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## EDITORIAL:

### **Towards Indonesian School of Thought of International Relations**

Greetings from the Indonesian Journal of International Relations (IJIR)!

We are glad to launch IJIR as an official journal published by Indonesian Association for International Relations (Asosiasi Ilmu Hubungan Internasional Indonesia – AIHII). The current publication of IJIR is the inaugural edition as result of continuous commitment, efforts and teamwork from leadership and all members of the Association, AIHII since three years ago.

We are delighted to maintain our contribution as epistemic community of International Relations in developing and advancing knowledge, research, and studies of International Relations in Indonesia. This volume 1 number 1, 2017 is the first step to codify, present and disseminate ideas systematically that can be greater benefits to students, researchers, lecturers, policy makers, business people, politicians, opinion leaders and general public.

This publication is also the first step towards a vision on developing Indonesian School of thought of International Relations. In essence, it is an alternative point of view, perspective, concept, yet theories about International Relations with special consideration of, but not limited to, norms, values, facts, precedents, habits, behavior and ways of thinking of Indonesian.

We are fully aware that we choose uneasy trajectory towards new knowledge and understanding. Provoking, debatable, yet challenging efforts are meant to encourage Indonesian scholars to conduct and write research on Indonesia and the world from the point of view of Indonesian scholars. However, we also welcome foreign scholars to share their ideas about Indonesia and International Relations in this journal. In the end, we visualize that there will be alternative narrative on Indonesia and International Relations as complimentary of existing explanation.

As a beginning of this long journey, an inaugural edition of this journal consists of five interesting manuscripts related to Asia region with different topics and field of explanation.

The first article entitled "*Can We Reinvent International Studies on Southeast Asia for the Post Western World?*" written by Suzie S. Sudarman. This article basically aims to analyze the possibility of transformation of international studies from Western world to non-Western countries. This article identifies the key elements for the research agenda to advancing the discipline, such as the nature of violence which often occurs in non-Western nations; the type of markets that occurs, and other realities that require further investigation and will be able to produce much

improved detailed narratives about how the non-Western world can influence global politics for instance.

The second article, written by Andi Purwono, entitled *"Islam in Foreign Policy: Promotion of Moderate Islam in Indonesia Foreign Policy 2004-2014"*. This article mainly talks about the shifting of Islam dynamics in Indonesia foreign policy, which Indonesia in the present is promoting moderate Islam in international relations. It also argues that promotion of moderate Islam in Indonesia foreign policy was constructed by Islamic norm, Islam rahmatan lil alamin norm.

Yuhao Wen wrote *"Political Rise or Standstill: Chinese-Indonesian Oligarchs in the 2014 National Legislative Election"*, as our third article. This article aims to introduce the general performance of Chinese-Indonesian candidates in the legislative election at the state level since 1999, basically focuses on analyzing media tycoon Hary Tanoesoedibjo's experience in the 2014 election. This article finds that he has been credited by political scientists and Chinese-Indonesian scholars for a certain degree of break-through in the Indonesian political landscape.

The fourth article is *"Chinese Dissident Game Two Players between the U.S. and China PRC"*, written by Susy Tekunan. This article aims to analyze the decision that the U.S. took upon the request of a Chinese dissent requesting for asylum when the U.S. Secretary of State came to China for a diplomatic visit. It also extracted the international issue between two contending countries using the game theory to consider the implication and thus to find a solution to the conundrum.

Meanwhile the fifth article entitled *"Poverty and the Linkage to Criminal Enhancement and Human Trafficking in Cambodia"*, written by Dwi Ardiyanti. This article aims to analyze the criminal enhancement in Cambodia, particularly poverty and human trafficking. It identifies that human trafficking is the most alarming problem currently and is getting worse since 2015 when ASEAN Economic Community declared for free trade service among ASEAN member states. Therefore, it also analyzes how this activity affects the cooperation of all member states.

Last but not least, we would like to thank and appreciate all the editors from respected International Relations Department across Universities in Indonesia who have been working tremendously under the IJIR publication task force as mandated by The 6<sup>th</sup> Indonesian Association for International Relations National Convention since November 2015. We should mention instrumental individuals such as Ade Marup Wirasenjaya (Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta), Susy Tekunan (Universitas Pelita Harapan), Elizabeth Dewi (Parahyangan Centre for International Studies, Universitas Parahyangan), Ayusia Sabitha Kusuma (Universitas Jenderal Soedirman), Sylvia Yazid (Universitas Parahyangan), Pamungkas Ayudhaning Dewanto and Tangguh Chairil (Universitas Bina Nusantara).

Many thanks to authors who have submitted their manuscripts, revised it and been waited patiently for this publication. For the reviewers who have worked hard to meet the deadline and improved the quality of the submitted manuscripts with constructive comments, we would like to give our highest appreciation. We also would like to thanks to layout editors for this publication namely Erenst Elmerreno, Ciko Fadilah and Muhammad Dio. Finally, we understand that there are many rooms for innovate to increase quality and consistency of this publication. We hope that by working together as an epistemic community of International Relations in Indonesia, we will do better for the next publication and for Indonesia.

Thank you very much.

Jakarta, 31 July 2017

**Prof. Dr. Tirta N. Mursitama, PhD**

Editor – in – Chief

Indonesian Journal of International Relations (IJIR)

# Can We Reinvent International Studies on Southeast Asia for the Post Western World?

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## Abstract

*At present with the realization that the non-Western world can also give a large contribution towards the present global dynamics and institutional development in the global context, international studies need to add to the discipline the new understanding of the non-Western experience in international politics and how that this phenomenon influences global affairs. In order to holistically understand the non-Western world and its increasing effect on global politics, it is necessary for international studies to transform. A couple of key elements must become a part of the research agenda that will advance the discipline. For example, the nature of violence which often occurs in non-Western nations; the type of markets that occurs, and other realities that require further investigation and will be able to produce much improved detailed narratives about how the non-Western world can influence global politics.*

**Keywords:** international studies must transform; and understand the nature of violence; the type of markets that occurs and other realities in the non-Western world that affect global politics.

## Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War the Asia-Pacific region draws increased attention but there is a gap between the rich comparative and foreign policy scholarship on China, Japan, and the United States with the wider world of international relations theory. Although Pierre Lizée's work, quoting Stanley Hoffmann, puts forward an argument that international studies as a discipline assumes that it speaks to the nature of politics throughout the entire world (Lizée, 2011: 17) (Hoffman, 1977: 41-60), it is evident that the study of Southeast Asia in particular tends to be under-theorized (Ikenberry & Mastanduno, 2003: 1).

The images, concepts, and theories which underlie international studies as

Hoffmann argued, must be recognized for what they are: product of the post-1945 era, when "to study United States foreign policy was to study the international system and to study the international system could not fail to bring one back to the role of the United States" (Hoffman, 1977: 41-60). The nature of American hegemony in the Asia Pacific region when it consolidated after the Second World War is distinctive, multidimensional, and known as the San Francisco System (Calder, 2004: 135-157). There are some main institutional features that needed to be highlighted: (Calder, 2004: 139) a dense network of formal security alliances mainly bilateral, between the United States and the key nations of the Pacific; a hub-and-spoke network of bilateral ties radiating from Washington, apart from ANZUS, the San Francisco

System did not create a multilateral security structure; it is a highly asymmetrical structure, in both economic and security dimension, the system offered military protection and economic access to non US participants, while failing to impose analogous collective defense obligations upon them.

Since 1993 multilateralism has slowly emerged to modify the hub-and-spokes bilateral arrangements. APEC (The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) has ventured into some security dimensions, multilateral development bank has been more active, ASEAN Plus Three process began but lingering historical boundaries and complex domestic politics in key nations, make it unclear just how ASEAN Plus Three can ultimately undermine the security elements of the San Francisco System (Calder, 2004: 151). Serious deterrence remains the province of the established bilateral alliances. In addition, unsettled boundaries were a major element of the System within Northeast Asia and helped make Northeast Asia “the Arc of Crisis” that it has been ever since. And the Chinese seemingly insatiable appetite for resources and energy presented environmental challenge and increased the prospects of greater volatility in transpacific alliance relations that necessitate an ability to communicate and renew strategic bargains.

America’s unprecedented global power seems to be exercised through a global system of distinctively American design that mirrors the domestic American experience. The game is not imposition, but cooptation, reinforced by America’s domination of the global culture, the clout of (its) technological edge and its global military reach. American global supremacy derives from “an elaborate system of alliances and coalitions that literally span

the globe, in addition to the global web of specialized organizations, especially the international financial institutions.” (Brzezinski, 1997: 24-29) In the post-Cold War era, from 1990 to 2001, US foreign policy was already moving toward a global strategy. The post 9/11 strategy is a continuity of this strategy although there was a profound shift in its goals (Crawford, 2004: 686).

Other intellectual traditions, most notably from the United Kingdom and France have also influenced the evolution of international studies but the field has remained profoundly Western affairs (Lizee, 2011: 1). The concepts which have framed the central claims and debates in the field were drawn from the Western experience (Lizee, 2011: 1). The problems that have constituted the main focus of international studies are the problems of the Western world. (Lizee, 2011: 1)

### *A Fundamental Shift in World Affairs*

Now that the non-Western world contributes to an unprecedented degree to the power dynamics and institutional developments underlying the evolution of global politics, international studies had to bring to the discipline a greater awareness of the non-Western experience of international politics and of how it will affect global affairs.

To understand fully the non-Western world and its growing impact on global politics, then, international studies itself had to change. Numbers of key elements certainly had to become part of the research agenda driving the discipline. The nature of violence, the nature of the state in the non-Western world, the nature of market, and other such realities all had to be studied in more detail in order to produce a

better account of the way in which the non-Western world will influence global politics.

The question posed by Lizée pertains to the following: do international studies have within itself the concepts and theories that allow it to understand the post-Western world? (Lizée, 2011: 3-4) It is obvious that we need to move beyond the all-consuming debate between proponents of a language of universals in the discipline, and proponents of a language of particulars that, in truth, can never be resolved. In this context, the discipline should still aim to speak a language of universals—but one that, along the lines that is more dynamic. The question for our times for international studies: how can we capture, in our explanations of global politics, the changes brought in the varying nature of world affairs by the “rise of the rest”? (Lizée, 2011: 10)

The post-Western literature must address what is specific about the non-Western world, but they must also help in developing concepts that will extend beyond the non-Western world that will be able to explain the character of the whole post-Western world emerging at the moment (Lizée, 2011: 10).

In a world without certainty, or that an absolute set of principles that compels us by their composition to believe in them is impossible, truth can only be obtained by engaging in persuasion dialogue and putting different views in conversation with one another. Political Science and International Studies on Southeast Asia in particular is approaching such a crossroads.

### *The Challenge in the Search for New Universals in Global Politics*

Pierre Lizée argued that there are at least four specific elements that specialists in international studies must focus on if

they want to understand better the new global politics emerging as result of the “rise of the rest” (Lizée, 2011: 193-194): the first of these elements concern the nature of violence. Most specialists need to understand fully how violence operates. Lizée deems such study of the zones of violence that exist in the non-Western world and of the likely local, regional, and global responses to these situations (Lizée, 2011).

The second element that must be integrated in international studies if the discipline is to explain the new global politics is the broader understanding of the nature of the state (Lizée, 2011). The way that the state was developed is crucial. The state was often created from the outside, in ways that, to this day, lead to sustained conflicts and tensions, and to the efforts to sustain the state.

The third and fourth elements have to do with democratization and economic development (Lizée, 2011: 1). There have been negotiations of liberal and non-liberal identities. There is also the possibility of the emergence of global capitalism and global political economy that could differ in significant degree from the liberal models that often guide the study of emerging markets.

Earlier, post-realism, point to this circumstance as important, as it identifies the profound limitations and distortions that could occur within the realist perspective that has been constructed through the negation of particular areas of human experience (Beer & Hariman, 1996: 8). It seems appropriate to cite Beer and Hariman that there really is a tremendous need to open up a post-realist space, that is structured less on a rigid opposition between realism and idealism but rather by a sense of radical inclusiveness (Beer & Hariman, 1996: 10). This may be deemed

appropriate in the realm of knowledge production concerning the non-Western world, as post-realism seeks to rectify the limitations and distortions that comes with far too selective an account of the actual determinants of political history, preempting the capacity for action within the varied forms of human collectivities (Beer & Hariman, 1996: 8). Beer and Hariman's views are particularly relevant as they point to a trained incapacity of the realist discourses in assessing processes of modernization, political economy, nationalism and other important determinants in foreign affairs (Beer & Hariman, 1996: 21). Since the September 11 tragedy the concept of post-realism hasn't been developed further.

The realist discourses, when used to investigate political transitions, seem to have seriously underestimated factors such as culturally-shaped skills, habits, and styles that will explain what is distinctive about the behavior of groups and society. Unlike the work of Ann Swidler that describes how bursts of ideological activism may occur when competing ways of organizing action are developing, although more often such movements are not complete cultures because some of their understanding still depends on traditional patterns (Swidler, 1986: 279). In this particular period of cultural transformation, ideology forms around ethos, so it is in concrete situations in which these cultural models are enacted that determine which takes root and which withers (Swidler, 1986: 280).

