DINAMIKA KELOMPOK SEPARATIS DONBAS: IMPLIKASI TERHADAP ESKALASI KONFLIK RUSIA-UKRAINA
Keywords:
conflict escalation, geopolitics, Russia-Ukraine conflict, separatist groups, donbas region
Abstract
This study analyzes the dynamics of separatist groups in the Donbas region, influenced by ethnic and linguistic factors, and their implications for the escalation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Using a qualitative approach and desk research within a neorealist theoretical framework, this study explores how Russia's military, economic, and political support transformed these separatists into effective actors. This also forms part of Russia's geopolitical strategy against NATO and EU expansion. Donbas separatist groups function as Russia's proxies and political tools, creating a conflict zone that prolongs regional instability. This support exacerbates tensions and hinders diplomatic efforts. This research concludes that Donbas separatists are geopolitical instruments significantly prolonging the conflict, impeding peaceful resolution, and worsening Russia's relations with the West
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References
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Kuczyński, G. (2018, Maret 30). Putin’s Invisible Army [Online]. Retrieved from THE WARSAW INSTITUTE REVIEW: https://warsawinstitute.org/putins-invisible-army/
Martin, P. (2024, 25 Januari). Putin’s Disinformation Push Targets Developing Nations, Sweden Says [Online].Retrieved from Bloomberg: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-25/putin-s-disinformation-push-focuses-on-global-south-sweden-says
Berezhnaya, L., & Hein-Kircher, H. (2019). RAMPART NATIONS: Bulwark Myths of East European Multiconfessional Societies in the Age of Nationalism. Brooklyn: Berghahn Books.
Giuliano, E. (2018). Who supported separatism in Donbas? Ethnicity and popular opinion at the start of the Ukraine crisis. Post-Soviet Affair, 1-3.
Matveeva, A. (2022). Donbas: the post-Soviet conflict that changed Europe. European Politics and Society, 410-413.
Galeotti, M. (2015). ‘Hybrid War’ and ‘Little Green Men’: How It Works, and How It Doesn’t. E-International Relations, 156-164.
Izzuddin, A. (2022). ANALISIS UPAYA PENYELESAIAN KONFLIK RUSIA-UKRAINA TAHUN 2022. Jurnal Pena Wimaya, 2-5.
Syahbuddin. (2022). Kompleksitas Konflik Ukraina-Rusia. Jurnal Pendidikan IPS, 41-42.
Nurkhasan, W. A., & Harini, S. (2023). SEPARATIS LUHANKS DAN DONETS DI UKRAINA PADA TAHUN 2022. Jurnal Solidaritas FISIP UNISRI, 1-18.
Pratama, T. A., & Zulha, M. A. (2023). Relevansi Rusia dan Turki Pada Konflik Armenia-Azerbaijan di Wilayah Nagorno-Karabakh. Jurnal Ilmiah Wahana Pendidikan, 349-357.
Syahdani, M. (2024). NEOREALISM AND DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION IN RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR: A MORE CYNICAL PERSPECTIVE TOWARDS UNJUST WAR? BHUVANA: Journal of Global Studies, 126-127.
Saeri, M. (2023). KONFLIK RUSIA-UKRAINA TAHUN 2014-2022. Jurnal Dinamika Global , 319-332.
Wilson, A. (1995). The Donbas between Ukraine and Russia: The Use of History in Political Disputes. Journal of Contempory History, 265-289.
Mbah, R. E. (2022). Russian-Ukraine 2022 War: A Review of the Economic Impact of Russian-Ukraine Crisis on the USA, UK, Canada, and Europe. Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, 144-153.
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Katchanovski, I. (2016). The Separatist War in Donbas: A Violent Break-Up of Ukraine? European Politics and Society, 473-489.
Malik, M. A. (2023). Hubungan Rusia-Ukraine Pasca Keruntuhan Kesatuan Soviet: Dari Perselisihan Kecil Ke Kancah Perang. SINERGI: Journal of Strategic & Internasional, 67-85.
