

RUSSIA INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: MAINTAINING REVISIONIST STATE'S BEHAVIOUR DEALING WITH THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIES

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Abstrak

Dunia memasuki era perubahan pada paruh kedua tahun 2000-an. Sangat sulit untuk memiliki pemahaman yang sama tentang kondisi-kondisi yang melingkupi disintegrasi tatanan dunia sebelumnya seperti halnya proses, cakrawala, dan hasil transisi menuju tatanan dunia baru. Artikel ini membahas apa yang sebenarnya terjadi di Rusia dan ketika gangguan global berkembang disebabkan oleh runtuhnya lembaga-lembaga internasional diciptakan setelah Perang Dunia ke-2, dominasi Amerika, atau sesuatu yang lain. Amerika Serikat yang mulai merevisi tatanan dunia; demikian, perilaku Rusia dapat dianggap sebagai revisionis hanya berkaitan dengan strategi revisionis Washington. Transisi dunia pasca-Washington saat ini dianalisis dalam konteks studi teoritis tentang transisi pasca-Wina, pasca-Paris, pasca-Versailles dan pasca-Yalta dan pengalaman sejarah. Artikel ini menyimpulkan bahwa transisi pasca-Washington saat ini tidak dapat diubah, namun mungkin membutuhkan waktu lebih lama daripada sebelumnya dan melampaui 2050. Setiap negara harus memikirkan kembali tempat dan strategi perjuangan untuk bertahan hidup dan pembangunan pada transisi dunia baru. Rusia masih bekerja untuk mendefinisikan strategi nasionalnya, dan keberhasilannya akan bergantung pada kombinasi resistensi asimetris yang bertujuan untuk mengutamakan kepentingan vital negara di dunia, upaya aktif untuk membangun tatanan dunia baru, dan reformasi dalam negeri yang diperlukan.

Kata kunci: *Rusia; Amerika Serikat; tatanan dunia; transisi; revisionis*

Abstract

The world entered the era of change no later than the second half of the 2000s. It is very difficult to have a common understanding of the conditions that surrounded the disintegration of the former world order as well as of the processes, horizons, and results of the transition to a new world order. This article discusses what exactly happens in Russia and when a growing global disorder caused by the collapse of international institutions created after 2nd World War, the preservation of American domination, or something else. It was the United States that started revising the world order; therefore, Russia's behavior can be considered revisionist only in relation to Washington's revisionist strategy imposed on it. The current post-Washington world transition is analyzed here in the context of theoretical studies concerning the previous post-Vienna, post-Paris, post-Versailles and post-Yalta transitions and their historical experience. The article concludes that the current post-Washington transition is irreversible, yet it may take more time than the previous ones and extend beyond 2050. Each country should have to rethink its place and strategy of struggle for survival and development in

Indonesian Journal of International Relations, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 19-51.

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ISSN 2548-4109 electronic

ISSN 2657-165X printed

the new transitional world. Russia is still working to define its national strategy, and the success will depend on a combination of asymmetric resistance aimed at upholding the country's vital interests in the world, active efforts to build a new world order, and domestic reforms required for that.

Key words: *Russia; the U.S; world order; transition; revisionist*

INTRODUCTION

The remaining great powers are no longer motivated by ideological rivalries, and they all show conspicuous signs of wanting to avoid wider political engagements unless their own interests are immediately and strongly affected. This situation creates weak leadership at the global level and, consequently, leads to the assumption that more than before, regions will be left to sort out their own affairs (Barry Buzan et al., 1998)

This article is an attempt to understand the problems of global transition with reference to Russia. The main premise of the article is that the world began to change in the mid-2000s and no later than 2008 when Russia intervened in the armed conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia. Russia's actions contributed to a relative decline of U.S. power that began soon after its military intervention in Iraq in 2003.

Historical standpoint the fundamental interests of Russia-the U.S have almost

never clashed. Let's leave aside the time after the October Revolution, when it took years for the U.S. to recognize a young Soviet Republic (Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации, 2019). Even the Cold War was a conflict of ideologies rather than a clash of basic national interests. Both countries have no territorial claims to each other.

The Russian Empress Catherine the Great supported the U.S. in its struggle for independence. Emperor Alexander the Second and Abraham Lincoln called each other good friends. Russia government and its people took the side of the American president during the U.S. Civil War. Both countries also fought side by side against Hitler Nazism. World War II was the biggest and bloodiest military conflict in human history. So much depended on the outcome of the war for the first time ever, the very possibility to live a free life for entire nations.

Never before has the price for the victory been so heavy. The peoples of the

Soviet Union had to sacrifice, according to different estimates, around 27 million lives, from which 13.5 million were civilian losses, more than the population of some countries. No matter how distant the war days become, it will forever stay in the memory of nations. On 25 April 2019, Russia and the U.S once again together commemorated the historic encounter between the Soviet and U.S. troops on the Elbe River, which is one of the most powerful symbols of historical brotherhood-in-arms (Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации, 2019).

These important examples remind Russia and the U.S that the periods of good relations between the two countries only benefited both nations currently and in the future, as well as the strategic interests of international security.

However, responding to NATO expansion, thus, the Kremlin moved from rhetorical opposition to the U.S. centered world order to practical actions by ending the U.S. monopoly on the use of force in international affairs, first in Georgia and later in Syria. Although scholars disagree on timing, causes, and implications of American decline for international order (Lieber, 2016; Ikenberry, Parmar, and

Stokes, 2018), many share the view that the U.S. has retreated from the status of superpower capable of unilaterally setting and enforcing global rules.