Ann Swidler views that culture influences action not by providing the ultimate values toward which action is oriented. Rather it generally shapes a repertoire or "tool kit," habits, skills, and styles from which people construct "strategies of action." Swidler then

develops two models of cultural influence for settled and unsettled periods (Swidler, 1986).

*"In settled periods, culture independently influences action, but only by providing resources from which people can construct diverse line of action. In unsettled cultural periods, explicit ideologies directly govern action, but structural opportunities for action determine which among competing ideologies survive in the long run."*

Swidler further discusses (Swidler, 1986) the fact that people don't build lines of action from scratch, for example, choosing instead the most efficient means to given ends beginning with some prefabricated links (Swidler, 1986). People tend to construct chains of action beginning with the links that culture shapes and organizes. They will value ends for which their cultural equipment is well suited (Swidler, 1986: 284).

*"...a culture has enduring effects on those who hold it, not by shaping the ends they pursue, but by providing the characteristic repertoire from which they build lines of action."* (Swidler, 1986)

Other scholars have largely acknowledged that since the late 1980s there has been a radical paradigmatic shift in the various fields of humanities and social sciences, i.e. attempts to develop a non-essentialist view of culture. This paradigmatic shift, variously referred to as "post-modern," "post-colonial," "reflexive," etc. also serves as a major impetus for the initiation of this study.

Anthropologists who are inspired by Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, Jacques Deridda, and Michel de Certeau provide more opportunities to understand the fragility, ambiguities, and historical



ruptures evident in symbolic systems. Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault in particular provide new ways of thinking about culture's relationship to social stratification and power (Weeden, 2002: 713-728). By contrast, an alternative model sees culture not as a unified system that pushes action in a consistent direction. Rather, it is more like a "tool kit" or repertoire from which actors select differing pieces for constructing lines of action (Swidler, 1986: 273-286).

In the 1990s Samuel Huntington came up with another model that saw culture as a specific group's primordial values and traits, but that clearly is untenable empirically. This group traits version of culture dismissed the diversity of views and experiences of contention within the group under study. By assuming deeply embedded understandings rather than showing their existence, we were constrained in registering transformations in level or fractures in systems of knowledge (Weeden, 2002). Peter J. Katzenstein (Katzenstein, 2010: 5-6) offered a different definition of civilization than that mentioned by Huntington: civilizations are viewed as configurations, constellations, or complexes which are not fixed in space or time; they are both internally, highly differentiated and culturally loosely integrated. Because they are differentiated, civilization transplants selectively. Because they are culturally loosely integrated they generate debate and contestations. And as social constructions of primordiality, civilization can become political reification. They are also weakly institutionalized social orders reflected in and shaped by a variety of practices and processes. They evolve gradually in response to their internal pluralism and their external encounters.

Divergent histories do have different effects on the process of globalization. As

we cannot find political, economic, technological, and cultural changes that are proceeding in the same fashion, we may expect unpredictability in the course of ethnic relations. Danilyn Rutherford (Rutherford, 2003) argues that divergent systems of practice may incline certain actors to appropriate global narratives in their own distinctive ways (Rutherford, 2003: 235).

Manuel Castells describes the transnational network society (Castells, 2010), or more specifically, the idea of the weakening of the nation-state, seems to need a more contextualized, empirically grounded, and culturally sensitive analysis. Different historic-cultural, ethnic backgrounds, and emotional perceptions can severely impact any negotiating process or more specifically, histories of nationalism and internal politics can lead to a sense of stubbornness and rigidity against global integration. By contrast, the pursuit of cooperation on a particular functional issue can greatly assist in the creation of a momentum for national identity to be placed in a broader political process, as there will be a clearer understanding of the potential gains that may accrue.

Looking back at Indonesia's history for example, we find Benedict Anderson's view of particular interest as he considers capitalism as enabling the first nationalist movement to flower. Anderson's work describes how imagining the nation arose historically, and in the process enhanced by the convergence of capitalism and print technology (Anderson, 1998). Nationality arose from exile, and that through long-distance transportation and print-capitalist communications, the imagined world of a new displaced person and culture was created (Anderson, 1998: 62-63). Industrial life and the very wealth of industrial capitalism created another sort of exile,

which made people available for nationalism. Young bilinguals often led nationalist movements (Anderson, 1998: 65). From these exiles of sorts, there is the rise of nationalist movements and their variable culmination in successful nation-states as a project for resolution of hybridity.

State-terrains that are bounded and modern, were waiting for their appropriate inhabitants (Anderson, 1998: 65). Colonialism seemed like it dreamed of nationalism before nationalists themselves came into existence (Anderson, 1998: 65). Nation-statehood destroyed both imperial dynastic realms and the even larger colonial-imperialist conglomerations that survived them. It provided a newfound alignment of imagined home and imagined homeowners, and a guarantee of the stabilization of that alignment through both power and economics (Anderson, 1998: 66).

Official nationalism (or when by the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, nationalism got married to states) developed after the appearances of popular linguistic-nationalism and refracted to indigenous ruling groups in colonized territory (Anderson, 1983a: 102). There is then, the occurrence of the conflation of nation and state. The imagined community finds the gauge of its autonomy in a state. And, vice versa the state finds in the nation its modern legitimation (Anderson, 1983b: 477-478). Implicit in Anderson's narrative is that industrial capitalism helps create nationalism, which was at the same time a response to global imperialism (Anderson, 1983b: 127). Ironically however, as the classical nation-state project was coming fully into its own; advancing capitalism was beginning to sap its foundations (Anderson, 1998: 66).

Benedict Anderson's explanations, through a useful critique of the way that people read "nation" as merely a

convenient shorthand expression for "nation-state," illuminates how, in reality, these are two interlinked entities with distinct histories, constituents and interests (Anderson, 1983b: 477). Anderson sees nation-states as pursuing policies that constitute the following variable mix of two types of general interests: it is best to conceive the state's interest as "representational" and the nation's as "participatory" interests (Anderson, 1983b: 478).

The intriguing question then would be just how these circumstances come about. To understand the seemingly contrasting perspectives, we have to attempt to focus on a specific cooperative effort when mutual interests can evolve in specific functional issues, particularly with regard to Indonesians, paraphrasing Swidler, people, or Indonesians do not build lines of action from scratch and culture influences action through the shape and organizations of those links (Swidler, 1986: 277). It is true that during unsettled periods, explicit ideologies may directly govern action and thus prevent Indonesians to reshape their repertoire, or "tool kit" habits, skills, and styles from which people construct "strategies of action" in a more natural way. The result may be that Indonesians in general are unable to value ends for which their cultural equipment is well suited (Swidler, 1986: 273-286). Moreover, modern technology may reinforce and at the same time threaten the project of the nation-state that will contribute to the difficulties of the process of negotiation between local particulars and the global cultural flows. On this particular issue, what Michael J. Shapiro thought of as insurrectional textuality seems appropriate (Shapiro, 1989):

*"...inasmuch as dominant modes of understanding exist within representational or textual practices, criticism or resistant forms of*

*interpretations are conveyed less through an explicitly argumentative form than through a writing practice that is resistant to familiar modes of representation, one that is self-reflective enough to show meaning and writing practices are radically entangled in general or one that tends to denaturalize familiar realities by employing impertinent grammars and figurations, by, in short, making use of an insurrectional textuality.” (Shapiro, 1989: 13)*

Franke Wilmer in her work on indigenous people and marginal sites in the changing context of world politics, discusses the development and modernization agendas underlying the social transformations occurring throughout the world (Wilmer, 1996: 360). I shall attempt to add to her observation based on the Indonesian experience. What is evident is not only that the presumed superiority of industrial economies and the bureaucratic systems that is necessary to manage them denigrate and undermine the cultural integrity and viability of indigenous peoples, but that there is extra state localized popular resistances that have been part of the Indonesian tapestry for the longest of time, which merit illumination. Prior to independence a common vision of a free nation was what linked these myriad resistance movements together (Anderson, 1983b: 481).

The state was weak from the very beginning. It was penetrated by society; people “joined” the state but then fundamental loyalties were typically to nation, ideological grouping, paramilitary organization, and local community. The penetration of the state continued via the political parties. As many of the traditional collaborationist upper classes in parts of the outer island lost many of their power and wealth, they were eager to protect their lineages’ futures by sending their children

into the civil service academies. They in turn added the energetically conservative and particularistic “ethnic” dimension to the kaleidoscopic inner life of the state. The army and Sukarno came to the “rescue” of the state (Anderson, 1983b: 483).

The price of the alliance with military leaders was the possibility of a successful coup and the installation of a military dominated regime. First, Sukarno began to encourage a remobilization of extra state popular organization, the result of which was that each political party was the core of a huge, organized, ideological family about 20 million strong, which competed fiercely for influence in every sphere of life and on a round-the clock basis. Hence the extra state popular movement penetration of the state resumed (Anderson, 1983b: 485).

Second, there was also an increasing emphasis on economic autarchy, and an actively anti-imperialist foreign policy. It was also aimed at decreasing the leverage of the United States in Indonesian domestic politics. Sukarno’s strategy was unsustainable as Indonesia was too poor. The only institution capable of sustaining itself was the army because it was “legally” closed to party penetration and it controlled the bulk of the country’s assets (Anderson, 1983: 486). The anti-communist massacres of 1965-1966 under the direction of the army leadership gave birth to the New Order, or in Ben Anderson’s parlance, the resurrection of the state and its triumph vis-à-vis society and nation (Anderson, 1983b: 487).

Anderson argued that the amalgam “nation-state,” is rather recent and that often it conjures a popular participatory nation with our older adversarial state. The behavior of the amalgam varies in character

according to the predominance of any one of its components (Anderson, 1983b: 494).

So, returning to Franke Wilmer's statement about the political dominance of one educated/re-socialize ethnic group in which the values supportive of modernizing programs have been internalized over others who are labelled "backward" etc, with regards to Indonesia, we really need to put it in the context of the existence of societal forces that are prone to threatening acts against each other or toward the state. An important contextual backdrop to any analysis of political change in Southeast Asia must take into account the resistant properties of culture and tradition, whether they are part of that particular society's overwhelming complexity or locally situated dimensions of change (Vatikiotis, 1996). Like in 1997 for example, when the nation experienced slow and uneven pace of economic reform, there has been an escalation of violence. Communities are torn apart as various religious and ethnic mobs squabbled over their source of livelihood. Groups and individuals that had been willing to tolerate the crony capitalist economic structure so long as the government delivered the economic goods challenged the legitimacy of the government in Indonesia.

In democratic Indonesia, there is an apparent need to provide a more accurate assessment of the influence of popular forces in Indonesian politics as they express themselves in a most paradoxical way (Aspinall, 2014: 117-137). On the one hand, the organizational weaknesses of popular forces allowed forces incubated under the New Order to reassert their leadership. On the other hand, the many networks and clusters of actors that connect that ruling elite with activist groups and coalitions face too many pathways for entry and co-

optation by the ruling elite (Aspinall, 2014: 122-124).

The legacies of authoritarian rule shaped the resources and strategies available to Indonesian political actors, what seems to complicate the analysis is the heterogeneity of the New Order elites (Pepinsky, 2014: 94). Pepinsky prescribed a solution to this complexity: that the study of Indonesian politics must follow broader disciplinary advances in the social sciences, and adopt a more sophisticated toolkit for resolving competing approaches (Pepinsky, 2014: 97).

Likewise, in international studies there is the universal logic that must be considered within, that constrains the trajectory of the reinvention if international studies for the Post Western world when not based on the prevailing logic. There is a need for a greater awareness of the non-Western experience of international politics and of how it will affect global affairs, or in Lizée's term it is important to reengage in context, the issue of universals.

### ***We Can Reinvent International studies on Southeast Asia in the immediate future***

As the particular is always a function of the universal this brings the argument, back to the idea that a renewed and opened ended exploration of the universals that traverse global politics (Lizée, 2011: 204). This is what will reveal what has been missed by the discipline when it comes to the non-Western world.

International studies discipline need to adopt the language of the particulars in conceptualizing what it considers as universals, what is truly global in global politics. The key issue is that the language of the particulars that is adopted remains a function of the universals. We need to

reflect on both the universals and the particular. International studies today must touch upon and explore in open ended ways the universals that pertain to global politics. Most global politics will involve the need to define the new universal elements. New actors, perspectives, and agenda may be added to the structure and values of global politics that we commonly refer to. What follows is a debate on bonds, and shared agendas that will determine global politics in the future. It is understandable if the new debates will pertain to new universal elements that will influence global relations.

International studies in Indonesia will contribute to the new debates when Indonesia develops its international studies discipline by allocating more funding to conduct inductive studies that will ensure the relevance of the Indonesian experience to the ongoing debate.

As Pierre Lizée has elaborated the question of what next for international studies requires that the discipline considers numbers of elements: the nature of violence. The character of the state must also be the focus of deeper analysis. The nature of democratization and the nature of economic development must be taken into account when considering the importance of the non-Western world in the evolution of global politics.

#### About the Author

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Yanuar, N., & Syarief, S. S. (2012). *Beyond Click-Activism? New media and Political Processes in Contemporary Indonesia*. FES Media Asia Series.