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Bowen, A. S. (2019). Coercive diplomacy and the Donbas: Explaining Russian strategy in Eastern Ukraine. Journal of Strategic Studies, 1-24.
Driedger, J. J. (2023). Risk acceptance and offensive war: The case of Russia under the Putin regime. Contemporary Security Policy, 199-125.
Juneau, T. (2024). How War in Yemen Transformed the Iran-Houthi Partnership. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 278-300.
Idris, F. N. (2023). SANKSI UNI EROPA TERHADAP RUSIA ATAS PELANGGARAN TERITORIAL UKRAINA: PENDEKATAN MULTI-TUJUAN. Jurnal Dinamika Global, 16-34.
Klepárník, V. (2023). From Donbas Conflict to the Russian-Ukrainian War. A Review of Literature. Czech Journal of Intenational Relation , 103-128.
Perepelytsia, H. (2022). Settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict on the Donbas in the Focus of the Problem of War and Peace. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 21-45.
Potočňák, A. (2023). Donbas Conflict: How Russia’s Trojan Horse Failed and Forced Moscow to Alter Its Strategy. Problems of Post-Communism, 341-351.
Kazdobina, J. (2024). Why the Donbas War Was Never “Civil”. Stockholm Centre For Eastern European Studies, 2-12.
Hitman, G. (2020). From separatism to violence: A typology of interactions between the citizen and the state establishment. Cogent Social Sciences, 1-14.
Lewis, J. S. (2022). What drives support for separatism? Exposure to conflict and relative ethnic size in Biafra, Nigeria. Nations and Nationalism, 1228-1252.
Germann, M., & Sambanis, N. (2020). Political Exclusion, Lost Autonomy, and Escalating Conflict over Self-Determination. International Organization, 178-203.
Lele, G. (2020). Asymmetric decentralization, accommodation and separatist conflict: lessons from Aceh and Papua, Indonesia . Territory, Politics, Governance, 972-990.
Gusarov, S. M., Zolotar, O., Belanuk, M., & Svyrydova, L. V. (2020). Legal Principles of Opposition to Separatism in the Modern State. Revista Amazonia Investiga, 29-36.
Emamifar, A., Sazmand, B., & Falatri, M. M. (2023). Enhancing neorealism: Lessons from India-Russia defense cooperation for Iran in the aftermath of the 2014 Russo-Ukraine conflict. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 1-18.
Nuruzzaman, Mohammed;. (2021). Does realism explain the Arab Spring? Neorealist alliance formation theories and the Syrian civil war. International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, 1-23.
German, M., & Tan, T. (2021). Understanding Russian and Turkish State-National Interests in the Syrian Conflict through the Neo-Realism Paradigm. Open Journal of Political Science, 706-720.
Bowen, A. S. (2019). Coercive diplomacy and the Donbas: Explaining Russian strategy in Eastern Ukraine. Journal of Strategic Studies, 42(3-4), 312-335.
Donahue, P. (2024). Why Did Russia Invade Ukraine? Understanding the Roots of the War. Bloomberg. Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com
Galeotti, M. (2015). ‘Hybrid War’ and ‘Little Green Men’: How It Works, and How It Doesn’t. E-International Relations, 156-164
Giuliano, E. (2018). Who supported separatism in Donbas? Ethnicity and popular opinion at the start of the Ukraine crisis. Post-Soviet Affairs, 34(2-3), 158-178.