Russia recognized the United States on October 28, 1803, and diplomatic relations between the United States and Russia were formally established in 1809. Diplomatic relations were interrupted following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. On December 6, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson instructed all American diplomatic representatives in Russia to refrain from any direct communication with representatives of the Bolshevik Government. Although diplomatic relations were never formally severed, the United States refused to recognize or have any formal relations with the Bolshevik/Soviet governments until 1933. Normal diplomatic relations were resumed on November 16, 1933, when President Franklin Roosevelt informed Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov that the United States recognized the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. On December 25, 1991, the United States recognized the Russian Federation as the successor to the Soviet Union and established diplomatic relations on December 31, 1991.

The U.S has long sought a full and constructive relationship with Russia. Thus, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the U.S adopted a bipartisan strategy to facilitate cooperation on global issues and promote foreign investment and trade.

The U.S supported Russia's integration into European and global institutions and a deepened bilateral partnership in security cooperation to reinforce the foundations of stability and predictability. In response to the Russian violation in 2014 of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, however, the U.S has downgraded the bilateral political and military relationship and suspended the Bilateral Presidential Commission (U.S Department of State, 25 June 2019). It is a body jointly founded in 2009 by the U.S and Russia to promote cooperation between the two countries.

Additionally, according to the U.S policy-makers, in identifying to ongoing Russian aggression in Georgia and Ukraine, Russia has demonstrated its willingness to undermine norms within the existing international system beyond traditional military campaigns to encompass a suite of hybrid tools that are used to gain influence.

Russia's campaign aims to undermine core institutions of the West, such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union, and to weaken faith in the democratic and free-market system. The U.S has sought to deter further Russian aggression through the projection of strength and unity with U.S. allies, and by building resilience and reducing vulnerability among allies facing Russian pressure and coercion.

The U.S like to move beyond the current low level of trust with Russia, stabilize bilateral relationship, and cooperate where possible and when in core U.S. national security interests. To achieve this, thus, Russia must take demonstrable steps to show it is willing to be a responsible global actor, starting with a cessation of efforts to interfere in democratic processes. The long-term goal of the U.S is to see Russia become a constructive stakeholder in the global community.

Russia-the U.S relations have been very tense in recent years, and this directly affects cooperation in trade, economy, and foreign investment. During these difficult times, people believe it a task of utmost importance to find a stable foundation to maintain and develop relations in the future. Thus, in order to reconsider the current

status quo and to look for solutions that will place Russia-the U.S relations on an upward trajectory.

Russia is one of five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and a member of the Council of Europe. Russia's participation in the G8 (currently G-7) was suspended in March 2014, as it is in response to its purported annexation of Crimea (U.S Department of State, 25 June 2019). Although Russia is not a member of NATO, NATO suspended all practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia as a result of Russia's 2014 actions in Ukraine.

However, necessary political and military channels of communication between NATO and Russia remain still open. Russia is a participating State in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It is also a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and East Asia Summit (EAS), and an observer state to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Russia also takes part in a number of regional organizations including the Commonwealth of

Independent States (CIS), the Eurasian Economic Community, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

U.S-RUSSIA BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS

In December, 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin thanked the CIA in his conversation with U.S. President Donald Trump for providing intelligence information that helped to prevent a large-scale terrorist attack in Saint Petersburg (Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации, 2019), which well-known as 'Russia's European City'. The Russian side in Kremlin notified the U.S. intelligence services that the Tsarnayev brothers were planning a terrorist attack in Boston. Unfortunately, the outcome was different. Both countries can also recall constructive cooperation during the Sochi Olympics in 2014 and the 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia.

During Russia 2018 Soccer World Cup, country was visited not only by leaders of many countries and governments, but also, most importantly, by hundreds of

thousands of soccer fans from across the world. There are 46 thousand U.S. fans, second place after China, who saw the real Russia, an open, friendly and modern country (Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации, 2019). The majority of guests were genuinely happy and expressed hope to return, those spectacular obtained their personal experience of the hospitality of Russian people. This was a triumph of public diplomacy, which showed that all boogeyman stories about Russia are fake.

However, until today, the U.S policy-makers still response negatively to Russia's ongoing violations of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, including Russia's occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea which the U.S has suspended bilateral engagement with the Russian government on most economic issues. As matter of fact, the U.S continues to investigate allegations of mistreatment of or discrimination against U.S. investors in Russia and following to urge Russia to improve its investment climate, adherence to the rule of law, and transparency.

Meanwhile, in Russia, the U.S. Commercial Service continues to assist U.S. firms interested in developing market

opportunities that do not violate sanctions. Since 2014, the U.S together with European allies' countries and G-7 partners imposed sanctions on Russia for its aggressive actions in eastern Ukraine, occupation of Crimea, and interference in U.S. elections. Sectorial sanctions have reduced Russia's ability to access financing in the financial, energy, and defense sectors, as well as limited its access to certain technologies in those sectors.

Thereafter, a combination of low oil prices, structural limitations, and sanctions pushed Russia into a deep recession in 2015, with the economy contracting by four percent and one percent in 2016. Russia's economy has returned to modest growth since 2017, owing to a global rebound in oil prices.

The World Bank has projected that GDP growth will remain modest, at approximately 1.5-1.8 percent in the period 2018-2020 (U.S Department of State, 25 June 2019). In 2018, Russia's oil production reached a post-Soviet high, averaging 11.6 barrels/day.