# Islam in Foreign Policy: Promotion of Moderate Islam in Indonesia Foreign Policy 2004- 2014

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## Abstract

*In Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono administration, the shift/ dynamics occurred in Indonesia foreign policy. In contrast to the exclusion and rejection of Islam as identity in official statement in Old and New Order, Indonesia actively promote moderate Islam in international relations. Using qualitative method, this document- based research argue that promotion of moderate Islam in Indonesia foreign policy was constructed by Islamic norm, Islam rahmatan lil alamin norm. This norm can be found by tracing the emergence process as mentioned by Finnemore and Sikkink's Norms Life Cycle Model. The finding suggested some conformity to the model and some deviation especially in term of state actor and their motivation.*

**Keywords:** foreign policy, moderate Islam, worldview, legitimacy, promotion

## Introduction

This article will describe the emergence / origin / construction of rahmatan lil alamin as an Islamic norm emerges in Indonesian foreign policy. In Muslim world, there is assumption that Islam has significant role in politics. This also can be found in Indonesia that as the biggest Muslim populated country in the world, its foreign policy is influenced by Islam. Indonesia is unique due to the fact that it is neither non-theocratic nor secular state (Esposito, 1987 or Hadi and Mu'ti, 2011). In the struggle for independence period, Islam has served as positive element in diplomacy to secure recognition and international endorsement for new republic (Hassan, 1980 or Rahman, 2007). But in the next period, majority of researchers of Islam in Indonesia foreign policy concluded that

Islam is absent and not become dominant factor in its foreign relations. Foreign policy was kept to dictated by Islamic consideration. There had never been formal expression of Islam in foreign policy Islamic role was secondary one. Study in Soekarno, Soeharto, and reformation era showed that view.

The shift then occurred when Islam articulated as new identity. In a meeting held by Indonesian Council on World Affairs (ICWA) on 19th of Mei 2005 in Jakarta, President of republic of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), mentioned that Islamic identity become inherent projection of Indonesia reference (Yudhoyono, 2005). The same statement was spoken by minister of foreign affairs Marty Natalegawa in world economic forum Group of 20 (G20). He said that as

the G-20 has confirmed itself for the status of the major forum on world economic issues, Indonesia was challenged to carve a niche within the group that is unique to itself as the world's third largest democracy, the country with the world's largest Muslim population, and a voice of moderation (Anwar, 2011).

These statements then followed by some diplomatic programs that focused to take moderate Islam as *image* in global politics (Sukma, 2012). This agenda was organized and supervised by directory of public diplomacy, ministry of foreign affairs (Kemenlu RI, 2008). Even some scholars said that this moderate Islam program was started since first Bali Bombing in 2002 and became one of SBY foreign policy priority (Weatherbee, 2013). In contrast to the exclusion and rejection as identity in official statement in Old and New Order, why was Islam used and promoted as Indonesia new identity in its foreign policy?

### **Previous Study of Islam in Indonesia Foreign Policy**

Islam in Indonesia foreign policy has been written by many scholars with different approaches. The first used agent-based perspective especially the leader character approach (leader personal traits). Leo Suryadinata wrote that Islam had never been a major consideration in the foreign policy of Indonesia in Suharto era (Suryadinata, 1997). According to him, the absence of Islam due to the fact that Indonesian elite, especially the foreign policy elite, were *abangan* and not *santri*.

The second study used a structural perspective with some variations. The first, national interest approach which assumes policy makers as rational actors that promotes national interests. (Perwita, 2007; Anwar, 2010a; Anwar: 2010b; Wicaksana,

2012). The second group in the structural perspective used state identity approach. Leifer and Rizal Sukma wrote that Islam had not been the basis of the state. (Leifer, 1983 and Sukma, 2003)

What can be learned from these previous studies was that research on Islam in Indonesia's foreign policy was dominated in area of influence research. These previous studies contribution was in identifying some variables that influence Islamic role Indonesian foreign policy. However, there are some criticisms that need to be submitted to the previous studies. First, previous research emphasized how to see Islam as an identity. Some researchers tried to find Islamic influence only in formal statements especially term religious solidarity of decision makers. Wicaksana explicitly in both of his writings suggested that he see the role of Islam as an identity. Meanwhile, Suryadinata also explicitly mention Islamic solidarity was not the basis of Indonesian foreign policy. In Perwita, Anwar and Sukma, and Leifer, it can be read that they see Islam in that role, especially when they wrote that it was not Islamic solidarity which become the reason of foreign policy. This identity approach bring us to difficult position to find the presence and role of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy. When they not found Islam in the formal form, then they concluded that Islam did not influence Indonesia foreign policy.

Second, some previous writer seemed to make dichotomy between Islam and Pancasila and universal values such as anti-colonialism or justice. The dichotomy between Islam and Pancasila or other universal values is a dangerous one (exactly contains wrong point). For those who believe in Islam as a substance, Pancasila and univesal values such as anti-colonialism are also Islamic values. Then Pancasila and other universal values were

compatible with Islam. Third, there is a pattern that is visible and recognized by previous researchers that there was a policy in the era of the Old Order and New Order to avoid Islam as a source of principles, norms, and values that guide our diplomacy and foreign relations. It means that in fact Islam had its influence, but politically neglected or denied by the leader. This fact gave us opportunity to prove that in actuality, Islam is present in foreign policy but manipulated in other words.

### **Methodological Alternative**

According to these weakness, this research is intended to show the role of Islam in Indonesia foreign policy by other methodological way in international relations (Bakry, 2016 or Asrudin, Mirza Jaka Suryana and Musa Maliki 2014). Many international relations theories tends to exclude religions as variable in international politics (Burchill and Linklater, 1996 or Pettiford, 2007). It will use an alternative approach that includes religion as a variable of the research. The end of Cold War make many scholars to bring back religion into account in global politics (Mansbach and Raffery, 2012 or Tibbi, 2008 or Spillmann, Wenger and Hess, 2003). This approach is based on the argument that religion affects some political aspects of international relations in several ways. There are four basic influence of religion in international relations (Fox and Sandler, 2004). In order to do so, this research used constructivism. Finnemore and Sikkink's norm life cycle, especially their first stage of norm life (emergence/ origin/ construction of norm) was used.

### **Findings**

As described in Finnemore and Sikkink's norm cycle, the influence of norms

can be seen through a three-stage process that begins with the emergence of norms. In this first stage, important events, normative actors, their ideational motivation, the mechanism of their emergence are important points.

### **Rahmatan Lil Alamin in Indonesia**

In line with the definition of norms as shared expectations shared by a group of actors on appropriate behavior, rahmatan lil alamin can be called the norm in the Islam World. It contains the common hopes among Muslims that the proper conduct of Islam is the one that brings mercy to all creatures of God. Rahmatan lil alamin is a phrase in Al Quran Surah Al Anbiya verse 107 which states that God did not send the prophet but to (be) mercy for the universe. This verse does not state that God sent the prophet to bring mercy, but to become a mercy to the whole of nature (Shihab, 202: 519). Rahmatan lil 'alamin is actually the mission of the prophet Muhammad. As followers of the teachings of the prophet, then every Muslim essentially also carries this great mission.

Rahmatan lil alamin actually has long been the face of Muslim life of Indonesia. The two largest religious organizations, namely Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, which are called by Robert Pringle as mainstream Islam (Pringle, 2010: 115), are the main bearers so Islam rahmatan lil alamin becomes mainstream of Indonesian Islam. Both have been continuing to practice and encourage Islamic rahmatan lil alamin in social life, nation, and state, even at the international level.

Azyumardi Azra's writing represented the view that Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah are the major organizations of Islamic bearers of

rahmatan lil alamin. According to him, the principle or value of Islam wasathiyah (moderate) which became one of the principles of rahmatan lil alamin became the paradigm and principal praxis of Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. He further said that the nature of moderation has become a long tradition of Islam in Indonesia and even the archipelago (Azra, 2015). Islam Indonesia as part of Islam Nusantara is one of the eight Islamic civilizations in the world that are characterized by accommodative, tolerant, relax, and flowering (Azra, 1999). Azyumardi Azra's statement confirms that as a norm, Islam rahmatan lil 'alamin has become a long-standing practice.

In order to be a blessing to all, the teachings of Islam are the teachings of ahlu sunnah waljamaah (aswaja) with some basic principles such as tasamuh (tolerance), tawazun (equilibrium), ta'adul / i'tidal (justice), tawasuth (moderation) and tasyawur (musyawarah) according to the basis of the Qur'an. Therefore, according to Hasyim Muzadi, with these principles, Nahdlatul Ulama always avoid the attitudes of tathoruf (violence / violence) and irhab (terror / terror). Rahmatan lil alamin then in Nahdlatul Ulama teaching is operationalized into the principles of tawasuth (moderate), tasamuh (tolerance), tawazun (balanced), and i'tidal (fair).

### **Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah as Norm Entrepreneur**

According to constructivism, norms appear not in a vacuum but in a fiercely contested environment. Lauren for example also mentioned that important events such as the crisis at the global or national level can encourage the evolution of new ideas and norms (Lauren, 1996). The study of the origin or occurrence of the norm usually calls favorable events as one of the

important variables. The study is usually done by using process tracking or genealogy as a method (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1988: 986). The presence of the norm of rahmatan lil alamin in Indonesian foreign policy was like that. The international terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and the 2002 Bali Bombing tragedy at the national level were important events that led to the emergence of Islamic norms of rahmatan lil alamin in Indonesian foreign policy.

The condition raised two important issues. First, bad image of Islam especially when networks of transnational Islamic organizations such as Al Qaeda, Jamiyyah Islamiyyah and Taliban were accused of using violence such as suicide bombings, terror and hostage. Secondly, Indonesia had bad image too then culminated in the Bali bombing, October 12, 2002. Moreover, in fact Indonesia had experienced various acts of terrorism, even long before the events of September 11, 2001 in the United States. Various bombing incidents such as JSE, Atrium, Istiqlal Mosque and "Christmas night bomb" indicated that there is indeed "home grown terrorism" that has connections with terrorist networks abroad.

### **Persuasion as A Mechanism**

Those dramatic events related to terrorism that exacerbate the image of Islam and Indonesia became the context that encouraged two unique organizational giants to the country (Al Qurtuby, 2011), namely Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah to take care. The enslavement of Islam and Indonesia in the context of acts of terrorism and the war on terror that led to them actively brings the real issue of Islam into the public consciousness. First, responding to important events at home and abroad related to terrorism case, Nahdlatul Ulama

in National Conference of Alim Ulama and Nahdlatul Ulama Major Conference 25-28 July 2002 issued fatwa haram for suicide bombing and terror action. The same affirmation in rejecting terrorism was also issued by Muhammadiyah by calling terrorism an enemy of religion and humanity. They were also strengthened by the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) which also issued Fatwa number 3 of 2004 on terrorism. In Fatwa no. 3 of 2004 on Terrorism, the MUI asserted that all acts of terror that cause fear in the society of the law is haram. Based on Ijtima 'Ulama Fatwa Commission in Indonesia on December 16, 2003 has set a fatwa on terrorism. MUI sued terrorism or suicide bombing as a forbidden act (Republika, 2011).

The fatwa has important meaning as an effort of persuasion. Unlawful fatwa against acts of terrorism is issued as a framing of Islamic organizations by using language that gives an interpretation that such acts of terrorism are contrary to Islam. The true teachings of Islam are represented by the norm of rahmatan lil alamin. This fatwa can be interpreted as a persuasion effort to bring the issue to the public agenda by framing the issue in a creative way that is with the perspective of religious teachings. Persuasion with this religious approach then becomes meaningful because it resonates with other norms that have already been present in public awareness such as humanity which became one of the basic principles of Pancasila' state.

These fatwa show that Islamic organizations seek to persuade the public and the government by setting meaning to reality, as well as alerting others that their interests or identities are in dangerous situations, and promoting solutions to solve problems. Therefore, the fatwa has played an important role because on the one hand it affirms the basic character of Islam that

should create grace for all. On the other hand, this fatwa serves as a confirmation of a strong theological foundation in banning and resisting acts of terror. The fatwa is also repeatedly reproduced through various statements and occasions and thus becomes the dominant discourse in Indonesia in particular. This norm gains strength because of the unreliable qualities of universality. That power comes primarily from its potential to be parallel so that it can resonate with the basic ideas of human dignity that are also found in many cultures around the world (Muzadi, 2006: 16).

Second, in strengthening the persuasion that Islam must bring mercy to all the synergistic cooperation network is also conducted by the two largest Islamic organizations Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. Both of them put forward the same platform that wants to display Islam rahmatan lil alamin with. On 2 January 2002, the Chairman of PBNU met with the Chairman of PP Muhammadiyah discussed how to create a friendly face of Islam. Both provide input to the government, the political elite, all components of the nation, and even the international community about it. The call was also conveyed to the Muslim community, the government, to put forward a peaceful approach in solving the problem.

Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah held a follow-up meeting on 15 March 2002 involving number of religious leaders such as Cardinal Julius Dharmaatmadja (Catholic), Nurcholish Madjid (Islamic scholar), Roeslan Abdulgani (nationalist), and A.A. Yewangoe from PGI. The meeting was also attended by the initiators of Malino I and Malino II meetings, namely Yusuf Kalla as Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare. The other is Mitsuo Nakamura a Japanese

political observer. This meeting resulted in the Declaration of the Indonesian National Moral Movement (Gernalnas).