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UNIAN. (2015, June 08). Kyiv Says 42,500 Rebels, Russian Soldiers Stationed In East Ukraine [Online]. Retrieved from Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty: https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russian-troops-fighting-poltorak/27059578.html
Kravhenko, S. (2015, Septemebr 16). The Central Bank With No Currency, No Interest Rates, But ATMs [Online]. Retrieved from Bloomberg: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-15/the-central-bank-with-no-currency-no-interest-rates-but-atms
Jack, V. (2022, February 22). Putin recognizes separatist claims to Ukraine’s entire Donbass region [Online]. Retrieved from POLITICO: https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-russia-ukraine-donbass-separatist-recognition/
Donahue, P. (2024, February 9). Why Did Russia Invade Ukraine? Understanding the Roots of the War [Online]. Retrieved from Bloomberg: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-09/why-did-russia-invade-ukraine-understanding-the-roots-of-the-war
Grove, T. (2014, Agustus 16). Russia sending 30 tanks and 1,200 fighters, says Ukraine rebel leader [Online].Retrieved from The Christian Science Monitor: https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/2014/0816/Russia-sending-30-tanks-and-1-200-fighters-says-Ukraine-rebel-leader?
Thompson, A. S., & Alba, D. (2022, Maret 3). Fact and Mythmaking Blend in Ukraine’s Information War [Online]. Retrieved from The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/03/technology/ukraine-war-misinfo.html
TBorger, J. (2022, Maret 16). UN international court of justice orders Russia to halt invasion of Ukraine [Online]. Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/16/un-international-court-of-justice-orders-russia-to-halt-invasion-of-ukraine
Sauer, P. (2024, November 1). ‘It’s better not to try our luck again’: how Russia’s wars left deep scars in Georgia and Moldova [Online].Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/01/russia-wars-georgia-moldova-europe-voters-closer-ties-moscow?
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Kuczyński, G. (2018, Maret 30). Putin’s Invisible Army [Online]. Retrieved from THE WARSAW INSTITUTE REVIEW: https://warsawinstitute.org/putins-invisible-army/
Martin, P. (2024, 25 Januari). Putin’s Disinformation Push Targets Developing Nations, Sweden Says [Online].Retrieved from Bloomberg: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-25/putin-s-disinformation-push-focuses-on-global-south-sweden-says
Berezhnaya, L., & Hein-Kircher, H. (2019). RAMPART NATIONS: Bulwark Myths of East European Multiconfessional Societies in the Age of Nationalism. Brooklyn: Berghahn Books.
OHCHR. (2023, April 10). Ukraine: civilian casualty update 10 April 2023 [Online]. Retrieved from ohchr.org: https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2023/04/ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-10-april-2023
Council Of Europe. (2019). CDL-AD(2019)032-e Ukraine - Opinion on the Law on Supporting the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 121st Plenary Session (Venice, 6-7 December 2019) [Online]. Venice: Venice Commission.
UNIAN. (2015, June 08). Kyiv Says 42,500 Rebels, Russian Soldiers Stationed In East Ukraine [Online]. Retrieved from Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty: https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russian-troops-fighting-poltorak/27059578.html
Kravhenko, S. (2015, Septemebr 16). The Central Bank With No Currency, No Interest Rates, But ATMs [Online]. Retrieved from Bloomberg: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-15/the-central-bank-with-no-currency-no-interest-rates-but-atms
Jack, V. (2022, February 22). Putin recognizes separatist claims to Ukraine’s entire Donbass region [Online]. Retrieved from POLITICO: https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-russia-ukraine-donbass-separatist-recognition/
Donahue, P. (2024, February 9). Why Did Russia Invade Ukraine? Understanding the Roots of the War [Online]. Retrieved from Bloomberg: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-09/why-did-russia-invade-ukraine-understanding-the-roots-of-the-war
Grove, T. (2014, Agustus 16). Russia sending 30 tanks and 1,200 fighters, says Ukraine rebel leader [Online].Retrieved from The Christian Science Monitor: https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/2014/0816/Russia-sending-30-tanks-and-1-200-fighters-says-Ukraine-rebel-leader?
Thompson, A. S., & Alba, D. (2022, Maret 3). Fact and Mythmaking Blend in Ukraine’s Information War [Online]. Retrieved from The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/03/technology/ukraine-war-misinfo.html
TBorger, J. (2022, Maret 16). UN international court of justice orders Russia to halt invasion of Ukraine [Online]. Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/16/un-international-court-of-justice-orders-russia-to-halt-invasion-of-ukraine
Sauer, P. (2024, November 1). ‘It’s better not to try our luck again’: how Russia’s wars left deep scars in Georgia and Moldova [Online].Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/01/russia-wars-georgia-moldova-europe-voters-closer-ties-moscow?
Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2025, Februari 3). Why did Vladimir Putin invade Ukraine in 2022? [Online].Retrieved from Britannica: https://www.britannica.com/question/Why-did-Vladimir-Putin-invade-Ukraine-in-2022?
Kuczyński, G. (2018, Maret 30). Putin’s Invisible Army [Online]. Retrieved from THE WARSAW INSTITUTE REVIEW: https://warsawinstitute.org/putins-invisible-army/
Martin, P. (2024, 25 Januari). Putin’s Disinformation Push Targets Developing Nations, Sweden Says [Online].Retrieved from Bloomberg: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-25/putin-s-disinformation-push-focuses-on-global-south-sweden-says
Berezhnaya, L., & Hein-Kircher, H. (2019). RAMPART NATIONS: Bulwark Myths of East European Multiconfessional Societies in the Age of Nationalism. Brooklyn: Berghahn Books.
Giuliano, E. (2018). Who supported separatism in Donbas? Ethnicity and popular opinion at the start of the Ukraine crisis. Post-Soviet Affair, 1-3.
Matveeva, A. (2022). Donbas: the post-Soviet conflict that changed Europe. European Politics and Society, 410-413.
Galeotti, M. (2015). ‘Hybrid War’ and ‘Little Green Men’: How It Works, and How It Doesn’t. E-International Relations, 156-164.
Izzuddin, A. (2022). ANALISIS UPAYA PENYELESAIAN KONFLIK RUSIA-UKRAINA TAHUN 2022. Jurnal Pena Wimaya, 2-5.
Syahbuddin. (2022). Kompleksitas Konflik Ukraina-Rusia. Jurnal Pendidikan IPS, 41-42.
Nurkhasan, W. A., & Harini, S. (2023). SEPARATIS LUHANKS DAN DONETS DI UKRAINA PADA TAHUN 2022. Jurnal Solidaritas FISIP UNISRI, 1-18.
Pratama, T. A., & Zulha, M. A. (2023). Relevansi Rusia dan Turki Pada Konflik Armenia-Azerbaijan di Wilayah Nagorno-Karabakh. Jurnal Ilmiah Wahana Pendidikan, 349-357.
Syahdani, M. (2024). NEOREALISM AND DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION IN RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR: A MORE CYNICAL PERSPECTIVE TOWARDS UNJUST WAR? BHUVANA: Journal of Global Studies, 126-127.
Saeri, M. (2023). KONFLIK RUSIA-UKRAINA TAHUN 2014-2022. Jurnal Dinamika Global , 319-332.
Wilson, A. (1995). The Donbas between Ukraine and Russia: The Use of History in Political Disputes. Journal of Contempory History, 265-289.
Mbah, R. E. (2022). Russian-Ukraine 2022 War: A Review of the Economic Impact of Russian-Ukraine Crisis on the USA, UK, Canada, and Europe. Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, 144-153.
Parawita, A. (2025). Konflik Rusia-Ukraina (Sejarah, Resolusi, serta Manajemen Konflik). Jurnal Riset Ilmu Manajemen dan Kewirausahaan, 147-161.
Katchanovski, I. (2016). The Separatist War in Donbas: A Violent Break-Up of Ukraine? European Politics and Society, 473-489.
Malik, M. A. (2023). Hubungan Rusia-Ukraine Pasca Keruntuhan Kesatuan Soviet: Dari Perselisihan Kecil Ke Kancah Perang. SINERGI: Journal of Strategic & Internasional, 67-85.
Revilia, R. (2022). KEPENTINGAN RUSIA DI TENGAH KONFLIK SIPIL NEGARA UKRAINA DENGAN PEMERINTAHAN SEPARATIS WILAYAH DONETSK. Jurnal Hubungan Internasional Indonesia, 13-30.