Russia on 12 December 2012 became the 156th World Trade Organization member (Office of the U.S Trade Representative,

2019). On December 14, 2012, the President signed legislation terminating the application of Jackson-Vanik, and extending permanent normal trade relations to Russia and Moldova. On December 21, 2012, the U.S and Russia both filed letters with the WTO withdrawing their notices of non-application and agreeing to have the WTO agreement apply between them.

Despite the secondary role that economic ties have traditionally played in Russia-U.S relations. Since 2014, as the confrontation that has been raging, and is

likely to continue for a long time to come with given sanctions, the U.S is and will remain an important economic partner for Russia for the foreseeable future. The true volume of trade, and especially investment ties could be several times larger than official statistics indicate and it would appear that the U.S is among Russia’s top five trade and economic partners, although officially it is in 6th position (Office of the U.S Trade Representative, 2019).

Table 1 The U.S Export to Russia (2014-2017)

Year Products	2014 Percentage	2015 Percentage	2016 Percentage	2017 Percentage
Planes, Helicopters, and/or Spacecraft (HS92 ID8802)	USD 5.2B (32%)	USD 2.72B (27%)	0	USD 3.46B (32%)
CARS (HS92 ID8703)	USD 1,97B (12%)	USD 618M (6.1%)	USD 623M (9.1%)	USD 602M (5.5%)
Vehicle Parts (HS92 ID8708)	USD 418M (2.5%)	USD 226M (2.2%)	USD 244M (3.6%)	USD 339M (3.1%)
Other Construction Vehicles (HS92 ID8430)	0	0	USD 137M (2%)	0
Specialized Vehicles (HS92 ID8705)	0	0	USD 97.2M (1.4%)	0
Packaged Medicaments (HS92 ID3004)	USD 381M (2.3%)	USD 302M (3%)	USD 321M (4.7%)	USD 370M (3.4%)
Electric Generating Sets (HS92 ID8502)	0	USD 199M (2%)	USD 145M (2.1%)	0
Medical Instruments (HS92 ID9018)	USD 272M (1.6%)	USD 257M (2.5%)	USD 206M (3%)	USD 218M (2%)

Soybeans (HS92 ID1201)	USD 192M (1.2%)	USD 195M (1.9%)	USD 68.7M (1%)	0
Centrifuges (HS92 ID8421)	USD 174M (1.1%)	0	USD 100M (1.5%)	USD 106M (0.98%)
Delivery Trucks (HS92 ID8704)	0	0	0	USD 114M (1%)
Excavation Machinery (HS92 ID8431)	USD 172M (1%)	USD 95.2M (0.94%)	USD 71M (1%)	0
Machinery Having Individual Functions (HS92 ID8479)	0	USD 185M (1.8%)	USD 119M (1.7%)	USD 152M (1.4%)
Other Heating Machinery (HS92 ID8419)	0	0	USD 128M (1.9%)	USD 124M (1.1%)
Valves (HS92 ID8481)	0	0	USD 109M (1.6%)	USD 85.3M (0.78%)

Source: https://www.oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/usa/rus/show/2014-2018

In 2014, the U.S export to Russia reached USD 16.5 billion, decline in 2015 to USD 10.5 billion, in 2016 is USD 6.83 billion, and in 2017 increase to USD 10.9 billion.

Russia's substantial dependence on the U.S in certain sectors of the economy, such as: metallurgy, engineering, aviation, finance, information communication technology persists, both in terms of exports and imports. It is difficult to curtail imports and exports entirely within a short period of time. Gradual diversification is necessary. First of all, this would involve reducing the role of the U.S dollar in settlements between Russia and third countries and creating

measures to protect Russia's relations with third countries from U.S. sanctions. Therefore, with unpredictable understanding of this diversification will take years to achieve. There is also an indirect negative dependence on U.S. extraterritorial sanctions that is detrimental to Russia's relations with third countries.

In fact, Russia's financial dependence on the U.S is of particular importance. This dependence is a consequence of the fact that a significant part of Russia's national wealth is made up of exports, is denominated in dollars and is even stored in U.S deposit accounts where it was previously stored in the U.S national debt. What is more, in

recent years, Russia has become a part of the American technological platform and, accordingly, the need to continue to use U.S technologies. It is unlikely that Russia will be able to get away from either quickly. What is more, Russia is still interested in obtaining American technologies for the sake of modernizing the economy and attracting capital from the U.S.

Exceptionally, partial exceptions in the nuclear sector, the mutually dependent relationship between Russia and the U.S is asymmetrical. In this regard, the decision of the Russian leadership to not resort to tit-for-tat measures in response to the U.S sanctions in banning supplies of Russian titanium alloys, rocket engines, non-ferrous metals, etc., seems completely justified. The country's economic interests dictate that this cooperation should continue. In 2019, at least there are 7 (seven) main factors for the sustainability of Russia-the U.S relations are, which is: (Официальные Сетевые Ресурсы Президента России, 2019)

First, Russia's continued dependence on the export of a range of products to the U.S and EU countries and, consequently, the desire to avoid sanctions in this area, primarily aluminum and non-ferrous metals; *Second*, the U.S' continued dependence on

the import of certain Russian products of titanium alloys and rocket engines; *Third*, the commercial attractiveness of operating on each other's markets despite the toxicity of Russian companies and the Russian market brought about by the sanctions.