The cooperation between Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah in conveying messages about Islamic moderation in developing the mission of rahmatan lil 'alamin was also shown by organizing the Jakarta International Conference (JIC) at Sari Pan Pacific Hotel Jakarta on Wednesday, October 15, 2003. They said that radicalism and terrorists are not the enemy East and West, not particularly the collision between Islam and the West ([www.nu.or.id](http://www.nu.or.id)).

Third, persuasion of Islam rahmatan lil alamin is also done through direct discussion between the leaders of Islamic organizations with policy makers. For example, discussions containing discussions on Islam, Indonesia, and international relations were conducted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia 2002-2004, Dr. Hasan Wirajuda with the Chairman of NU KH Hasyim Muzadi. Both have discussed many issues including the importance of having international and national forums to promote Islam Rahmatan lil Alamin.

The role of this communication can be seen from Hassan Wirajuda's statement. According to him, despite the authoritative government's role in foreign policy, other actors are also involved in decision making, and they can be influential by introducing new ideas into the decision-making circle (Wirajuda, 2012: 103).

Communication and persuasion of the norms of rahmatan lil alamin submitted to policy makers can also be found at a closed meeting of Minister of Foreign Affairs Marty Natalegawa with the Secretary General of the International

Conference of Islamic Scholars (ICIS) KH Hasyim Muzadi. The two figures were there on Thursday, August 12, 2010 at the ICIS office on Jl Dempo, Matraman Dalam, Central Jakarta to discuss issues and conflicts that exist in the Islamic world. The Foreign Ministry also said it supports the ICIS in campaigning moderate and tolerant Islam to the international community ([m.detik.com](http://m.detik.com)).

According to Marty, for several years there has been good cooperation between Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Nahdlatul Ulama events, especially in ICIS development. In addition, his arrival is also a form of support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to promote to the international world about moderate and tolerant Islam. The Foreign Minister also claimed to have an explanation from KH Hasyim Muzadi related to ICIS and the challenges ahead. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs supports it because it is part of what the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would like to say to various opportunities on how to deliver a better Indonesia in the eyes of the international community.

The collaboration of Islamic leaders and elite leaders of the foreign ministry is widely recognized. Chairman of PP Muhammadiyah for 2005-2015 period, Din Syamsuddin, for example, called Kiai Hasyim Muzadi as the promoter of Islam rahmatan lil-'alamin, inside and outside the country ([Abd. Rohim Ghazali, 2017](#)).

The recognition and appreciation of Hasan Wirajuda's role was also revealed by NU Chairman Hasyim Muzadi. According to him, Hassan Wirajudha during his time as the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Indonesia has succeeded to unite between formal diplomacy and non-formal diplomacy termed by first track



diplomacy and second track diplomacy (Tabloid Diplomasi, 2009).

What was the significance of the activities of Islamic organizations through these persuasion suggestions to Indonesian foreign policy? First, in the domestic realm it can be read as a persuasion norm rahmatan lil 'alamin to the Indonesian government in particular. There is an ideational motivation that encourages Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah to be interested in persuading the norm to be adopted in policy. It was more appropriately seen in a constructivist perspective as the persuasion of ideas that the country might adopt.

Second, from the substance of the discussion it is seen that there is a common view in looking at the ongoing world issues between the leaders of Islamic organizations and the elite at the foreign ministry. In view of Haynes's view, such a thing is possible because both have shared religious beliefs (Haynes, 2008). Fox and Sandler's similar view is that foreign policy can indeed be motivated by religious considerations through the religious world-based views of policymakers and through a religious-based world view that limits the choice of policymakers (Fox and Sandler, 2004).

Third, from the discussion between the leaders of Islamic organizations and the elite in the foreign ministry, the relationship between the two was not merely the direction that the leader of the Islamic organization persuades the elite of the foreign ministry. There was a two-way communication going on which then raises the common interest to react to it. This was the symbiosis that exists between the two. The mechanism of emergence of norms occurred, not just one-way persuasion, but also two-way discussion.

Fourth, the evidence indicates that not only Islamic organizations play a role in entrepreneur norms in the emergence of this norm. Elite foreign ministries also show an important role. This combination of non-state and state actor contributed to the emergence of the rahmatan lil alamin norm in Indonesian foreign policy.

### **Ideational and Instrumental Motivation of the Norm Entrepreneurs**

Ideational motivation that drives entrepreneurs norm persuasion is an ideational commitment, public interest, and empathy (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1988). The persuasion of the norm of rahmatan lil alamin is also meant for it. There is a sense of calling to look at the situation. In a special language, it relates to the purpose of getting the mercy of the existence of Islam not only Muslims but the whole of nature (Tabloid Diplomasi, 2012). This term is used because it is mentioned in the Qur'an so it is not an addition of Islam, but it is Islam itself.

This effort to introduce and spread affection is also aimed at creating a peaceful and secure world that provides an opportunity for the improvement of the quality of life, free from oppression and hegemony, in order to uphold the principle of honesty and justice and high appreciation of the dignity of humanity. This global vision is what encourages efforts to foster international relations with both state and non-state actors.

According to the former chairman of Nahdlatul 'Ulama (Nahdlatul Ulama) Nahdlatul Ulama (PBNU) KH Hasyim Muzadi, Nahdlatul 'Ulama as Islam Ahlus sunnah wal Jamaah with its moderation position actively tried to mediate the tension that occurred in the Islamic world because Ahlus sunnah wal Jamaah embraced carrying mission rahmatan lil

alamin. At the same time, the constitutive norm of rahmatan lil 'alamin which is believed also raises the identity of self as an Islam of grace. Awareness of identity, as a moderate Islamic organization carrying the mission of rahmatan lil 'alamin, also raises interest to behave. The assumption that always attaches Islam to terrorists is a threaded and one-sided understanding.

In addition to ideational motivation, we can also find instrumental motivation. The previous explanation mentioned that in addition to Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, the elite of the foreign ministry also played a role in the emergence of this norm through discussion and communication of both actors. In early 2005, Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda said that as a country with the largest Muslim population in the world, Indonesia has the responsibility and interest to display the true Islamic face of Islam which is rahmatan lil 'alamin, and moderate Islam is a asset of Indonesia foreign policy (Wirajuda, 2005).

The statement was interesting from the following perspectives. Firstly, this was evidence of a change in Islamic appearance in the official statement of Indonesian foreign policy officials. Second, the phrase explicitly also mentioned the responsibility and interest to display Islam rahmatan lil 'alamin. The phrase 'Indonesia has a responsibility to show the true face of Islam is Islam which rahmatan lil' alamiin' indicates an ideational reason underlying the policy. This is in line with the logic of propriety that as the country with the largest Muslim population, it is very inappropriate if Indonesia does not behave to explain the true face of Islam amid the issue of terrorism that brings a bleak image of Islam.

There are two lines of constructivism thinking that can explain it. First, the statement of the foreign minister becomes a confession that proves explicitly that the norm of rahmatan lil 'alamin has become a norm that is believed, accepted, and adopted also by the policy-making elite. This norm is coupled with other national norms, especially the essence of the second principle of Pancasila on humanity. The norm raises the interest, and furthermore the interest encourages action in the form of policy.

The second line of thought, the norm raises the identity of Indonesia as the country with the largest Muslim population whose Islamic character rahmatan lil alamin. This identity raises the interest. It is this interest that then encourages action.

In other words, in addition to indicating the adoption of the rahmatan lil alamin norm, the statement also proves that the norm has raised the identity of Indonesia as a Muslim country that holds the norm. In the perspective of constructivism, this norm also constructs the national identity of Indonesia as a country with the largest Muslim population in the world that continues to spread mercy for all. These norms and identities are factors that drive interest in Indonesia's foreign relations.

Third, the phrase 'Indonesia has an interest to show the true Islamic face of Islam which rahmatan lil' alamin' indicates an instrumental reason in policy. This means that in addition to ideational reasons represented by the word 'have an obligation' there is an instrumental reason that is represented by a word of interest.

What interests are behind the policies showing the face of Islam rahmatan lil alamin? The use of Islamic symbols in

foreign politics according to Albert Hourani is usually aimed at mobilizing popular support and avoiding opposition (Dawisha, 1985). This is done by attracting support for the policy both from within and outside the country. With this support, it will be gained legitimacy for the policy so as not to appear opposition.

In the context of the search for domestic legitimacy, this was based on the fact that Indonesian Islam is moderate and mainstream Indonesian Islamic organizations are also moderate. Therefore, the government has an interest in making policies that are in line with the character of its people.

The search for domestic legitimacy in promoting Islamic rahmatan lil almain can also be seen from the effort to involve Islamic organizations in Indonesia's international diplomacy. This was stated by Minister of Foreign Affairs Hassan Wirajuda who stated that the strengthening of moderation as a major theme of Indonesian foreign policy is done by empowering moderate groups in the country as a first step. The Minister of Foreign Affairs also stated that the success of combating terrorism is also determined by empowering moderates.

The involvement of moderate groups who are non-state actors marks a shift in the pattern of foreign policy which in the previous era was more formulated by the elite than the masses. They are invited to participate in promoting Indonesian moderation through various diplomatic activities.

In the context of the search for international legitimacy, it was to make good image of Indonesia. A positive image will in turn encourage closer cooperation and avoid conflict. As mentioned in the

official statement, this is diplomacy to win the hearts and minds of governments and the public abroad in order to reduce misperceptions.

Second, the search for international legitimacy is also linked to international public expectations of Indonesia. Indonesia's moderate Islamic identity is also motivated by the West as revealed by Rizal Sukma who attended the Wilton Park Conference in England in March 2010 that the international community hopes that Indonesia can play a role as the voice of the Islamic world. This expectation boils down to suggestions that Indonesia can be a mediator between the West and the Islamic world. Not only that, moderate Islam of Indonesia is also expected to be an alternative model that may be applied to other Muslim communities.

The statement, support, and policy about Islam rahmatan lil alamin continues to appear on various occasions to this day. In 2006 Foreign Minister Hasan Wirajuda called this moderate Islam an asset of Indonesia's foreign relations as well as a part of soft power that needs to be maintained. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the leadership of Marty Natalegawa also expressed support for the efforts of Islamic organizations that would campaign for moderate and tolerant Islam to the international world. In the Era of Foreign Minister Retno P. Marsudi the same is also conveyed. Even according to Retno, the government cannot do alone in spreading the message of Islam rahmatan lil alamin without partnering with Muhammadiyah and also Nahdlatul Ulama.

Retno P. Marsudi's statement is in line with what Hasyim Muzadi once said about the relation of Islamic and governmental organizations in an effort to create synergy between formal diplomacy

and non-formal diplomacy termed by first track diplomacy and second track diplomacy. The relationship creates mutually symbiosis. The Islamic organization feels advantaged because of the access it provides, while the Indonesian state is also greatly benefited because the image of Islam Indonesia's moderation has become well known by Islamic figures, not just by governments of other countries.

### **Conclusion**

The above narration indicates that the norm of rahmatan lil alamin has long existed and became the practice of social life as indicated by the two largest Islamic organizations namely Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. The acts of terrorism in the country and the international world and especially the accusations of Indonesia as a hotbed of terrorism then became an incident that encourages both organizations to persuade the norm to government policy.

They not only made some public and governmental persuasion efforts about Islam rahmatan lil alamin, but also discussed it, including the steps needed, with the foreign ministry elite. It was intended that the state adopts this norm in Indonesian foreign policy.

Finnemore and Sikkink mentioned that transnational actors are the main actors that cause the emergence of norms. The facts in the present paper show different things that not only Islamic organization (as norms of entrepreneurs) plays a role in bringing the norm. The political elite of the foreign ministry also plays an important role in the emergence of the norm. We see the presence of national political elites as the norm of entrepreneurs that constructing norms with non-state norm entrepreneurs (NU and Muhammadiyah). They also determine the level of acceptance and

institutionalization of norms to state policy. The presence of the norm of rahmatan lil alamin in political discourse and policy and institutionalized practices becomes evidence of the emergence of norms.

Cooperation between non-governmental and governmental norm entrepreneurs is instrumental in raising the norm of rahmatan lil alamin in foreign policy and elevating it into national priorities. Therefore, the role of national elites in the formation of norms should be recognized as a causal mechanism for the emergence and institutionalization of norms. Norms that are supported simultaneously by the politically powerful entrepreneur norm in a proven government then make it more enduring.

This study also reassessed the elite's motivation in becoming a norm entrepreneur. The research findings confirm the Finnemore and Sikkink hypotheses that national entrepreneurial norms are driven by ideational reasons. The findings noted that ideational reasons were joined together with instrumental reasons. There was evidence of recognition from the elite of foreign policy makers that ideational reasons in the emergence of the norm of rahmatan lil alamin are also related to the instrumental reasons of foreign policy, especially the image, interests of security cooperation and economy.

