor level of collaboration.

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