Fourth, the selective nature of U.S. sanctions, which thus far are not all-encompassing and cover a small number of sectors of the Russian economy and a range of Russia-U.S economic ties; *Fifth*, Russia's connectedness to the American technological platform; *Sixth*, the continuing attractiveness of the U.S domestic market and its financial system, including for storing its national gold and foreign currency reserves, the preservation of the dollar as a world reserve currency and the currency of international settlements; *Seventh*, Russia's integration into the global financial system.

They minimize the likelihood of a further dramatic decline in economic relations between the United States and Russia, provided that the confrontation does not escalate in the coming years and total given sanctions are not introduced against Kremlin.

Russia Federation is global actor in applying strict policies against the Ukraine. In pursuing the state's political goals from Moscow, the escalation of military operations in 2014 defined the way the state behaves (Manurung, 2017). Through a combination of military and non-military operations, Russia is now slowly regaining its power through the annexation of the Crimea. The effectiveness of this method is used to determine Russia's contemporary warfare strategy. It thus explains how Russia's foreign policy and defense policy from 2000 to 2013 has dependence on Ukraine's strategic environment on Russia, and Russia's national interest in Ukraine. The main focus of this paper is on the achievement of Russia's political objectives in its military operation in Ukraine and analysis on Russia's national security components that significantly influence the interaction of this asymmetric conflict.

Whilst in International Relations studies, there is dynamics large-scale global changes are actively discussed by politicians, journalists and experts. However, in modern literature there is still no common understanding on the conditions that surrounded the disintegration of the former world order as well as of the processes, horizons and the results of the

transition to a new global order. What has been said and written about past epochs and times is valuable (Taylor, 1954; Wolfers, 1965; Morgenthau, 1978; Holsti, 1991; Kissinger, 1994; Cox, Dunne, and Booth, 2001). It is not fully applicable to the present time. However, it rises question on what conditions would cause a collapse of the global world order. And how the transitions to a different type of world order begun and aim to develop international security architecture. In what circumstances are the dynamics and time horizons of this global transition? What should be expected as a possible alternative for world major powers? Part of the problem is that research literature on the crisis of the present world order can hardly be described as extensive and complicated. Individual articles and books published so far on the present world order (See, for example, Ikenberry, 2014; Ikenberry, Parmar, and Stokes, 2018; Kissinger, 2014; Mazarr and Rhoades, 2018; Stuenkel, 2016; Bremmer, 2018; Lind and Wohlforth, 2019) are only the beginning of a profound and serious discussion. The studies on Russia and the contemporary global transition are still more limited (see, for example, Radin and Reach, 2017; Sakwa, 2017; Karaganov and Suslov, 2018). These publications are a far cry from the multitude

of studies conducted over the last three decades by the so-called agent-of-chance or leader of transition, who examined internal political transitions to liberal democracies. Perhaps now when there are problems with democracy in Western countries, too, and when transit-ology is often called as inverted scientific communism, it is time to analyze global transitions.

Researchers need to clarify the nature of the contemporary world and its development vector. What exactly is in store for us and when a growing global disorder caused by the collapse of international institutions created after 2nd World War, a new cold or even hot war; a gradual stabilization in a bipolar or multipolar world; the preservation of American domination, albeit in a modified way; or something else.

It was the U.S that started revising the world order; therefore, Russia's behavior can be considered revisionist only in relation to Washington's revisionist strategy imposed on it. The current post-Washington world transition is analyzed here in the context of theoretical studies concerning the previous post-Vienna, post-Paris, post-Versailles and post-Yalta transitions, and their historical experience. Another

conclusion, related to the main premise, is that the post-Washington transition is irreversible; yet it may take more time than the previous ones and extend beyond 2050. In the conditions of the new transition, each country will have to rethink its national strategy of struggle for survival and development. China, India and other rising powers will have to be more active in constructing an alternative economic, political, and military order beyond the reach of U.S. hegemonic influence. The post-Western and U.S.-centered world orders will have to learn to coexist to avoid mutually dangerous clashes, while competing for new opportunities on the global scale. Russia's search for self-identity is also far from over, and its success will depend on a combination of asymmetric resistance aimed at upholding the country's vital interests in the world, active efforts to build a new world order, and domestic reforms required for that.

GLOBAL TRANSITION: CHALLENGES TO WORLD ORDER

According to Henry Kissinger's definition, any world order implies a balance of power among major international actors and their recognition of certain rules of conduct (Kissinger, 2014, p. 9). These rules

reflect the participating states' ideas about the principles of justice and the distribution of power capabilities. In the theory of international relations, the understanding of transition processes in world politics, taking into account ideas and power capabilities, is characteristic of both realism and constructivism. Realist scholars give top priority to the balance of power, while constructivists assign priority to perceptions and beliefs of international actors. Apparently, both dimensions must be taken into account when one wants to understand the fundamentals of the international system and its changes.

A transition to a new world order, or *global transition*, begins with challenges to the world order posed by powers that seek to revise it. A transition ensues when such challenges are serious enough to make it impossible for the powers responsible for keeping the world order to maintain it with available means. Meanwhile, the perceptions of world transition on the part of both the powers that wish to keep the status quo and those seeking to revise it do not match their capabilities. The inertial thinking status quo powers are confident that the present difficulties are temporary and that they are able to "uphold the world," whereas the ambitious revisionists tend to exaggerate

their ability to change the world. Russia's then Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov spoke about these opportunities back in the 1990s, long before the global transition processes began (Primakov, 1996). In America, many people viewed, and still view, Russia as an internally weak and purely regional power, although it has already demonstrated its considerable military and political capabilities not only in Eurasia regions but also in the Middle East (Gunitsky and Tsygankov, 2018).