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# Political Rise or Standstill: Chinese-Indonesian Oligarchs in the 2014 National Legislative Election<sup>1</sup>

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## Abstract

*Stereotype and suspicion toward certain ethnic minorities of the country has never left Indonesia's story of social diversity. Growing participation and greater representation of Chinese-Indonesians in national and local election have demonstrated an inspiring progress of the country's ongoing democratization which encourages the recognition of minority's ethnic identity in wider society. Based on this context, this paper aims to introduce the general performance of Chinese-Indonesian candidates in the legislative election at the state level since 1999, with a focus on analyzing media tycoon Hary Tanoesoedibjo's (or Hary Tano) experience in the 2014 election, in which he has been credited by political scientists and Chinese-Indonesian scholars for a certain degree of break-through in the Indonesian political landscape. Such story of success, however, does not necessarily indicate any trend that Chinese-Indonesian politicians in general have obtained the same degree of equality in politics as their indigenous counterparts. The tactic that Hary Tano has adopted is to expand his political clout through buying-off minor parties. Yet, in practice the underlying social norms of the status quo means that there is a long road ahead until Chinese-Indonesian oligarchs are taken seriously as political actors rather than used for short-term political gain.*

**Keywords:** Chinese-Indonesians, oligarch, Hary Tanoesoedibjo, Partai Hanura, political equality, national legislative election

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## Introduction

The political status of Chinese-Indonesians has been improving since the collapse of the New Order regime in 1998.<sup>2</sup> After the enactment of the Law no. 12/2006 in 2006, the right of an individual with any ethnicity of the country to contest for the country's top leadership has been acknowledged by the state. Progress does not halt there. In the 2014 national legislative election, Chinese-Indonesians have witnessed certain break-through in politics. Media tycoon Hary Tanoe was nominated by Partai Hanura to be the first ever ethnic Chinese vice-presidential candidate of the country. Rusdi Kirana, President Director of Lion Air and a Christian, was appointed to be the new deputy chairman of the traditionalist Islamic Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB). He skillfully utilized his economic leverage for the election and as a result PKB won an impressive result of 9.04 percent of the total votes and ranked the fifth among the twelve parties in the contest (CSIS, 2014). According to a survey by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in the March just before the election, PKB was likely to win only 6.7 percent.<sup>3</sup> Does this news sufficiently point to a rise of Chinese-Indonesian politicians with oligarchic background, or the overall situation for Chinese-Indonesian politicians remains largely unchanged? To address this question, this paper sets out to argue that Chinese-Indonesian politicians have not obtained the same degree of political equality as their indigenous counterparts. The underlying social norms of the status quo means that there is a long road ahead until Chinese-Indonesian oligarchs are taken seriously as political actors rather than used for short-term political gain. As a

case study, Hary Tanoe's short journey in the 2014 national legislative election will be elaborated in detail.

## Chinese-Indonesians in Demography

Chinese-Indonesians are proportionately small in Indonesian population. In 2000 for instance, they were accounted for only 1.50 percent of the total population (Suryadinata, Arifin, & Ananta, 2003). Self-identification was the major survey method used in the 2000 census. Since the painful memory of the 1998 anti-Chinese riots and violence had not elapsed, many Chinese-Indonesians actually had omitted their Chinese ancestry, as they were uncomfortable to be viewed "ethnically" by the indigenous society (Suryadinata, Arifin, & Ananta, 2003). In other words, total population of the Chinese had been underestimated.

The latest and most comprehensive census that has systematically covered ethnic data and information is the one for 2010. In 2006, enactment of the Law no. 12/2006 had removed the official line of distinguishing "indigenous" and "non-indigenous" people of Indonesia. Ethnic minority, including Chinese-Indonesians, have obtained greater room and confidence to publicly express their ethnic identity. However, ironically, in 2010 the population proportion of the Chinese had experienced a further drop down to 1.20 percent (Ananta, 2013). This should be a consequence of the thirty years New Order policy of assimilation of the Chinese and Chinese identity into a "unified" Indonesian nation. Many Indonesians with Chinese ancestry now had considered themselves to belong to other ethnic groups rather than being Chinese (Suryadinata, Arifin, & Ananta, 2003).

The position of being a minority has also reflected by Chinese-Indonesians'

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<sup>2</sup> "Chinese-Indonesians" in this paper are referred to Indonesian citizens who have Chinese ancestry.

religious belief. In 2000, 88.22 percent of all Indonesians were Muslims (Ananta, Arifin, & Bakhtiar, Chinese Indonesian in Indonesia and the Province of Riau Archipelago: A Demographic Analysis, 2008). Among the Chinese community, that percentage was only 5.41 percent, while the other 53.82 percent were Buddhists and 35.09 percent were Christians, including Protestants and Catholics. In 2010, the situation was largely the same. Muslims were 87.54 percent of the country's total population, but were 4.65 percent of all the Chinese (Ananta, Arifin, & Bakhtiar, Chinese Indonesian in Indonesia and the Province of Riau Archipelago: A Demographic Analysis, 2008). Buddhists and Christians were 49.06 percent and 43.80 percent of the Chinese community. Those demographic figures can be interpreted from another perspective. 1.50 percent of Indonesia's total population had included three to four million people, who composed one of the largest Chinese communities in Southeast-Asia (Pan, 2016).

### **From the New Order to the "Reformasi"**

Chinese-Indonesians have experienced difficult political and cultural attitude during the contemporary era. In 1965, the abortive coup to overthrow President Sukarno was immediately attributed to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). By claiming to be the largest communist party in a non-communist country, PKI was known to maintain a close relation with the communist People's Republic of China (PRC). This relation exposed PKI in a dangerous situation during the Cold War era when political ideology was dominating people's life in every aspect. Chinese-Indonesians were automatically considered as a partner of the PKI by the indigenous society, and inevitably became the victims of series of anti-communist riots and violence. About

half a million people, including both Chinese and non-Chinese, were killed (Cribb & Brown, 1955). PKI was then eliminated as a political force in the country. Chinese-Indonesians were openly identified as an origin of instability by the state and society. Their political rights, such as creating political party, were suppressed. Those Chinese who would like to participate in politics could only join the dominant New Order political parties or affiliated organizations. Without sufficient channels to make political appeals, not to mention to ensure security in their daily life, Chinese-Indonesians were vulnerable politically and socially (Lembong, 2008). In terms of Chinese culture, the New Order regime introduced a policy of assimilation, through which outlawed Chinese-language education and Chinese media, with an exception of the government-run *Harian Indonesia*. In the following three decades, Chinese culture was in stagnation.

By contrast, Chinese-Indonesians were left considerable spaces in the economy since the Dutch colonial era. They have had a long history of economic activism across the archipelago. In 1930 for instance, 36.60 percent of ethnic Chinese in the Dutch East Indies were involving in trading activity and 20 percent were participating in industry activity (Suryadinata, Pribumi Indonesians, the Chinese Minority and China: A Study of Perceptions and Policies, 1978). These numbers were significantly higher compared to the 13.38 percent and 5.48 percent of the Europeans, and 5.38 percent and 10.38 percent of the indigenous people. The colonial government aimed to stimulate economic activities across the archipelago through supporting Chinese business. Chinese-Indonesians' reputation of being skillful business people was widely recognized. Similarly, Suharto implemented a pro-business strategy of national

development to consolidate his political supremacy. By cooperating with a small group of Chinese-Indonesian oligarchs, his regime was able to achieve rapid economic growth which had legitimized the New Order regime as an efficient leadership. Suharto controlled the key resources for development, such as the oil industry, and he distributed them to his cronies, composing by a small group of Chinese-Indonesian tycoons such as Liem Sioe Liong and Eka Tjipta Wijaya (Muzakki, 2010). In 1994, among the top twelve conglomerates in Indonesia, only one was owned by non-Chinese (Suryadinata, Chinese Indonesians in an Era of Globalization, 2008). However, even the wealthiest Chinese had to rely on the solely strongman in politics, the influence of the material power of Chinese-Indonesians in politics was still strictly constrained. After 1998, Chinese-Indonesians in general are economically well-off than their indigenous counterparts. In 2002, only three out of the twelve top conglomerates in the country were owned by non-Chinese. In 2004, 70 percent of the domestic private capitals were in the hands of Chinese-Indonesians (Beiyan, 2008).

During the *Reformasi*, the situation of Chinese-Indonesians in culture and politics has been improved. The ban on the “three pillars” of Chinese culture, that is, Chinese education, organizations and media has been removed. Lunar New Year has been for the first time since the past four decades set to be a national public holiday. In politics, the new Indonesian Citizenship Law defines “Indonesian citizens” are the “indigenous Indonesians and other persons of non-indigenous acknowledged by law as citizens (Winata, 2008).” In the Article 2 of

the Law no. 12/2006, for the first time the concept of “Indonesian citizen” has been clarified as a person who was born in Indonesia and who has never assumed the citizenship of other countries. Chinese-Indonesians and ethnic minorities who have been living in Indonesia for generations are now included into “indigenous Indonesians” from the legal point of view. The law also granted them the right to run for government position at the state level as high as to the country’s president (Ananta, Arifin, & Bakhtiar, Chinese Indonesian in Indonesia and the Province of Riau Archipelago: A Demographic Analysis, 2008).

### **The 2014 National Legislative**

Promulgation of the Law no. 12/2006 has undoubtedly increased Chinese-Indonesians’ opportunity in politics, yet this does not mean they had not involved before 2006. In fact, the overall number of Chinese-Indonesians who had contested for the seats in the national and regional legislatures has grown steadily during the *Reformasi* era. Many of them were elected and then entered the People’s Representative Council (DPR) or the Regional Representative Council (DPD) (see Table 1). In 2014, the twelve parties in the contest have proposed 6,600 candidates for the 560 seats in the DPR (Harian Indonesia, 2014). 55 of the candidates are Chinese-Indonesians and 15 were eventually elected. The total number of Chinese-Indonesians who entered the DPD in 2014 has not been calculated when this research was conducted, but by looking through the general trend since 1999, it is reasonable to predict that the total number of Chinese parliamentary members at the national level in 2014 will reach a new high.

**Table 1. Total number of Chinese-Indonesian parliamentary members (MP) in the DPR and the DPD since 1999**

Year of the election	MP in the DPR	MP in the DPD	Total MP number at the state level
1999	5	3*	8
2004	12	3	15
2009	14	2	16
2014	15**	–	–

Source: "1.86 Yi", <http://indonesia.sinchew.com.my/node/47233?tid=5>.

Note: \*Cited from Long Yi, "Yin Du Ni Xi Ya Hua Ren Zheng Ce Yu Hua Ren Zheng Zhi Can Yu De Li Shi Fen Xi - Yi Zheng Zhi Jing Ying Gou Cheng Wei Jie Shi Yao Su" [Historical Analysis of Chinese-Indonesians' Political Participation and the Policy toward Chinese-Indonesians – Uses the Formation of Political Elites as an Explanatory Element], [In Chinese], Jinan Journal (Philosophy and Social Science), no. 5 (2013): 132-37.

\*\*Cited from Wen Beiyan, "Yin Ni Zong Tong You Duo Yue Nuo Zhi Zheng Shi Nian: Ye Ji Xian Zhu, Ti Sheng Yin Ni Ge Ling Yu Dao Xin Tai Jie" [Ten-Year Presidency of Yudhoyono, With Outstanding Merits, And Has Developed All Aspects of Indonesia to A New Stage], Harian Nusantara, June 20 2014, accessed July 11, 2014, <http://qiandaoribao.com/news/50328>.

Hary Tanoe's political career started with the Nasdem Party in 2011. He left Nasdem and joined Hanura in February 2013 for the 2014 legislative and presidential elections. He was nominated by the party to be the first Chinese-Indonesian vice-presidential candidate in the history and scheduled to run for the presidential election in July with Hanura's founder, former military general Wiranto. However, since Hanura is a minor party whose performance in the legislative election in April has turned out to be weak, it is unlikely that it would be qualified to nominate its own candidates to independently contest for the upcoming presidential election in July for the party. Hanura won only 5.26 percent in the legislative election and ranked the tenth out of the twelve parties in the contest (KPU). Even within its coalition with other parties, this poor electoral outcome also has suggested that Hanura is far from being capable to persuade its running mates to

nominate the presidential candidate pair that it proposed to represent the collation, especially considering its partners are the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) which won 18.95 percent, PKB (9.04 percent) and Nasdem (6.72 percent). However, is he as incompetent as what Chrisnandi criticized, or he has been squeezed for Hanura's short-term political gain? When officially announced the Wiranto– Hary Tanoe pair, the former general proudly introduced that as a Javanese Muslim himself, his pair with Chinese Christian Hary Tanoe represented Hanura's firm endorsement of pluralism (The Jakarta Post, 2013). On one hand, this may indicate that Chinese identity has received more recognition in politics. On the other hand, as Marcus Mietzner has observed, since 2009 political parties have become more pragmatic to aware the significance to obtain a centrist position where most potential voters would stay in (Mietzner, 2010). Even though the issue of



ethnicity has remained largely unmentioned, both religion and political ideology no longer serve as a dominant theme when voters are making their decision for election. Hanura's inclusion of the Christian and Chinese profile is a follow of the trend to seek for an image of multiculturalism and "unity in diversity".