Bowen, A. S. (2019). Coercive diplomacy and the Donbas: Explaining Russian strategy in Eastern Ukraine. Journal of Strategic Studies, 1-24.
Driedger, J. J. (2023). Risk acceptance and offensive war: The case of Russia under the Putin regime. Contemporary Security Policy, 199-125.
Juneau, T. (2024). How War in Yemen Transformed the Iran-Houthi Partnership. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 278-300.
Idris, F. N. (2023). SANKSI UNI EROPA TERHADAP RUSIA ATAS PELANGGARAN TERITORIAL UKRAINA: PENDEKATAN MULTI-TUJUAN. Jurnal Dinamika Global, 16-34.
Klepárník, V. (2023). From Donbas Conflict to the Russian-Ukrainian War. A Review of Literature. Czech Journal of Intenational Relation , 103-128.
Perepelytsia, H. (2022). Settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict on the Donbas in the Focus of the Problem of War and Peace. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 21-45.
Potočňák, A. (2023). Donbas Conflict: How Russia’s Trojan Horse Failed and Forced Moscow to Alter Its Strategy. Problems of Post-Communism, 341-351.
Kazdobina, J. (2024). Why the Donbas War Was Never “Civil”. Stockholm Centre For Eastern European Studies, 2-12.
Hitman, G. (2020). From separatism to violence: A typology of interactions between the citizen and the state establishment. Cogent Social Sciences, 1-14.
Lewis, J. S. (2022). What drives support for separatism? Exposure to conflict and relative ethnic size in Biafra, Nigeria. Nations and Nationalism, 1228-1252.
Germann, M., & Sambanis, N. (2020). Political Exclusion, Lost Autonomy, and Escalating Conflict over Self-Determination. International Organization, 178-203.
Lele, G. (2020). Asymmetric decentralization, accommodation and separatist conflict: lessons from Aceh and Papua, Indonesia . Territory, Politics, Governance, 972-990.
Gusarov, S. M., Zolotar, O., Belanuk, M., & Svyrydova, L. V. (2020). Legal Principles of Opposition to Separatism in the Modern State. Revista Amazonia Investiga, 29-36.
Emamifar, A., Sazmand, B., & Falatri, M. M. (2023). Enhancing neorealism: Lessons from India-Russia defense cooperation for Iran in the aftermath of the 2014 Russo-Ukraine conflict. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 1-18.
Nuruzzaman, Mohammed;. (2021). Does realism explain the Arab Spring? Neorealist alliance formation theories and the Syrian civil war. International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, 1-23.
German, M., & Tan, T. (2021). Understanding Russian and Turkish State-National Interests in the Syrian Conflict through the Neo-Realism Paradigm. Open Journal of Political Science, 706-720.
Bowen, A. S. (2019). Coercive diplomacy and the Donbas: Explaining Russian strategy in Eastern Ukraine. Journal of Strategic Studies, 42(3-4), 312-335.
Donahue, P. (2024). Why Did Russia Invade Ukraine? Understanding the Roots of the War. Bloomberg. Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com
Galeotti, M. (2015). ‘Hybrid War’ and ‘Little Green Men’: How It Works, and How It Doesn’t. E-International Relations, 156-164
Giuliano, E. (2018). Who supported separatism in Donbas? Ethnicity and popular opinion at the start of the Ukraine crisis. Post-Soviet Affairs, 34(2-3), 158-178.
Mbah, R. E. (2022). Russian-Ukraine 2022 War: A Review of the Economic Impact of Russian-Ukraine Crisis on the USA, UK, Canada, and Europe. Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, 9(3), 144-153.
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Published
2025-08-05
How to Cite
Kamurahang, P., & Mahdi , I. (2025). DINAMIKA KELOMPOK SEPARATIS DONBAS: IMPLIKASI TERHADAP ESKALASI KONFLIK RUSIA-UKRAINA . Indonesian Journal of International Relations, 9(2), 370-386. https://doi.org/10.32787/ijir.v9i2.705
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