A transition gains momentum if it is accompanied not only by destructive but also creative processes and efforts to build the foundation of a future world order. In the history of international relations, creative processes of this kind occurred rarely enough to make a smooth transition and were accompanied by wars. In his classic study, *War and Change in World Politics*, Robert Gilpin showed that powers that considered themselves guarantors of the world order needed wars to prevent the rise of new powers (Gilpin, 1981). It was wars that historically secured a new balance of power and rules of conduct for nations, including defeated countries. The main issue with regard to the latter was whether they should be included as full-fledged actors of the new world order or denied the ability to

pursue independent foreign and home policies. Both things are fundamental for great powers, confirming the important spheres of influence and internal sovereignty.

A global transition continues until the processes of destruction, creation and violence, inherent in it, end with the formation of a new balance of power and

(Isti, 1991; Kissinger, 1994; Schroeder, 1994; Bogaturov, 2000, 2003, 2004; Tsygankov, 2012).

new rules of conduct, recognized and supported by powers responsible for implementation of strategic policy in International Politics.

Since the Westphalian era, the history of International Relations has seen several world transitions, which are analyzed in research literature (Ho

Table 2 Russia-West Dynamics International Relations

Year Events	1830	Mid 1840	1856	1871-1918 (47 years)
a) The Great Britain increasing sphere of influence	1) Russia and Turkey sphere of influence weakened; 2) British political economy sphere of influence boosting in Middle East region; 3) France and Austria did not directly challenge the system but wanted more influence for themselves and the weakening of Russia; 4) France wanted			

	<p>to establish new relations with Turkey Constantinople in order to balance regional power;</p> <p>5) Austria wanted to enlarge influence over Danube principalities in the Balkans.</p>			
<p>a) Turkey Ottoman breakup;</p> <p>b) Vienna concert established</p>		<p>1) Weakening principles of rule-based order;</p> <p>2) Russia did not seek to change system rule;</p> <p>3) Russia only protect Orthodox believers rights in Turkey Ottoman Empire;</p> <p>4) Russia preserve its prestige of a European state; keep its fleet in the Black Sea;</p> <p>5) Britain had never fully accepted Russia's leadership in the Vienna concert;</p> <p>6) Britain became the</p>		

		main revisionist power.		
a) Congress of Paris (1856)			1) The Crimean War began and resolved the growing differences among European powers; 2) Russia lost Crimean War, rejected by European powers to protect Orthodox believers beyond its borders and the right to have a Black Sea fleet 3) It created new world order.	
a) Post Congress of Paris (1856-1871); b) World War I (1914-1918); c) Versailles Peace Treaty (1918); d) World War II (1939-1945); e) Yalta Conference (1945); f) The United Nations				1) Russia's unilateral denunciation of the Congress of Paris provisions; 2) Russia's sovereign rights & violations of the Congress provisions by European powers; 3) Britain readiness to fight for European powers

<p>established on 24 October 1945;</p> <p>g) Cold War (1945-1990)</p> <p>h) Post-Cold War (1990-present)</p>				<p>status quo;</p> <p>4) Prussia, later is Germany, made a deal with Russia in exchange for major dividends;</p> <p>5) 1871-World War 1 (1914-1918) is the period years of Anarchy;</p> <p>6) Germany manifested itself as a major revisionist power;</p> <p>7) Before 1st WW began, Russia, Great Britain & France formed military alliance, well-known as 'Triple Entente';</p> <p>8) Triple Entente countries sought to maintain their positions & influence in Europe by containing Germany ambitious sphere of influence;</p> <p>9) Balkan wars</p>
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				<p>for influence eventually led to a destructive war;</p> <p>10) The emergence of a new world order based on the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1918;</p> <p>11) The rise of Germany & the election of Adolf Hitler in 1933 as country's Chancellor;</p> <p>12) Germany withdrew from the League of Nations;</p> <p>13) Germany reoccupied the Rhineland in violation of the Treaty of Versailles (1936);</p> <p>14) Soviet Union attempted to create a collective security system to contain Germany aggressor behavior, which failed</p>
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				<p>due to differences among European powers;</p> <p>15) Hitler concluded agreements with Britain & France in Munich (1938), and signed agreement with Moscow in 1939;</p> <p>16) World War II began in 1939 up to 1945;</p> <p>17) Difficult negotiations at the Yalta Conference (1945);</p> <p>18) Yalta Conference formulated the contours of a new world order, and denying Germany not only spheres of influence but also internal sovereignty</p> <p>19) Yalta agreements remained valid.</p> <p>20) Both the Soviet Union and</p>
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				<p>the U.S informally recognized their spheres of influence in Europe & viewed the UN as a place for debating the principles of international security;</p> <p>21) The emergence of a new status quo, along with new powers.</p>
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Source: constructed by reasearcher

The post-Vienna transition began in the mid-1840s with the weakening of the principles rule-based order established by the Vienna system, as its members sought to take advantage of the Turkey Ottoman Empire’s breakup.

Russia did not seek to change the rules of the system, wishing only to further protect the rights of Orthodox believers on the territory of the Ottoman Empire, preserve its prestige of a European state and keep its fleet in the Black Sea. England, which had never fully accepted Russia’s leadership in the Vienna concert, and the

United Kingdom became the main revisionist power.