In addition, to promote Hanura Hary Tanoe has fully utilized his business empire. In 2014, among all parties Hanura received the second largest campaign donation with a total amount of Rp 135.5 billion, which was much higher compared to the donation it gained in 2009 which was only Rp 19 billion and ranked the fifth in all parties (Halim, 2013). The campaign advertisements produced by his extensive media outlet are another known important contribution to the party. Hary Tanoe's MNC Group was once sanctioned by the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPU) for the political stand of two of its television shows were heavily pro-Hanura (Jakarta Globe, 2014). Indonesian public television stations are regulated to remain

neutral and independent in election, even though major media have been known to have close connection with politicians. For instance, according to Winters, almost all major politicians are backed by media tycoons, or politicians have been seeking opportunity to expand their media resources (Winters, 2013). Hary Tanoe's efforts for advertisement are effective. In March 25 before the election, Hanura's members were ambitious to expect their party to win 13 percent of the total votes in April (Aritonang & Widhiarto, 2014). In the contrary, according to an opinion polling released by CSIS six days later, from July 2012 to March 2014, the support rate for Hanura had never surpassed 6.7 percent (see Table 2) (CSIS, 2014). Even so, in the period between November 2013 and March 2014, the time which overlapped with the official campaign period commencing from March 20, the party's support had experienced a noticeable growth from 2.4 percent to 6.7 percent. Without Hary Tanoe's campaign advertisements, the actual turnout for Hanura in the legislative election in April should be much lower.

**Table 2. Hanura's support rate (percentage) from July 2012 to March 2014**

Time for the survey	July 2012	April 2013	November 2013	March 2014
<b>Support Rate</b>	1.5	2.2	2.4	6.7

Source: "CSIS National Survey," <http://www.csis.or.id/post/press-release-csis-national-survey-march-2014>.

Thus, the key question for looking into Hary Tanoe's short journey in 2014 should not be on his contribution to the party, but on whether he had realized before joining the party that he would be "squeezed". If he had, what was his purpose to join the party? Chinese-Indonesian oligarchs are not unfamiliar with the tactic to patronize political man. Under the New Order regime, to acquire security in politics, economy and social life,

an inevitable issue that most Chinese-Indonesians facing was which indigenous politicians they would support and how much economic benefits they would have to spend on them (Winters, 2013). In 2011, two mainland Chinese scholars, Jiang Zhenpeng and Ding Lixing, conducted a survey to 141 indigenous Indonesians at the higher education institution in Yogyakarta regarding the general public's attitude toward the political participation by

Chinese-Indonesians. 5.07 percent of the respondent answer “may be” or “not sure” to the question whether Chinese-Indonesians should increase their participation in politics, such as to contest for the seats in the DPR and the DPD, or to run for local administrator (Zhengpeng & Lixing, 2013). 36.67 percent believed that Chinese-Indonesians should not do so. One reason given by them was that Chinese-Indonesians were not the locals, and thus they should not have full political participation. Other reasons included their concern of the association of Chinese-Indonesians with communism. Based on this context, this paper believes that Chinese-Indonesian oligarchs should already have a sufficient understanding regarding the possibility that they would be “squeezed” for economic benefits by their clients in politics. Meanwhile, the multi-polarized political structure of power in the *Reformasi* era has made patron-client relationship between Chinese-Indonesian oligarchs and parties, indigenous politicians as well as other types of political front man work much less to guarantee reciprocity. This relationship used to be more stable under the Suharto government. However, the democratization and decentralization after 1998 have gradually disintegrated the concentric circle structure of political power by stimulating new power centers rising at both the state and local levels. The new structure is too dynamic for Chinese-Indonesian oligarchs to maintain any stable patron-client relationship.

The Hanura–Hary Tanoe partnership is a typical exchange of political and economic interests. Even though Wiranto is an oligarch himself, he does not possess any sizable network of media (Winters, 2013). His major backer Hary Tanoe thus brought him his media empire, including the MNC Group, Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia, Global TV, MNC TV,

Sindo Radio, Seputar Indonesia and Okezone.com, which has 20 television stations, 22 radio stations, 7 print media and 1 online media. As a return, by monopolizing Hanura’s electoral campaign, Hary Tanoe intends to not just patronize that party, but to go further to buy-off it, although it seems that his effort has failed eventually. He has been focusing on minor presidentialist party whose material resources for political activity are limited. He joined the small Nasdem party soon after it was established in 2011. The legislative election in 2014 was the party first try, and it won 6.72 percent of the total votes and ranked just two places higher than Hanura (KPU).

### Conclusion

As an ethnic minority with deep stereotypes, Chinese-Indonesians once had difficult experience in expressing Chinese identity in culture and politics. Since the collapse of the New Order in 1998, the situation has been improving. In the democratic era, the Chinese have never halted searching for greater opportunity for legislative election. Inspiringly, an increasing number of them have entered the DPR and the DPD. In the economy, Chinese-Indonesians have appeared to be more successful in comparison with their indigenous counterparts. The economic success is an important currency for the Chinese oligarchs to acquire more political interests.

In the 2014 national legislative election, Chinese-Indonesians have witnessed a break-through in politics. For the first time in history, a Chinese-Indonesian, namely Hary Tanoesoedibjo, was nominated by his party Hanura to be the candidate for the vice-president of the country. However, soon after the electoral result turned out to be an unsatisfactory

one, Hanura urged him to resign. This paper argues that Hary Tano was used for short-term political gain by the party rather than taken seriously as a political actor. He has foreseen the possibility of this difficult situation before joining Hanura. Since the New Order era, it has been a default rule in politics for Chinese-Indonesian oligarchs to patronize indigenous political men for political appeals, also for the indigenous political men to squeeze them for material resources. In the case of Hary Tano, he intended to not just patronize, but go further to buy-off the party. However, this tactic has proved to be a failure for him this time.

### About the Author

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# Chinese Dissident Game Two Players between the U.S. and China PRC

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## Abstract

*The paper analyzes the decision that the U.S. took upon the request of a Chinese dissident requesting for asylum when the U.S. Secretary of State came to China for a diplomatic visit. The analytical paper extracted the international issue between two contending countries using the game theory to consider the implication and thus to find a solution to the conundrum. Game theory allows for positive results if it is a repeated game but for this rare situation it is not likely that it is a regular game to be repeated over time. While this event is in the past, a similar situation may arise that could use the signaling and strategic decision-making process by using this practical yet rarely applied method.*

Keyword: game theory, US – China relations, diplomacy, signaling game, repeated game

## Introduction

Chen Guang Cheng, Chinese lawyer from Shandong province, has been under house arrest for being a prominent human rights activist fighting against states-forced abortion policy and welfare for the poor. He was detained in 2006 for four years and continued under house arrest in his home. On April 22, 2012, he executed a planned escape that captured international attention to find refuge in the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, where he stayed for 6 days and later left to receive treatment in a hospital in Beijing (Jane Perlez and Steven Lee Myers, 2012).

The first game is a simple simultaneous game between the two players of China and the U.S. The simplicity of the game is compensated with the complicated payoffs determination behind the game. Chen decided that he wants to

leave China, a change of mind that feeds into creativity of many conspiracy theorists and novelists. With this new demand, the Chinese and the U.S. are trapped in international relations game that not only complicates their budding economic and security relations but also seeped into each government's domestic and international evaluation.

In the simultaneous game, China will consider either to allow or deny Chen's request to leave China and the U.S. considers whether to play hard or soft with the Chinese government.

China			
U.S.		Allow	Deny
	Soft	3 3	2 4
	Tough	4 1	1 2

For China, the best payoff is for the U.S. to play soft and for China to deny Chen's request (4). Since China wants to show its toughness and give lessons to other dissidents that you can't just hide in the embassy and ask to leave. The same box will give payoff of (2) for the U.S. because for the U.S being tough to China who had been violating human rights issues is better for its international image, mostly to domestic human rights proponents. The second-best payoff for China is still when the U.S. is playing soft and China will allow Chen's to leave with concessions from the U.S. This will deliver both players the same payoffs of (3). The second to least payoff for China is if it denies Chen's request and the U.S plays tough (2) because then they will have to work out the differences and one of the player will end up looking quite bad. For the U.S. this is the worst payoff (1). The worst payoff for China is if it allows Chen's to leave while the U.S. plays tough (1), China will lose face as a rising power since it appears weak and fearful in front of the hegemonic U.S. For the U.S. this is the highest payoff (4) because consequently it will appear strong and able to stand by its human rights standard by saving Chen and pressuring China.

Under simultaneous game, the Nash Equilibrium is for China to deny and for the U.S. to play soft. It will give the highest payoff for China but second to worst payoff for the U.S. The two players will likely negotiate since there are many economic

benefits that both countries can offer to each other and no one party would jeopardize the relationships. For example, the U.S. is the largest market for China products and its top trading partner. China, who would not want to cross the U.S. Negotiations, will bring the game to settle on more desirable payoffs for both players, which is for the U.S. to play soft and China allows Chen to leave. This will deliver payoffs of (3,3) for both countries. As the case unfold, China announced that it allows Chen to leave the country to pursue education and the U.S. found an institution that offers Chen a fellowship.

### Signaling Game

Amnesty International called on China to guarantee Chen's, his family's and other human rights activists' safety. They stated, "It is time for this shameful saga to end." China has been known for prosecuting activists and its media censorship continues to be a sign of hostile government. For instance, since April 27, state media in China have not reported anything about the escape and Chinese in China most likely do not know what is really going on with Chen or maybe even who he is. Internationally, China has been trying to portray a peaceful and friendly power that is willing to cooperate and play under the international standard. Its long effort to join the WTO made the country organized its trading practices to be able to pass the requirements. China also has been

actively involved in many multilateral organizations that again demonstrate its desire to be admitted as world's player that can abide by the rules. There is too much at stake for China to maintain its undemocratic practices towards its citizens that appear to resemble despotic rule, unacceptable by many western countries. In contrast to the U.S., China adopts non-intervention non-binding trade relations that it does not meddle with domestic issues in countries that it is trading with. Therefore, it might expect the western countries to stay away from Chinese domestic issues such as Chen.

The signaling game between China and the U.S. allows the U.S. to consider a changed China. China wants to win international approval while being in dilemma of preventing further dissent that stands in the way of its effective domestic governing activities. China, faced with international pressure, would be more

peaceful than hostile, while China who wants to appear tough and not answering to anyone would be more likely hostile. In this game, nature decides that PRC (China) will be hostile with probability of 70% and peaceful with probability of 30%.

#### Strategies

##### China/ PRC

- If hostile, Keep Chen with probability of 60%
- If peaceful, Keep Chen with probability of 40%

The U.S. will decide whether to play tough or soft based on the payoffs it will get under PRC's different strategies. The payoffs ranking was based on similar consideration as the simultaneous game with the U.S. play rather soft if PRC is peaceful and play tough if PRC is hostile.

#### If PRC Keep Chen then the probability that PRC is Hostile is

Probability (Keep) x Probability (Hostile)

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Probability (Keep) x Probability (Hostile) + Probability (Keep) x Probability (Peaceful)

$$\frac{0.6 \times 0.7}{(0.6 \times 0.7) + (0.4 \times 0.3)} = \frac{0.42}{0.54} = 0.78$$

**If PRC Keep Chen then the probability that PRC is Pacific is**

$$\frac{\text{Probability (Keep)} \times \text{Probability (Pacific)}}{\text{Probability (Keep)} \times \text{Probability (Hostile)} + \text{Probability (Keep)} \times \text{Probability (Pacific)}}$$

$$\frac{0.4 \times 0.3}{(0.6 \times 0.7) + (0.4 \times 0.3)} = \frac{0.12}{0.54} = 0.22$$

**If PRC Let Go of Chen then the probability that PRC is Hostile is**

$$\frac{\text{Probability (Let Go)} \times \text{Probability (Hostile)}}{\text{Probability (Let Go)} \times \text{Probability (Hostile)} + \text{Probability (Let Go)} \times \text{Probability (Pacific)}}$$

$$\frac{0.4 \times 0.7}{(0.4 \times 0.7) + (0.6 \times 0.3)} = \frac{0.28}{0.46} = 0.61$$

**If PRC Let Go of Chen then the probability that PRC is Pacific is**

$$\frac{\text{Probability (Let Go)} \times \text{Probability (Pacific)}}{\text{Probability (Let Go)} \times \text{Probability (Pacific)} + \text{Probability (Let Go)} \times \text{Probability (Hostile)}}$$

$$\frac{0.6 \times 0.3}{(0.3 \times 0.6) + (0.7 \times 0.4)} = \frac{0.18}{0.46} = 0.39$$

So, If the PRC Keep Chen then there is a very high probability that the PRC is hostile and there is a slightly better chance that the PRC is pacific if it let go of Chen (compare to when it is keeping Chen), the chance that it is hostile is still much higher (61% to 39%).

Payoff for the US to play tough given the PRC Let Go of Chen:

$$(0.61 \times 4) + (0.39 \times 2) = 2.44 + 0.78 = 3.22$$

Payoff for the US to play tough given the PRC Keep Chen:

$$(0.78 \times 3) + (0.22 \times 1) = 2.34 + 0.22 = 2.56$$



Payoff for the US to play soft given the PRC Let Go of Chen:

$$(0.61 \times 1) + (0.39 \times 4) = 0.61 + 1.56 = 2.17$$

Payoff for the US to play soft given the PRC Keep Chen:

$$(0.78 \times 2) + (0.22 \times 3) = 0.78 + 0.66 = 2.22$$

Whether China lets go or keeps Chen, playing tough gives higher payoffs for the U.S. so playing tough is the dominant strategy for the U.S.

The US will be indifferent of playing tough or soft under PRC strategy to let go of Chen is if the probability of PRC to be hostile and let go of Chen is slightly lower than current probability.  $k$  is the probability of hostile PRC letting go of Chen.

$$4k + 2(1-k) = k + 4(1-k)$$

$$4k + 2 - 2k = k + 4 - 4k$$

$$2k + 3k = 2 = 2/5 = 0.4$$

This combination could be that Nature decides probability of hostile PRC is 0.7 then probability of letting go (a) for the US to be indifferent whether to play tough or soft is:

$$\frac{\text{Probability (Let Go) } \times \text{ Probability (Hostile)}}{\text{Probability (Let Go) } \times \text{ Probability (Hostile) } + \text{ Probability (Let Go) } \times \text{ Probability (Pacific)}} = \frac{0.7a}{0.7a + 0.3(1-a)} = 0.40$$

$$\frac{0.7a}{0.7a + 0.3(1-a)} = 0.40 \quad \times (0.7a + 0.3 - 0.3a)$$

$$0.7a = 0.4(0.7a + 0.3 - 0.3a)$$

$$0.7a = 0.28a + 0.12 - 0.12a$$

$$0.7a - 0.28a + 0.12a = 0.12$$

$$0.54a = 0.12 = 0.22$$

Therefore, if the probability that the PRC hostile is 0.7 and probability of letting go is 0.22 then based on the payoffs,

the U.S. is indifferent between playing tough or soft.

But under PRC strategy to keep Chen, for the U.S. to be indifferent with tough or soft strategy, it requires the combined probability to be much lower than the current probability.

$$2k + 1 = 3 - k$$

$$3k + (1-k) = 2k + 3(1-k)$$

$$3k = 2 = 2/3 = 0.67$$

$$3k + 1 - k = 2k + 3 - 3k$$

This combination could be that Nature decides probability of pacific PRC is 0.3 then probabilities for the PRC to keep (b) for the US to be indifferent whether to play tough or soft is:

$$\text{Probability (Keep)} \times \text{Probability (Pacific)}$$

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$$\text{Probability (Keep)} \times \text{Probability (Hostile)} + \text{Probability (Keep)} \times \text{Probability (Pacific)}$$

$$\frac{0.3b}{0.3b + 0.7(1-b)} = 0.67$$

$$\frac{0.3b}{0.3b + 0.7(1-b)} = 0.67$$


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$$\text{X } (0.3b + 0.7 - 0.7b)$$

$$0.3b = 0.67(0.3b + 0.7 - 0.7b)$$

$$0.3b = 0.20b + 0.47 - 0.47b$$

$$0.3b - 0.20b + 0.47b = 0.47$$

$$0.57b = 0.47 = 0.82$$

So, if PRC keeps Chen, in order for the U.S. to be indifferent about playing tough or soft then the probability to keep for the Pacific China has to be at least 82%.

### Conclusion

The U.S. will decide on a strategy after PRC made a move to keep or to let go. The strategy that the U.S. adopts is either being tough or soft. In the signaling game, the U.S. will not know which PRC it is facing but the common knowledge is that there is higher probability that PRC is hostile then if it's pacific. Another

understanding is that hostile PRC has higher probability to keep Chen while pacific PRC has higher probability to let go of Chen. With this information and given the payoffs assignments, the U.S. has a dominant strategy to play tough. The U.S. will get the same payoffs for both strategies if the probability of the PRC to let go or to keep under pacific PRC is higher than current probabilities: 78%

rather than 60% for letting go, and 67% rather than 40% for keeping. Therefore the U.S. will not have a dominant strategy and will be indifferent whether to play tough or soft.

For now, the two players apparently took the cooperative outcome from the simultaneous game of Allow and Soft strategies that deliver payoff of (3,3) for U.S. and China. China realized that by persisting to retain Chen, it would face further international condemnation and maybe the U.S. tough action (after its many human rights violations). Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that "Chen is eligible to apply to study abroad just like any other Chinese citizen." It was soon followed by U.S. announcement of a fellowship offered to Chen from a U.S. university, later it turned out to be NYU Law. The announcement was a result of a deal between the two players to avoid embarrassment for both countries and proceed with their economic agenda (Perlez and Wines, 2012). There are contradicting views on what impact Chen's will have after his departure from China. A friend of Chen, who is also a dissident, argues that the situation is different now that Chinese dissident like Chen will still be impactful even abroad (For Dissidents, *Escape Means Fighting from Afar*, NPR, 2012). The media commentators argue that China prefers its dissidents to be out of the country to loosen their impact or that law school would be so time consuming that Chen will have no more time to continue his advocacy for the helpless people whose rights he had been fighting for (James Warren, *The Very Different Life Chan Guangcheng Would Lead at NYU Law*, 2012). The most recent development with Chen Guang Cheng is revealed in his memoir "The Barefoot Lawyer: A Blind Man's Fight for Justice and Freedom in China." He still lives in the United States

with his wife and children and holds a position at the Witherspoon Institute in Princeton, New Jersey. He stated his disappointment with the U.S. Convoy led by Hillary Clinton with what he said to be the pressure for him to follow the direction of the Chinese government to prevent jeopardizing the diplomatic relations between U.S. and China (Toosi, 2016). Chen felt that he was pressured by the U.S. Convoy to agree to the Chinese demands to stay in a Chinese-controlled hospital and to attend NYU in Shanghai campus instead of in New York. This information reveals that the Chinese government prefers to keep Chen inside China in order to control him as much as possible. Chen finally agrees to go to the state-controlled hospital despite of his fear of safety but then he was allowed to leave the country and attend NYU in New York. The U.S. Convoy must view Chen as a rabble-rouser to their meticulously planned diplomatic mission to China. It was shown in the documentation as well as Hillary's book "Hard Choices" that the decision-making process was challenging to those involved, including Kurt Campbell who even offered resignation as things seemed to go awry. The diplomatic relations have been successfully maintained despite of the intricate situations.

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# Poverty and the Linkage to Criminal Enhancement and Human Trafficking in Cambodia

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## Abstract

*Cambodia is one of the ASEAN country members. This country is facing problem of poverty and criminality. The old and new political system in Cambodia since 1970s determined as the cause of current condition. Poverty is the cause of many problems and it impacts on other fields as well. Human trafficking is the most alarming problem currently. Furthermore, the problem is getting worse since 2015 when ASEAN Economic Community declared for free trade service among ASEAN member states. Cooperation may show another side of globalization. The cooperation causes liberalization; include laboring in the other side. ASEAN Economic Community can be seen as another side of slavery and Cambodia face the worse problem, called human trafficking. Human trafficking can be caused by many things and poverty is one of the most determinants. In the case of poverty in Cambodia, can be seen as domino effect of poverty itself, but it takes time to figure out the main player on it. Policy and government can be the main actor, but still the consideration of this problem should be taken carefully and the solution needed here involved coordination of many fields which can be researched further. Competition among ASEAN country members create bigger problem and consequences which should be faced. Meanwhile, Cambodia still included as one of Third World Countries and it still need more time to take this cooperation challenge then turn it into profitable moment.*

Keywords: poverty, human trafficking, ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), criminality

## Introduction

Cambodia is one of the members of ASEAN (Association of South East Asia Nations). In terms of AEC euphoria, which has been started by the end of December 2015, it is important to take into closer toward each country members' economic development. Still, it is too early to conclude that Cambodia is considered as the poorest country in the Southeast Asia region. As a regional organization, ASEAN has big responsibility

to enhance economic development of each country members. The fact is economic rate of Cambodia is included as one of the Least of Developed Countries at the ranked 8 (United Nations Committee for Development Policy, 2016). This ranked is not absolutely exposes all countries around the world, but we need to consider the consequences of this ranked, related to the development of ASEAN as a regional union in South East Asia.

As one of the ASEAN country members, Cambodia, which has been facing much pain for years caused by civil war, will face more consequences which related to the consequences of the rank. The Least of Developed Country rank is made by an organization which suggests that country with less liberalization will be included in the rank. As we know, that Cambodia civil war caused by political condition in the past which correlates to economy, politic, and social welfare until nowadays. Thus, UN conflict resolution at that time was considered as the best answer for Cambodia.

One of the implementation of UN big role in Cambodia is MDGs (Millennium Development Goals) program. This program aims to solve many problems around the world, such as eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other disease; ensure environmental sustainability; and develop a global partnership for development (United Nations, 2015). The goal of MDGs relates to the global development, not only for ASEAN country members.

ASEAN as a basic regional organization in South East Asia Nation should take care each member. Then, united achievement as is very important. If we may take into closer consideration about the Cambodia economy, we will see that Cambodia still left behind other countries in ASEAN, which ranked on 8 positions as one of the 50 Poorest Countries in the world (Ranker, 2016). It doesn't mean that the others do not care much about Cambodia economic

development, but political conflict in this country forced other ASEAN countries member not to be involved into political problem. Political conflict in Cambodia affects poverty rate in the country.

Conflict in Cambodia has been started in March 1970, a US-supported group, led by General Lon Nol, launched a coup against Prince Norodom Sihanouk, a hero for Cambodia's independence from France in 1953. An armed element, called the "Khmer Rouge", was formed and overthrew Lon Nol's rule in April 1975. When coming to power, the Khmer Rouge carried out genocide, resulting in death of 1.7 million people (Cambodian Institute for Coordination and Peace, 2016). However, the conflict could be solved by assistance of United Nations in brokering several negotiations. The negotiations then led to the Paris Peace Agreement (PPA), UN brought Cambodia conflict to agreement assignment which was signed by the four warring parties on 23 October 1991 and held an election in the country. Though, UN failed to secure full peace and unity in this country because the Khmer Rouge boycotted the UN-sponsored election in 1993 and continued launching military attack against the de jure government (Cambodian Institute for Coordination and Peace, 2016).


To deal with the prolonged armed conflict, the Cambodian government initiated the so-called "win-win" policy, which successfully dismantled the Khmer Rouge's last stronghold without bloodshed and integrated the separatists into the mainstream society in late 1998 (Cambodian Institute for Coordination and Peace, 2016). Since that time, there has been relative peace, but socio-economic development has been slow and

people still face severe living conditions. Poverty is widespread, health care resources are underdeveloped and under-funded, roads and other infrastructure are in poor condition, literacy rates are low, and HIV/AIDS prevalence rates are high (Annear 1998; Beresford et al. 2004; Coates 2005; Hugu et al. 2000; Kola 2004; Lanjouw, Macreae and Zwi 1999; Ott 1997) (Population Studies Center, 2016). The report gave such good view that poverty can't be separated from political condition, since it is interrelated to each other. In other words, we can say that the poverty and un-welfare condition in a country affected by political condition. In Cambodia, we can see that conflict of radical activities has affected the economic and political condition in the country which remains exist. In Cambodia, UN Conflict Resolution is evidence that political condition in this country is a tool for other organization to set the economic condition.

### **Reduction of Poverty in Cambodia (correlates with MDGs Program)**

Cambodia as one of the agricultural countries has faced terrible radicalization for years. However, the conflict resolution has challenged this country to prove better economic condition after civil war by its own. Based on data, poverty rate more than halved, from 53% (2004) to 20.5% (2011). Increased rice prices and increased rice production has contributed to poverty reduction, along with greater road access for farmers to markets, better access to market information through mobile phones, improved irrigation, and a liberal undistorted agricultural market (The World Bank, 2014) Related to MDGs program, Cambodia is not the only country in the world which has been assisted by UN. The aims of program will bring a country to better condition.

At first, the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger in Cambodia can be seen as the "fragile aims" in this point. Though, it is important to take more consideration to index of poverty reduce year by year in Cambodia. As we can see in the diagram below:

**Figure 1: Cambodia Headcount Poverty Rate, 2004-2011.**

The diagram shows us that poverty rate in Cambodia has been reduced by assistance given by World Bank. However, this assistance is a fragile and non-permanent condition for better economic condition. It can lead Cambodia to the worse condition in the future, since it is still too early to conclude that assistance from World Bank is what Cambodia need at this time. As has been said by Neak Samsen, a Poverty Analyst of the World Bank in Cambodia and the co-author of the Poverty Assessment Report (The World Bank, 2014):

*"Despite impressive reduction in poverty, these hard-won gains are fragile. Many people who have escaped poverty are still at high risk of falling back into poverty," said. "For example, the loss of just 1,200 Riel (about \$0.30) per day in income would throw an estimated three million Cambodians back into poverty, doubling the poverty rate to 40%".*

However, we still have to believe that many things may happen in the future for a better economic condition in Cambodia. One of evidence is that poverty reduction in

Cambodia has shown better impact for investment in this country. Second, WHO profound that

*"...dollar per dollar spent on health, many countries are falling short of their performance potential. The result is a large number of preventable deaths and lives stunted by disability. The impact of this failure is born disproportionately by the poor, but several developing countries, were judged to have the least fair financing of health system, including Sierra Leone, Myanmar, Brazil, China, Vietnam, Nepal, the Russian federation, Peru, and Cambodia" (Michael, 2012).*

The result was just about making better condition for certain time. It proves that decline on agriculture, fisheries, forestry, industry, and services as well as the GDP remain low until 2011. Though, spreading number and rank concluded that Cambodia has improving its economic condition. We need to take more consideration for what extend the rank is made.