English politicians, such Lord Palmerston already in the 1830s thought of increasing England’s influence by weakening Russia and Turkey. The economic and political influence of Britain in the Middle East grew, whetting the appetite of the ruling class. France and Austria did not directly challenge the system but wanted more influence for themselves and the weakening of Russia. France wanted to have new relations with Turkey Constantinople, while Austria wanted greater influence over Danube principalities

in the Balkans. The Crimean War resolved the growing differences among the powers, as the 1856 Congress of Paris created a new world order. As British historian Alan Taylor wrote, the main target of the war was not Turkey or the Balkans but a revision of the entire European system of power relations (Taylor, 1954, p. 61). Russia, which lost the Crimean War, was denied the right to protect Orthodox believers beyond its borders and the right to have a Black Sea fleet.

The post-Paris transition was launched by Alexander Gorchakov's famous note to European powers in 1871, which notified them of Russia's unilateral denunciation of the Congress of Paris provisions. The note referred to both Russia's sovereign rights and violations of the Congress provisions by European powers. Of these, only Britain showed readiness to fight for the status quo. Others were either too weak or, like Prussia which became Germany, made a deal with Russia in exchange for major dividends. The subsequent years, until World War I, are known as the years of anarchy, during which Germany manifested itself as a major revisionist power, while countries of the Triple Entente sought to maintain their positions and influence in Europe by

containing Germany ambitious sphere of influence.

The Triple Entente was the military alliance formed between Russia, Great Britain, and France before World War I. An example of Triple Entente is Russia, Great Britain, and France's formal bond which was formalized in 1907 to offset the alliance formed between Imperial Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. Balkan wars for influence eventually led to a destructive war and the emergence of a new world order based on the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1918.

The post-Versailles transition was made possible by the rise of Germany and the election of Adolf Hitler in 1933 as the country's Chancellor. Shortly after that, Germany withdrew from the League of Nations, which it had been forced to enter earlier, resumed military conscription and launched a large-scale military build-up program. In 1936, it reoccupied the Rhineland in violation of the Treaty of Versailles. Attempts by the Soviet Union to create a collective security system to contain the aggressor failed due to differences among European powers. In 1938, Hitler concluded agreements with Britain and France in Munich, and in 1939 he signed an

agreement with Moscow. Neither agreement prevented a new world war. After the war was over, the allied powers, following difficult negotiations at the Yalta Conference in 1945, formulated the contours of a new world order, denying Germany not only spheres of influence but also internal sovereignty.

The Yalta system was soon challenged by the Cold War. There emerged two competing world orders based on antagonistic ideologies and political systems. Both the Soviet Union and the West sought to change the balance of military and political power. They did not recognize each other's spheres of influence and sought to undermine each other's political systems.

A series of crises from Berlin to Cuba, Europe, and Afghanistan shook the world until the 1980s. Nevertheless, some principles of the Yalta agreements remained valid. In particular, both the Soviet Union and the U.S informally recognized their spheres of influence in Europe and viewed the United Nations as a place for debating the principles of international security. This factor facilitated a dialogue between the two major powers and periods of *détente*. Unlike previous world transitions, the Cold War did

not lead to a hot war, largely, due to a nuclear deterrence system. The development of world transition processes during that period could be explained by the Soviet Union's economic slowdown in the 1970s, and its growing inability to maintain military parity with the U.S.

As seen from the above, the time spans of international transitions range from relatively short too long. The post-Vienna and post-Versailles transitions were short, each taking about ten years and ending in wars among major powers. The post-Paris transition was the longest, taking about forty seven years. The post-Yalta transition, with the above reservations, lasted from the mid-1970s until 1989 when the Cold War ended. It was followed by the emergence of a new status quo, along with new powers, the U.S. and Western Europe as that were ready to guarantee the observance of the new world order. Since America played the main role in its establishment, it can rightly be called the Washington order.

RUSSIA INTEREST: MOVING ON GLOBAL TRANSITION

Russia's position in the Washington world order differed from that of Germany in the Versailles and Yalta systems. No one

imposed, or could impose, reparations or disarmament on Moscow, much less a division of the country. Even a discussion of this was impossible. Russia was not defeated in the Cold War; it ended it together with the West on the basis of a temporary unity of interests.

However, the Yalta rules, which Moscow expected to be respected, were in many respects violated by Washington, which was the main revisionist of these rules. Many officials in the Bill Clinton administration viewed Russia as a defeated power and expected it to submit to America's foreign policy priorities (Cohen, 2009; Stent 2014). Few people in the U.S believed that the end of the Cold War was a victory for both sides. Washington, as the only superpower, placed emphasis not on reaching new agreements on the delimitation of spheres of responsibility and common rules of conduct, but on global propagation of the principle of democracy, which the American establishment largely viewed as the only acceptable principle of legitimacy (Plattner, 1988).

Russia was treated not like France in the Concert of Europe but much like Imperial Russia defeated in the Crimean War and deprived of a large part of its

spheres of influence and internal sovereignty. After the Soviet Union's breakup, the West extended its influence to Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and many of former Soviet republics and contributed to Russia's internal reforms following the Washington consensus model.

It is due to the Russia and Western powers jointly negotiated spheres of influences in Yalta following World War II, many in Russia saw the U.S. decision to expand NATO as an attempt to take advantage of Russia's power weakness and fulfill the security vacuum in Europe following the Cold War. Washington did not want to affront the Kremlin and introduced new global rules on an ad hoc basis and without any formal settlement at a special official gathering. Still, the fact that the Warsaw Pact was disbanded, while NATO persisted, meant for America that the West had won the Cold War.

As a defeated power, Russia was expected not to challenge the West's priority, accept American military interventions, and the Western liberal narrative of universal values. American and European leaders frequently criticized Russian leaders for human rights violations and heavy handed domestic policies in

Chechnya regions. Such an approach even amounted to attempts to limit Russia's sovereignty in settling internal issues, for instance, in organizing domestic institutions as Russia's leaders saw appropriate.

Not surprisingly, Russia became the main revisionist power in relation to the Washington world order imposed on it (Sakwa, 2017; Bordachev, 2018; Krickovic, 2018). Scholars have established that recognition of a power by the established great powers reduces its assertiveness and revisionism, whereas misrecognition encourages revisionist behavior (Tsygankov, 2012; Murrey, 2019)

The analysis of the current post-Washington world transition has revealed several different positions. The most noticeable of them are alarmism and stability positions. Alarmists rightly draw attention to accelerating global trends towards the destruction and decay of various international institutions and subsystems. For example, the authors of the October 2018 Valdai Report used the metaphor of a crumbling world order to describe these trends. Those people believe this process is irreversible and that it is impossible to recreate the foundations of global regulation (Valdai Report, 2018). Another position that

is close to that of Alarmists is that a new Cold War is unfolding between Russia and the West, which may have unpredictable consequences. The danger of this confrontation was emphasized, in particular, by Sergei Karaganov and Dmitry Suslov, who see an attempt by the West to change the global balance of power in its favor behind this confrontation (Karaganov, 2016; Karaganov and Suslov, 2018). In the United States, ideas close to alarmism were expressed, in particular, by Stephen Cohen (Cohen, 2009) and Robert Legvold (Legvold, 2016).

Supporters of the stability position or Stabilizers hold that the idea of a decaying world order is exaggerated. Liberal supporters of this position both in Russia and Western countries consider it possible and desirable to preserve the world order shaped after the end of the Cold War. According to Richard Haass, President of the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, this world order rested mainly on a harmony of interests and led to unprecedented stability and prosperity in the world. People sharing this view, among them Gilford John Ikenberry, a renowned theorist of International Relations, admit that the liberal world order is in a deep crisis (Ikenberry, Parmar, and Stokes, 2018), but they attribute

this crisis to the way this world order is implemented, rather than to its basic principles. The director of the Russian International Affairs Council, Andrei Kortunov, in his article *The Inevitable, Weird World*, also insists that there are no alternatives to the world order based on the principles of rationality, normativity and openness (Kortunov, 2016). Russian liberals agree that the international positions of the U.S and the West have weakened significantly; yet they may strengthen in the near future as the West remains the leader of political, technological and economic development, while the world order, shaped after the Cold War, is generally rational and needs to be improved rather than transformed. Even if the U.S. falls short of expectations, Russia should pin its hopes on Europe as it positions itself as an integral part of it (Kortunov, 2016; RCIA, 2017; Yavlinsky, 2017).

Some scholars and experts close to realist thinking also consider fears of a world order collapse exaggerated. Realists believe that the world remains, and will largely remain, under the influence of the U.S as the sole superpower. It is obvious to them that the U.S. will remain the world's undisputed leader in the development of technology and weapon systems, even

despite a relative decrease in America's share in the world economy and trade. For example, Nuno Monteiro, a prominent theorist of unipolar, links the preservation and development of unipolarity not so much to economic resources and economic shifts in the world, as to the U.S' targeted state policy in the field of military technology and military capabilities (Monteiro, 2014, p. 48). A similar view was expressed by William Wohlforth at the latest meeting of the Valdai Club in Sochi. He drew the audience's attention to a persisting gap between the military capabilities of America and the rest of the world (Wohlforth, 2018).

Both Alarmists and Stabilizers correctly grasp the meaning of the important trends, but they exaggerate their significance. Alarmists underestimate the importance of both destructive and constructive processes in the world, which implicitly lays the ground for a future world order. In addition, they tend to diminish the U.S' ability to regenerate the foundations of its power, even though not based on liberal principles, thus sabotaging and prolonging the transition to a new world order. Stabilizers are overly skeptic about the non-West's ability to reduce the aforementioned technological gap and create alternative and stable political and international institutions.

The ongoing world transition has both destructive and creative tendencies, which are closely intertwined. The transition began in the mid-2000s and has since been gaining momentum after a series of color revolutions in Eurasia and the Middle East, irreparable mistakes of the liberal West, and the rise of nationalist political parties and sentiments in the world. Although the U.S. remains a military superpower, people are witnessing a shift in military and economic power and a serious weakening of the ideological and political authority of America and the West in the world.

RUSSIA COMPETING STRATEGIES WITH OTHER MAJOR POWERS

In the era of half-life and world transition, only those survive who can adapt external and internal conditions to their needs, thus exerting an important influence on the balance of power and rules in a future world order. A withdrawal into isolation, even temporary, is not possible today due to the “turbulence” of the global world and its relative openness. The present time requires strategies in which firmness in defending sovereignty would be combined with a flexible ability to create something new and desirable in the economic, information, military, and political spheres. The

implementation of such strategies will require a strong, creatively minded and target-focused state. Such a state should be able to go beyond economic macro-regulation, invest in optimal international projects and support sectors and industries that are the most promising for that purpose (Hemerijck, 2013; Tsygankov, 2015; Kurlantzick, 2016).

European countries interested in preserving the former “liberal” world order will have to broaden their horizons of thinking and change internally, since the “European Union” project is no longer a guarantor of neither internal prosperity, nor an appropriate model for others to follow. It is hard to tell how this project should be overhauled, but its success in the future world order after 2050 is far from guaranteed. Obviously, the EU will have to turn towards Asia and Eurasia, but European elites have yet to realize the importance of such a turn and prepare for it.