*"The health status of Cambodians has been steadily improving since the 1980s, but*



*remains relatively poor when compared to other countries in the region. Today, health status is characterized by falling but still high rates of infant and maternal mortality, increased but still low life expectancy, under nutrition, and a double disease burden with prevalent communicable diseases and emerging non-communicable diseases. There are significant inequalities in health status by socioeconomic status and between urban and rural populations (Asia Pacific Observatory on Health System and Policies, 2015)."*

As we can see that not all improving report will show the condition for real. The use of traditional medicine is strong in Cambodia, with a culture of robust traditional medicine centered on the Kru Khmer, the traditional healers who are found all throughout the country. The two most salient health-related problems linked to poverty in Cambodia are malnutrition and access to health care (WHO and Ministry of Health in Cambodia, 2012). In other words, we can say that the better condition of Cambodia, along with economic improvement, reported remains to be fragile report that indicate by the time Cambodia as one of the ASEAN country members facing better improvement in some cases. Though, we still need to figure out the main problem which should be solved in Cambodia, since it will relate to other terms, such as economic development, social welfare, and political condition. Thus, it will be one of the biggest responsibilities of ASEAN as a regional organization to make united improvement of each country members.

### **The Enhancing Criminal Rate in Cambodia (Human Trafficking Case)**

This raises poverty which eventually enhance criminal, and Human Trafficking

need more consideration, indeed. Crime caused by the enhancement of poverty and ignorance of citizens form trafficking criminal action. Women and men are transferred to be slaves for commercial exploitation or prostitution as well. Then it directs toward humanitarian issues. We need to take into more consideration into concept of free trade area among ASEAN country members which also applied for services. The chance then turns into serious risk when it comes to human trafficking.

This condition will be another face of liberalization and the high desire to develop global cooperation, as it is does by all member states in ASEAN which called AEC. Human trafficking is the process through which individuals are placed or maintained in an exploitative situation for economic gain. Trafficking can occur within a country or may involve movement across border. Women, men, and children are trafficked for a range of purposes, including forced and exploitative labor in factories, farms, ad private households, sexual exploitation, and forced marriage. Trafficking affects all region most countries of the world (United Nations, 2014).

Women and children are trafficked to Cambodia in Thailand and Malaysia for sexual exploitation and forced labor in factories or as domestic servants, while the Cambodian men trafficked as forced labor in agriculture, fishery, and construction sectors. Cambodian children transferred commercially to be slaves to Vietnam and Thailand to serve as beggars (Sari, 2010).

In addition, Cambodian women and children also trafficked to China and Vietnam or sexual exploitation. They come from both rural areas such as Phnom Penh, Siem Reap and Sihanoukville (Sari, 2010). There are no

exact figures on the number of prostitutes in Cambodia, but highest estimate reached 100 thousand of the 13 million population of Cambodia with 35% of those aged 18 years. Human trafficking in Cambodia increased since the early 1990s, with estimates varying from 18 thousand to 100 thousand of commercial sex workers (Sari, 2010). On the other hand, the Cambodian government tries hard to solve the problems caused by human trafficking in Cambodia. The seriousness of Cambodian government shown by set up the stages of the National Action Plan (NAP), human trafficking handler National Action Plan Five-Year Plan Against Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation of Children in Cambodia for 2000-2004; which followed the National Plan of Action Plan Against trafficking and sexual exploitation of children 2006-2010 which contains a number of work programs, including the importance of establishing mechanisms for collaboration and other countries and a number of related parties that the implementation involves a number of international organizations and NGOs, local and foreign NGOs, namely combat child trafficking and commercial sexual exploitation of children which was developed based on a policy that has been made by the government and by the applicable law in Cambodia. In ECPAT (End Child Prostitution, Abuse and Trafficking) who have problems focusing on the elimination of all forms of CSEC (ECPAT International, 2008).

In addition, Cambodian government cooperated with Thai government. The two countries agreed on a bilateral cooperation to eliminate trafficking of women and children as well as working together to help the victims. On June 1, 2005, ECPAT Cambodia in cooperation with the Cambodian National

Council for Children. These activities include training, workshops and raising awareness of the dangers of human trafficking and sexual exploitation. The members of the coalition who provide direct services to victims to get protection from the government by increasing the capacity of care and protection, ECPAT also put through cooperation with the tourism ministry in conducting workshops to prevent child sex tourism (Cambodian National Council for Children, 2002-2010).

ECPAT then did a one-day Seminar on Sharing Good Practices and Establishment of the Child Protection Network. The group also held a national workshop on Tourism is safe from child sex, in cooperation with the Ministry of Tourism, World Vision Cambodia and Child Wise Australia. Cambodia Ministry of Social Affairs and representatives from 24 cities and provinces also participated in this activity. ECPAT also monitor the National Plan of Action against CSEC (2000-2004). This group publishes three issues of their newsletter and distributed 4,000 copies, published through the mass media articles and analysis of the situation in the local newspaper on reported cases of rape and human trafficking, informing the public about trends and routes of trafficking. Then the children who are victims of human trafficking brought to the organization the right to obtain reparation and rehabilitation, such as Cambodia Recovery Centre (Cambodian National Council for Children, 2002-2010).

### **Cambodia Globalization and Poverty**

Globalization is a process in which between individuals, between groups and between countries interact with each other and influence each other across borders. Globalization may cause positive effects such as improving the welfare and progress of

civilization, but it can also have a negative impact that encourage poverty, inequality, unemployment and even cross-border crimes in all parts of the world. Global developments have changed the characteristics of an area that was originally in the domestic sphere shifted to cross-border or transnational.

After civil war ended, the Congress of the United States discontinued its support for the government in Cambodia. Mr. Lon Nol as chosen candidate for president of Cambodia, faced many conflicts in terms of the financial crisis and civil war with Khmer Rouge (Communist Party) that was controlled by General Pol Pot. In the year of 1975, Pol Pot occupied the entire country and adopted communism. The Pol Pot focused on the rural areas and agriculture manufactures as their main primary production functions. The country was renamed as the Democratic Kampuchea. In the following years, Vietnam and Mr. Hun Sen, a leader of the New People's Republic of Kampuchea became allies, and used their combined military forces to remove Khmer Rouge from power in 1979. The country was unstable for decades until the United Nations stepped in. In the year of 1991, Cambodia declared a cease-fire under the supervision of the UN. In the year of 1993, Cambodia formed a new government, which was scrutinized by UNTAC. Cambodia stayed in peace, and a new modern society had begun (BBC News).

UN support for Cambodia government is beneficial; however, it can also be seen as bundling problem since the current government of Cambodia at that time had not ready yet to be "released" and control the country. But at that time, it was impossible to be depending on global peace organization any longer. In other words, the unpreparedness of Cambodia government at

that time might cause bigger problem. It was caused by the unfinished conflict resolution strategy to solve civil war problem in Cambodia, then national election was like something forced but it still could not solve the root problem in Cambodia at that time. Then, the most horrifying problem is getting bigger and relates to poverty and human trafficking.

### **The Benefits of Globalization and Positive Effect in Cambodia**

One of the benefits of globalization Cambodia can be seen through enhancement rate of GDP which is ten percent per year in 1998-2008. Globalization also supports the quality of education, health care and standard of living for Cambodian. During the economic crisis in 2008 to 2009, Cambodia suffered stagnation in their real GDP. In 2010 to 2011 however the GDP bounced back again at six percent. It is expected that their GDP will continue to grow at 6.5 percent annual rate from 2012 to 2013 (World Bank).

In fact, economy rate of Cambodia is increasing, since the country still relies on agriculture. Cambodia conducted international trade cooperation with China, South Korea, and Kuwait, and Vietnam after civil war. China is the main foreign investor in Cambodia, indeed. It embarks direct capital investment of agriculture sector amounting to about 4.2 billion dollars, which is 40.14% of total foreign investment in Cambodia. Korea has invested about 40 million dollars to purchase Cassava from Cambodian farmers. Kuwait has made a bilateral agreement with Cambodia to provide a loan of about 546 million dollars to support rice production for the Kuwait market. They will also provide technical support such as buildings for hydro-power

plants and direct flights for tourism (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2016). The enhancement of economy power in Cambodia then becomes so real. However, Cambodia still included as poor country in South East Asia region. The agricultural sector is really support but still cannot lift Cambodia into better place in economic sector. The complexity of problem still become the main reason, hence we need take more consideration into the effort of Cambodia government to solve this domestic problem post of civil war.

However, globalization era at the other side forces Cambodia to solve the domestic problem soon. The cooperation among ASEAN country members cannot be conducted if there is still domestic problem which can't be solved in which it may related to the cooperation among ASEAN members, instead. The international trading relationships helped to create more jobs for Cambodian people and improved their standard of living, indeed. We can imagine that economy problem may impact to another field and the horrifying risk revealed by human trafficking practice in Cambodia.

In the year of 2004, Cambodia became a member of WTO (WTO, 2016) and expended their economy into the global market. They gained benefits in trade policy and made agreements with their members of WTO. According to WTO agreements, each county has to permit equal opportunity in terms of trade to all countries with regard to trade policies including subsidies, low tariffs, and regulations. Members especially have to adhere to laws that help to protect property rights.

Then, the opportunity was not taken for granted; Cambodia attracted more foreign

investment such as a big Multination Corporation Company (MNCs) from other countries such as China, Korea, Japan, Australia, Kuwait, and other members of the WTO. For instance, news that was published in The World's Peace website in Dec 27, 2011 said that the Japanese had planned investment in Cambodia. There were more than 65 Japanese's companies attended the meeting. They spent their capital for investment in the environment, human resources and infrastructure. On the other hand, WTO's policy can be seen as favoring to the developed countries more than the developing countries, which results in deteriorating terms of international trade with those developed countries (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2016). The beneficial of globalization again become real and at the same time impact on cooperation among countries which included non-ASEAN country members.

### **The Negative Effects of Globalization and Poverty**

Globalization may also impact on cooperation practice among non-state actors, such as cooperation among Multinational Corporations (MNCs). The company spreads all over region and it has power to control resources in those regions. Then, problem comes when there is imbalance with capital and local sources in a region. MNC produce services and good by cultivate local sources, but when it can be fulfilled, MNC will bring in sources from the other region. It can enhance the competition among citizens. In the other hand, it will raise the benefits of local revenue.

Investment from China came after free trade momentum agreed. Many of these companies used to produce the cloth in their

home country, but because to take advantage of cheap labor forces, they removed their capital from China and invested in factories in Cambodia. People in the factories have to work long hours-at least 40 hours a week. They only get paid \$70 to \$80 per a month. If we compare these wages to the United States, the wages in the U.S. are quite different. American people, who are uneducated, can still earn at least \$60 to \$70 per a day in the factory. This terrible condition has made Cambodia become poorer (IMF, 2016).

Cambodia has taken this path. It opened to free market and gave incentive to the foreign investors such as lower taxes, no regulations, and free land concession. Many problems have occurred with the MNCs operating in Cambodia. For instance, the Cambodian government gave 340 sq. km to a Chinese company called Tianjin Union Development to build resorts and a casino. In this company's framework, they need to cut down many trees in the forest of their land concession in order to build their resorts and casino. This company not only destroyed the forest, but also many settlements of Cambodia in the area. The people lost their own property, land and housing (IMF, 2016).

The competition occurred after globalization era can't be avoided. Local resources such as labor should increase their capability and local encouragement about product in which investments are attracted to. It means, there still lot of things to be forced in order to chase the gap among ASEAN country members in the globalization era. The happening problem may occur continuously if the Cambodia government still can't solve domestic problem. Thus, it is important to not only take poverty into economical consideration, but empowering of human capability as main resources is very

important. Social and security problem should be followed to be settled; otherwise the cooperation among countries will be harmful. Then, Cambodia can't reach the gap to other countries. Meanwhile, coordination to solve human trafficking problem should be conducted and well set by all ASEAN country members.

### **Conclusion**

The government has implemented various programs to be developed under a National Action Plan to address trafficking and sexual exploitation of children. ECPAT assist Cambodia government implementing the work programs to solve humanitarian issues by increasing awareness of the dangers of sexual crimes against children, workshops conducted for the owners of hotels, guest houses and travel agencies from engaging in any act that leading to the CSEC, and monitor the implementation of the National Action Plan (NAP) for Cambodia. Besides, Cambodia government cooperates with Thai government to tackle human trafficking across borders and from Thailand and Cambodia. Cooperation is carried out by Thailand also aims to help the victims to return to their home countries. The Cambodia government has conducted effort to deal with sexual crimes against children through a variety of programs. However, obstacles in the implementation existed.

Positive effects of globalization in Cambodia have not solved economic problems. In the other side, it creates more problems in Cambodian society than benefits, such as human trafficking. The foreign investment to Cambodia has helped to create more jobs for Cambodian people, but the MNCs have paid too low of salaries to the Cambodian people for them to feed their

families and maintain a decent standard of living.

According to the discursive material theory, we can bring every part of these structures concerning globalization, including MNCs, WTO policy, foreign aids, and the role of government in Cambodia. Poverty plays as main problem and impacts on security. There is the more important need for countries like Cambodia to solve its domestic problem and make sure that they are ready for the competition era which included globalization and cooperation in the surface of all relations among countries.

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