This also partly applies to the U.S, but only if President Donald Trump turns out to be an aberration and if the new Democratic elite demonstrates willingness for global economic and political integration. More likely is the continuation, in one way or another, of the Trump-launched great-power

nationalism project, already supported by a large part of the U.S. public and elites. The project is aimed at reducing Washington's international obligations and retaining its superpower status, especially in the military-industrial, energy and IT spheres (Posen, 2018). To achieve this goal, America will need internal transformations and a new foreign policy that will not be limited to measures of military-political pressure and economic sanctions, which are hallmarks of Trump's policy. Such measures have already been used against the Democratic Peoples' of Republic Korea, the People's Republic of China, Iran, Europe, Russia, and Latin American countries. Despite Washington's confidence that its policy of dictate will be effective, these measures may cost it dearly in the future.

The strategy of revisionist powers should combine measures of asymmetrical resistance to uphold their major interests in the world and active efforts to build a world order that would be alternative to the previous one and carry out domestic reforms required for that. Asymmetry in defending basic national interests today is not only necessary but also quite possible. As Otto von Bismarck once said, there are times when the strong is weak because of his scruples and the weak grows strong because

of his audacity. Today, weakness is a distinguishing feature of not only countries but also international associations of the once-united West, which opens up new opportunities for Russia, China and all those not willing to return to the position of second-rate powers. The goal of asymmetrical counteraction is achievable as it is not a victory over the adversary but its inability to continue the offensive. As Brantly Womack, a theorist of asymmetric international relations wrote about such relations, the weaker side cannot threaten the position of the stronger side, but the stronger side cannot impose its will on the weaker side at an affordable cost (Womack, 2016, p. 1).

The formulation and implementation of such a strategy will involve many difficulties, including the risk of confronting the more developed economies, the choice of internal development areas, the identification of promising international projects, and administrative strengthening of the state. The protection of basic interests should be commensurate with creative goals for a relatively long-term beyond 2050 perspective.

The ongoing world transition is difficult for those who have not yet taken

sides regarding the new world order. The practice of non-aligned countries during the Cold War years shows that playing both sides of the fence is very difficult, yet possible. Partly this is already happening. Countries that used to belong to the U.S. sphere of global influence are now building their own relations with China, Russia and other revisionist powers. For example, they sign defense contracts with them, despite Washington's protests. Yet, today this strategy involves considerable difficulties. Its implementation requires not only strong political will, but also a certain balance of power in the world and consent from external powers. Both factors are now lacking. The world is witnessing a global reshaping of markets, regional systems, and military-political alliances, which complicates the choice for many countries.

Each country has to make a difficult choice. The global transition has begun and cannot be reversed. A new world order is on the horizon, and the real struggle for it is still ahead. New issues on the agenda are initiative, will and the ability to make strategic decisions. The alternatives are chaos and a loss of the status of a major player in world politics.

CONCLUSION

Russia always enjoyed the privilege to pursue an independent foreign policy over the course of its thousand-year history. In the future, Russia will continue to take proper measures to strengthen national sovereignty. Post 911, Russia certainly does not do it at the expense of the security of other countries, including the U.S.

However, the thaw in U.S.-Russian relations did not last long. Frictions arose in 2011 as the Arab Spring rocked the Middle East. The U.S.-led overthrow of the Muammar Qaddafi regime in Libya and Washington's support for the opposition to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad were especially neuralgic for the Russian leadership.

When Vladimir Putin returned to the presidency in 2012, his abrupt change of course on domestic policy was another major blow to the reeling relationship. Medvedev's efforts to modernize and reform the Russian economy and politics were largely abandoned, and the relaxation of the domestic political climate was abruptly reversed with the introduction of measures to clamp down on public protests, media freedoms, and activities of foreign and Russian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to promote Russian civil society.

In 2014, U.S.-Russia relations plummeted to their lowest since the end of the Cold War when Russia responded to the U.S.-welcomed revolution in Ukraine by annexing Crimea and sponsoring a separatist insurgency in eastern Ukraine. Inside Russia, the breakdown was accompanied by further constraints on weakened democratic institutions and civil society. Animosity in the United States toward Russia in the wake of its aggression against Ukraine was further inflamed by the revelation of Russian meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

The reason is Russia leaders and policy-makers new understanding of the role played by the leaders of major global and regional powers and their ideas of a better and just world order. The idea that the global competition is between the liberal-minded U.S and other Western countries, on the one hand, and non-Western supporters of the Westphalian world order, on the other, became obsolete several. It should be replaced by a more flexible and realistic understanding of complex ideological and political cooperation and rivalry in a world where there can be global alliances of nationalists, liberals, left, and right populists and representatives of other political groups,

all united into a single coalition of Western and non-Western leaders.

It is still relevant, as never before in recent decades, to assess the significance of domestic politics in international political processes. The world is undergoing deep-rooted national and international transformations accompanied by ideological reassessment of the customary understanding of liberalism, nationalism and other 'isms' which will have a decisive influence on the character of leaders and their choice of international behavior strategies. The nature and degree of internal political stability of societies and their ability to survive and counter external pressure, and mobilize to resolve important strategic issues are of no less fundamental importance.

In conclusion I would like to quote President John F. Kennedy, namely a few sentences from his famous speech of June 10, 1963 regarding the U.S relations with Soviet Union: "If we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal".

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